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ABSTRACT 
 
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
THE PLANNING, DESIGN AND RECEPTION OF BRITISH HOME FRONT 
PROPAGANDA POSTERS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
 
by Rebecca Mary Lewis 
 
This thesis has been completed as a requirement for a higher degree of the University 
of Southampton 
 
This project focuses on propaganda posters produced during the Second World War (1939 
to 1945), primarily by the British government, aimed chiefly at their civilian population. 
The project uses Foucauldian discourse analysis and content analysis to investigate the 
images and their context, and identify key themes across a wide range of posters, over a 
long time-frame. This thesis contributes to an historical understanding of the British 
popular propaganda experience, largely ignored in previous historical research. 
 
 Drawing on material from several archives, including the Imperial War Museum (IWM), 
the Public Record Office (PRO) and Mass-Observation (M-O), the project also uses 
questionnaires to elicit memories of the posters, and a poster database to collect together 
material which would otherwise remain dispersed. The thesis sets the posters against a 
background of contextual material, it identifies key propaganda theories, discerns relevant 
poster styles and recognises British poster style as one of pragmatic functionalism. The 
thesis outlines the poster production and distribution processes of the Ministry of 
Information (MOI) and considers the first (highly criticised) posters before concentrating 
on four case studies, each of which is structured in three sections: the planning (context), 
the design, and the reception of the posters. 
 
 The first case study examines what people were fighting for, and identifies their ‘imagined 
community’, by considering urban and rural representations of the UK in the posters. The 
second case study considers industrial propaganda, emphasises the idea of the island 
nation, and identifies those involved in the industrial effort. The third case study looks at 
the ‘enemy within’, and examines who was excluded from, or was considered damaging to, 
the war effort. The fourth case study explores in detail who was compromising the war 
effort through their sexual behaviour, putting themselves at risk of venereal disease. The 
thesis argues that the posters drew heavily on longer term discourses emanating from new 
and established institutions, although there was often a clear distinction between those that 
drew on the past and tradition, and those that pushed forward to the future. 
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Introduction 
Using a mixture of content analysis and Foucauldian concepts of discourse analysis, this 
project investigates the propaganda posters produced by the British government, largely for 
the British home front, during the years 1939 to 1945, the span of the Second World War. 
The initial chapters set the context. The first describes the sources and methods used in the 
project. The second investigates contemporary understandings of propaganda and the 
design history of the modern pictorial poster. The third considers the process by which 
posters were commissioned, designed and produced, particularly by the Ministry of 
Information (MOI). Through four case studies the project then considers the planning 
decisions taken by the government, the design of the posters themselves, and evidence of 
the reception of posters. The Introduction chapter details the aims of the project, explains 
the relevance of the project at this time, and considers current interest in ‘the planning, 
design and reception of British Home Front propaganda posters of the Second World War’, 
historical, theoretical and personal. The concepts of ‘propaganda’ and ‘poster’ are 
considered, as well as reflections on the place of the poster in relation to other media 
available throughout the war. In the process, the Introduction covers the key literature 
pertinent to the project. It concludes with an outline of the layout of the thesis. 
 
The project aims to understand the production processes of government home front 
posters. With the MOI at the centre of this process, the project explores the government’s 
role in relation to posters, its interaction with other government departments, and relations 
with external agencies. The case studies use a Foucauldian frame to establish the longer 
term discourses on which the posters were drawing, discourses which were used because of 
the common frames of reference, shared with their target audience, on which poster 
designers drew. The case studies are framed by a knowledge of the general reasons for 
propaganda, identified by scholars of propaganda, in particular persuasion, education, 
information, celebration, encouragement, morale boosting, and identification of enemies. 
The case studies are also informed by a knowledge of the general techniques of propaganda, 
in particular the appeal to the emotions of hatred, fear, anger, guilt, greed, hope and love. 
Contemporary models of propaganda are assessed critically in relation to the posters studied. 
In the conclusion, the project produces a model which demonstrates how the posters fitted in 
to a larger framework. This enables us to understand where the government ranked posters 
in relation to other media, and to see where they fitted, for example, in the legislative 
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structure. The artistic approach to posters is not the key element of the study. Nevertheless it 
has been deemed important to identify and analyse the influence of trends and technologies 
from art and design on British posters, particularly official posters. This allows us to see 
what design styles were available to the government, whether they put them to use, and what 
discourses the styles used embodied. The project also analyses the reception of the 
propaganda posters at the time, in so far as this is possible. In particular, it will look at 
whether they were more positively received at the time than as remembered by a 
questionnaire respondent:  
At the risk of being labelled conceited I would say that thanks to a decent education 
and being employed in a Government establishment (and with at least a modicum 
of common-sense) I did not need the messages of the posters. Perhaps this is why I 
don’t remember them very well.1 
 
The subject of ‘The planning, design and reception of British Home Front propaganda 
posters of the Second World War’ is still a pertinent subject of research, nearly seventy 
years after the war ended, and we have to question why. The scope of historiography 
widened considerably during the twentieth century from a heavy concentration on political 
events, to a broader appreciation of economic, social, cultural, intellectual, and 
psychological aspects. Historians have recognised since the 1960s that ‘history from 
below’ is as important as studies of the great political figures of history.2 Tosh claims that 
history is ‘collective memory, the storehouse of experience through which people develop 
a sense of their social identity and their future prospects’.3 Barraclough asserts that the 
‘boundary line between contemporary and past society is tenuous, shifting and artificial’,4 
and Mauro even goes so far as to say that history is ‘the projection of the social sciences 
                                                 
1
 Male, East Sussex, reply to questionnaire, May 1998. Briggs, A., Go To It! Working for Victory of the 
Home Front 1939-1945, 2000, p.13 notes that the posters provided a colourful change from the monochrome 
monotony that accompanied much war work. 
2
 Nationmaster, ‘History from below’, http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/History-from-below, last 
updated December 24 2003, accessed January 11 2004, notes: ‘History from below is a form of historical 
narrative which was developed as a result of the Annales School and popularised in the nineteen-sixties. This 
form of social history focuses on the perspectives of regular individuals within society as well as individuals 
and regions that were not previously considered historically important.’ The phrase was first popularised by 
E.P.Thompson in an article in the Times Literary Supplement in 1966. 
3
 Tosh, J., The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods & New Directions in the Study of Modern History, 1991 
(Second Edition), p.1. Tosh, J., The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods & New Directions in the Study of 
Modern History, 2002 (Third Edition, Revised), p.1 rephrases this as: ‘All societies have a collective 
memory, a storehouse of experience which is drawn on for a sense of identity and a sense of direction’. At 
first glance this appears to make the same point, but is no longer noting that this is history, making the further 
point that ‘professional historians commonly deplore the superficiality of popular historical knowledge’. 
4
 Barraclough, G., Main Trends in History, 1978, p.49.  
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into the past’.5 He claims that historians have tended to look for a ‘uniqueness’ in their 
facts, whereas the influence of sociology has led to more interest in understanding the 
‘norm’.6 The links with sociologists have cleared the way to study the ‘underlying 
framework’ of society, including more of a concern with structural patterns of such issues 
as the family and social class, rather than simple causal links to specific events.7 
 
It has thus been recognised that society is not simply a backdrop, but worth studying for 
itself. A wide variety of sources are now available in a variety of archives, and digitisation 
projects are improving public access to previously inaccessible sources.8 With the face of 
history changing over the past few decades, particularly with an increase in interest in 
social and family history, there are now a perplexing number of avenues for the historian to 
go down, and consequently a wide-ranging and bewildering array of sources. It is our job, 
as historians, to assess the sources available and consider their relative importance and the 
methodologies required in order to use them, with the value of a source defined by the 
topic under consideration. Subjects such as psychology and sociology have influenced 
historical study for some time, and have changed the way we view the importance of some 
sources.9 Take Marwick’s example of a chocolate wrapper: he considers that, to the general 
historian, this is largely an insignificant source compared with other sources available, yet 
to the historian of the chocolate industry, or of design, it may be an essential source.10 We 
would argue that the value of the chocolate wrapper as a historical source is far more 
valuable than this: as an ephemeral item, amongst other examples, it gives us evidence of 
eating habits, consumerism, and health concerns.11 Unlike a medieval historian who has to 
scratch around for scraps of information, the contemporary historian is overwhelmed by 
the sheer amount of information available, and has to make some tough decisions as to 
how to process the plethora of available material. The use of sources for this project is 
discussed in the next chapter on Methods and Sources. 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., p.63, quoting Frederic Mauro. 
6
 Ibid., p.53. 
7
 Ibid., p.54. Tosh, J., op.cit., 2002, p.128 also refers to the ‘social structure’ which social historians now 
make efforts to understand. 
8
 Imperial War Museum (IWM), ‘Posters of Conflict’, http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/art/posters4.htm, 
accessed January 10 2004, details ‘Posters of Conflict’, a highly relevant digitisation project at the IWM. The 
project aims to digitise 10,000 posters, and provide them online at AHDS Visual Arts, ‘ahds visual arts’, 
http://vads.ahds.ac.uk by the end of 2006, with the first 2,000 posters expected online in May 2004. 
9
 See, for instance, Izenberg, G.N., ‘Text, Context and Psychology in Intellectual History’, in Kozicki, H. 
(eds) Developments in Modem Historiography, 1993 pp.40-62 and Jordanova, L., History in Practice, 2000, 
pp.67-71. 
10
 Marwick, A., The Nature of History, 1989 (Third Edition), p.211. 
11
 For example, the growth of concerns with health led to the placing of calorific and nutritional values of 
foodstuffs on British food packaging, something tha
  4
 
Despite this growing awareness of different sources, however, the existing historiography 
has not devoted much time to posters. Amongst an abundance of studies on the Second 
World War, posters, and propaganda, there is little that focuses on the British propaganda 
poster effort. The Second World War has assumed a quality of myth, and both academic 
and nostalgic interest has been attracted.12 Posters can make for beautiful illustrations, and 
there are vast numbers of non-academic books available on the subject.13 Some academic 
texts are also available,14 although few of these are on British posters, and are more often 
on propaganda in general.15 British home front posters are often used as illustrations in 
general texts on the Second World War, although the accuracy of information provided can 
sometimes be questioned.16 Posters have made appearances in various exhibitions, which 
has stimulated further interest in the subject.17 The timing of such exhibitions, in the 
1930s,18 1970s,19 1990s,20 and into the twenty-first century,21 needs to be explored, as we 
need to question why there was believed to be a market, with commercial returns, for such 
exhibitions at such times. As an example, the 1998 ‘Power of the Poster’ exhibition at the 
                                                 
12
 For instance, general histories such as Briggs, A., op.cit., 2000; Briggs, S., Keep Smiling Through, 1975; 
Davies, J., The Wartime Kitchen and Garden: The Home Front 1939-45, 1993; Marwick, A., The Home 
Front: Britain and the Second World War, 1978 (Second Edition); Minns, R., Bombers and Mash, 1980; 
Morgan, K., The People’s Peace: British History Since 1945, 1999 (Second Edition); and Pike, A. and Pike, 
A., The Home Front in Britain 1939-45, 1985. 
13
 For general histories of the poster, consider Barnicoat, J., A Concise History of Posters, 1972; Gallo, M. 
Posters in History, 1989; Hillier, B., Posters, 1969; Hutchinson, H., The Poster: An Illustrated History, 1968; 
Metzl, E., The Poster: Its History and Its Art, 1962; Rickards, M., The Rise and Fall of The Poster, 1971; 
Rossi, A., Posters, 1969; Timmers, M. (ed.), The Power of the Poster, 1998; and Weill, A., The Poster: A 
Worldwide Survey and History, 1985. Some of these do have an academic slant. For a specifically British 
history see Elvin, R., ‘100 years of British Poster Design’, Art and Industry, Vol. 50, No.299-300, May-June 
1951, pp.162-175. 
14
 For instance, see Aulich, J. & Sylvestrova, M., Political Posters in Central and Eastern Europe 1945-95, 
1999; Bonnell, V.E, Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin, 1997; 
Landsberger, S., Chinese Propaganda Posters, 1995; and Mace, R., British Trade Union Posters: An 
Illustrated History, 1999.  
15
 See page 9 for examples of academic studies on propaganda, concentrating on the overseas effort. 
16
 For example, see Campbell, J. (ed.), The Experience of World War II, 1989; Freeman, R.A., Britain at 
War, 1990; Healey, T., Life on the Home Front, 1993, and Minns, R., op.cit., 1980; Mercer, D., (ed.), 
Chronicle of the Second World War, 1990, although presented in date format, evidently used posters as 
convenient illustrations, rather than in a strict chronological sense. 
17
 Examples of books produced about the time of ‘The Power of the Poster Exhibition’, aside from the 
official text: Timmers, M. (ed.), op.cit., 1998, are: Bernstein, D., Advertising Outdoor: Watch This Space!, 
1997; Bonnell, V.E., op.cit., 1997; Heyman, T., Posters American Style 1998; and Sproule, J.M., 
Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion, 1997. 
18
 A major poster exhibition was held at the V&A in 1931. 
19
 A major exhibition on war posters was held at the IWM in 1972, as the result of which Darracott, J., and 
Loftus, B. (eds), Second World War Posters, 1972, was published.  
20
 A major poster exhibition, ‘The Power of the Poster’ was held at the V&A in 1998. In the same year, a 
major touring exhibition, ‘Posters American Style’, was also held in America. 
21
 In 2001, the IWM held a small poster exhibition, ‘Symbols and Stereotypes’. ‘Rene Wanner’s Poster Page’ 
has kept international Internet visitors up to date with exhibitions since 1997. Details of past exhibitions are 
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Victoria and Albert Museum (V&A) was particularly important at a time when the UK’s 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was attempting to re-brand the UK as ‘Cool Britannia’. Posters 
from an earlier era demonstrate some of the ways in which ‘national projection’ was 
achieved before.22 A major reason for the 1998 V&A exhibition was the revival in the use 
of posters by advertisers, with seventy-five per cent using posters as a medium in 1998, as 
opposed to thirty-five per cent in 1991.23 Alongside these texts there is a growing range of 
documentation on the internet, of which the quality can sometimes be questionable.24 So 
long as authors’ credentials for authority on a topic are assessed, useful information and 
images can be garnered, and a wider range of quality sites is becoming more easily 
available.25 
 
Often general poster histories cover the history of the poster before and after the Second 
World War, but pass quickly over the war period itself.26 An exception is the 100 Best 
Posters of the Century, which awards government posters of the Second World War six 
entries on merit alone.27 Moody, keen to see an academic study of wartime posters, 
commented that many have perceived the subject as being ‘too large’ to tackle.28 Rossi is 
evidence of the truth of this comment, claiming that his general history of posters cannot 
adequately deal with war posters: being so numerous, they require a separate study.29 Yet 
                                                                                                                                                    
accessible through Wanner, R., ‘Rene Wanner’s Poster Page/Archive’, 
http://www.posterpage.ch/div/archive/archive.htm, last updated January 10 2004, accessed January 11 2004 
22
 Tames, R., ‘Poster Power at the V&A’, History Today, April 1998, p.32. 
23
 Cook, R., ‘The Writing’s on the Wall’, The Independent, April 6 1998, p.6. 
24
 For example, EarthStation1.com, ‘EarthStation1.com - The Poster Prop Page - Pictures of Propaganda 
Posters of WWI, WWII & More’, http://www.earthstation1.com/warpostr.html, accessed August 10 2001; 
Postergirls of WW2, Anonymous, ‘Poster Girls of World War II’, 
http://www.geocities.com/queenknuckles/postergirls.htm, accessed January 17 2004; and Carrothers, B., 
‘World War Two Posters’, http://bridgeboymusic.com/billyboy/posters.htm, accessed August 10 2001. All 
use several wartime posters with little or no discussion. Such sites tend to be based on general knowledge and 
enthusiasion, in some cases posters are simply used for their attractiveness. 
25
 For example, Smithsonian American Art Museum, ‘SAAM: Posters American Style: Menu’, http://nmaa-
ryder.si.edu/collections/exhibits/posters/mainmenu.html, accessed August 10 2001; Landsberger, S., ‘Stefan 
Landsberger’s Chinese Propaganda Poster Pages’, http://www.iisg.nl/~landsberger, accessed August 10 
2001, and Wanner, R., ‘Rene Wanner’s Poster Page’ http://www.posterpage.ch, accessed August 10 2001, all 
deal with the ideology of the posters in sections of their sites. Even sales sites such as International Poster 
Gallery, ‘vintage posters - International Poster Gallery’, http://www.internationalposter.com/home.cfm, 
accessed August 10 2001, provide a lot of useful background information. Academics often have little 
knowledge of HTML procedures, and therefore many do not realise that they are under-selling themselves on 
the Internet, as the lack of META tags means that such web pages do not rank highly in search engines, and 
are therefore difficult to find, although this situation is improving. 
26
 For example, Rossi, A., op.cit., 1969, appears to consider any wartime posters of very little significance to 
the development of poster history, and jumps straight from the nineteen-thirties to ‘after the Second World 
War’. 
27
 Taylor, T. (ed), The 100 Best Posters of the Century, 1999. The book did not choose the one best poster per 
year, but chose posters over the whole period on ‘merit’ alone. 
28
 Moody, M., Research and Information Officer, Department of Art, IWM. Personal Comment, June 1999. 
29
 Rossi, A., op.cit., 1969, p.143. 
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we cannot ignore a subject simply because it is perceived to be too vast: although it may 
mean that the topic can be tackled only from one angle at a time, there is surely even more 
of a justification for studying it. Second World War posters have been studied by a few 
authors, including Zeman30 and Rhodes,31 although even these are contained within more 
general propaganda histories, with black propaganda considered by Boehm.32 Many 
general texts that deal with wartime Britain also consider British propaganda including 
Cantwell, who deals specifically with British posters,33 and Osley34, Yass35 and Begley,36 
who consider posters alongside other propaganda materials produced by the government. 
Part of the problem is that although the materials have been preserved, accessing them is 
difficult and a deterrent to would-be users. Attempts have been, and are being, made to use 
the materials through research projects on the subject of British wartime posters.37 
 
The popularity of these books, exhibitions and internet sites demonstrates the nostalgic 
interest the general public has in posters. As ephemeral objects, posters often bring back 
memories of contemporary commodities, and associations with events around the time that 
they were produced. As Smith aptly suggests ‘the war permeated our lives, even though we 
[those born after the 1940s] never saw a bomber or heard a siren’. The Second World War 
is a part of British cultural history, arising from the ‘mythical’ experience of the ‘people’s 
war’, a time when it is commonly believed that all ‘pulled together’ in the name of 
victory.38 The idea of the ‘people’s war’ was a contemporary wartime phrase, a ‘potentially 
inclusive, democratic sentiment’,39 one that has been popularised amongst post-war 
                                                 
30
 Zeman, Z., Selling the War: Art and Propaganda in World War II, 1978. 
31
 Rhodes, A., Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion: World War II: An Allied and Axis Visual Record, 1933-
1945, 1975. 
32
 Boehm, E., Behind Enemy Lines: WWII Allied/Axis Propaganda, 1989. 
33
 Cantwell, J., Images of War: British Posters 1939-45, 1989; See also Opie, R. The Wartime Scrapbook, 
1998. 
34
 Osley, A., Persuading the People: Government Publicity in the Second World War, 1995. 
35
 Yass, M., This is Your War: Home front Propaganda in the Second World War, 1983. 
36
 Begley, G., Keep Mum: Advertising Goes to War, 1975. 
37
 Rennie, P., ‘An investigation into the design, production and display contexts of industrial safety posters 
produced by the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents during WW2’, PhD submitted January 2004: 
London School of Printing, considers the posters from a historical viewpoint, but with particular reference to 
printing and graphic design. Previous projects include: Fisher, S. J., ‘The blitz and the bomber offensive: a 
case study in British home propaganda, 1939-45’ Univeristy of Edinburgh: Unpublished PhD, 1993; Royal, 
K., ‘Posters of the Second World War: the fourth arm of British defence’, University of Westminster: 
Unpublished MA, 1991, and Spiers, L.M., ‘An enquiry into the use of propaganda on the Home Front during 
World War Two with special reference to the role and effectiveness of the poster as a means of conveying 
Government policy’, Winchester School of Art: Unpublished MA, 1998. 
38
 Smith, M., Britain and 1940: History, Myth and Popular Memory, 2000, p.1. See also Calder, A., The 
Myth of the Blitz, 1992, and Ponting, C., 1940: Myth and Reality, 1990. 
39
 Weight, R. & Beach, A., The Right to Belong: Citizenship and National Identity in Britain, 1930-1960, 
1998, p.8. 
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generations by Calder’s The People’s War.40 Donnelly attributes to wartime propaganda 
campaigns a major responsibility for establishing this myth.41 During the war, a ‘shared 
sense of national identity had to be mobilised amongst the people of Britain’. Achieved 
partly through propaganda posters, more and more people ‘were encouraged to identify 
themselves as active citizens, as active members of the nation’, a citizenship ‘to be earned 
by communal and individual service of one’s nation in wartime’.42 With the first ‘national 
citizen army’,43 in the Second World War, notions of the ‘citizen soldier’, the good citizen 
who is also courageous, first presented by Aristotle, were used.44 The boundaries between 
the civilian and the combatant soldier were blurred during the war, with ‘propagandist 
attempts to personify the entire population as heroic’.45 Social citizenship lectures were 
presented through the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA), considered further in 
chapter four. This thesis thus also considers posters presented to soldiers on issues that 
affected them as citizens,46 although it does not address military recruitment campaigns. It 
is also outside the scope of this project to consider political, electioneering and overseas 
propaganda produced by the government or by political parties during the war. It 
concentrates solely on posters aimed at the home front, or those that affected people as 
citizens. 
 
The myth of the ‘people’s war’ is still ‘sold’ today and boosts the heritage industry, a 
multi-million pound industry for the UK.47 The posters, along with the general wartime 
                                                 
40
 Calder, A., The People’s War, 1969. 
41
 Donnelly, M., Britain in the Second World War, 1999, p.1. 
42
 Noakes, L., War and the British: Gender and National Identity, 1939-91, 1998, p.48. M-O FR 673, 
‘Saturation of Instructions: Efficacy of Government Instructions’, April 1941, p.3, noted that many 
government campaigns required ‘a considerable degree of citizen consciousness’. Oliver, D., and Heater, D., 
The Foundations of Citizenship, 1994, p.10 note that the idea of citizenship emerged in the classical Graeco-
Roman world, with the ‘idea of “civic virtue”, of being a “good” citizen’, re-emerged in the eighteenth 
century. See pp.10-30 for a historical outline leading to ideas of modern day citizenship, as taught in the 
classroom. Nicholas, S., ‘From John Bull to John Citizen: images of national identity and citizenship on the 
wartime BBC’, Weight, R. & Beach, A., op.cit., 1998, pp.39-40 notes that the concept of the ‘active citizen’ 
was little evident in interwar popular culture, but that the Second World War projected a more ‘positive 
model of patriotism and citizenship’, more ‘inclusive and participatory’. See also Morgan, D., and Evans, M., 
The Battle for Britain: Citizenship and Ideology in the Second World War, 1993. 
43
 Hopkins, H., The New Look: A Social History of the Forties and Fifties in Britain, 1964, p.20. 
44
 Oliver, D., and Heater, D., op.cit., 1994, p.119. 
45
 Paris, M., Warrior Nation: Images of War in British Popular Culture, 1850-2000, 2000, p.201. 
46
 Havinghurst, A.F., Britain in Transition: The Twentieth Century, 1985 (fourth edition), p.289, notes that 
the distinction between civilian and soldier soon lost meaning ‘for throughout the conflict the man in uniform 
and the civilian shared to a considerable degree the same experience.’ Walker, M., Unless I’m Very Much 
Mistaken: My Autobiography, 2003, p.59, the Formula 1 commentator who was a soldier during the war, and 
in the advertising industry after the war, claims: ‘I didn’t find it difficult being a civilian again because I 
guess I had always been one at heart’. 
47
 For more information on this, see Vernon. J., ‘University of California, Berkely: History 103C: syllabus’, 
http://history.berkeley.edu/faculty/Vernon/History103/h103syl.html, accessed August 10 2001, and Samuel, 
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experience, have gained mythical accretions, and most people have a knowledge of many 
of the wartime posters, as a product of the shared experience. Joke books, although they 
contain very little factual information, can be useful as they assume a shared experience of 
the war, of which posters are a part.48 The Second World War is still regarded as a defining 
moment in the history of the UK, particularly of the twentieth century. There are countless 
populist texts written on the Second World War, demonstrating the defining impact the war 
had on many lives. These can often shed light on the general wartime mood, but as these 
are often written retrospectively, the influence of nostalgia can often be felt only too 
clearly.49 We do have to question whether the Second World War will remain such a 
defining moment in history. We have now passed what some considered the defining 
landmark of the new millennium.50 Those who can personally remember the war are 
disappearing, and more recent wars and events, such as September 11 2001, have gained 
significance. As can be seen by the remembrance of past historical events such as the 
Battle of Hastings in 1066, however, 1939 and 1945 are always likely to remain important 
dates in British history, taught to new generations, as evidenced on page 241. 
 
The propaganda of the First World War has been well researched by several historians,51 
and there are also several studies of propaganda in inter-war UK. Grant considered the 
development of domestic government publicity departments,52 and Taylor53 and Black54 
                                                                                                                                                    
R., Theatres of Memory: Volume 1: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture, 1994, particularly ‘Living 
History’, pp.169-202. 
48
 Deary, T., Horrible Histories: The Twentieth Century, 1996, pp.75-6, for instance, illustrates a spoof war 
poster with the slogan ‘A Sewing Machine can be as much as weapon of war as a spade,’ and then comments 
that ‘This may be true but it is harder digging a garden with a sewing machine.’ 
49
 For instance, see: Byerly, B., and Byerly, C. (eds), Dearest Phylabe, Letters from Wartime England, 1996; 
Hillary, R., and Faulks, S., The Last Enemy, 1997; Jones, L., Contented With Time, 1992; Kelsey, M., Victory 
Harvest, 1997; Perry, C., Boy in the Blitz, 2000; and Wyndham, J., Love Lessons, 2001, to name but a few. 
See Tosh, J., op.cit., 2002, pp.17-18 for a description of nostalgia, which becomes history with ‘all its 
negative features… removed’. 
50
 This was probably more relevant for those involved in the computing industry, but others, for instance, 
Bevis Hillier suggested in 1989 in The Times that it was time to start preparing to celebrate the year 2000. 
Nicolson, A., Regeneration: The Story of the Dome, 1999, pp. 25-27 notes that the Government was 
determined to celebrate the millennium with The Millennium Dome and The London Eye, although in 
general there was at best ‘unenthusiastic millenarianism’ in the UK. Tosh, J., op.cit. 2002, pp.xii-xiii notes 
that the new millennium could have provided a ‘convenient vantage point’ to reflect on British history, but 
that ‘the public celebration of the Millennium in Britain was almost empty of historical content’.  
51
 See, for instance, Dutton, P., ‘Moving Images? The Parliamentary Recruiting Committee’s Poster 
Campaign 1914-1916’, Imperial War Museum Review, Vol. 4, 1989, pp.43-58; Hardie, M., and Sabin, A.K. 
War Posters: Issued by Belligerent and Neutral Nations 1914-1919, 1920; Haste, C., Keep the Home Fires 
Burning: Propaganda in the First World War, 1977; Messinger, G.S., British Propaganda and the State in 
the First World War, 1992; and Sanders, M.L., British Propaganda During the First World War 1914-1918, 
1982. 
52
 Grant, M., Propaganda and the Role of State in Inter-war Britain, 1994. 
53
 Taylor, P.M., The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939, 1981. 
54
 Black, J.B., Organising the Propaganda Instrument: the British Experience, 1975. 
  9
concentrated on the development of the publicity efforts of the Foreign Office to ‘project 
the national image’ abroad. All considered how peacetime departments fought to retain 
control of publicity whilst plans for the development of the MOI were in progress. 
Although the government produced official war histories of many British departments of 
state in the early post-war years, there were ‘two obvious omissions’, the Board of 
Education and the MOI.55 Why the MOI was omitted is not clear: although its perceived 
failures may have counted against it, these would actually have made very interesting 
history. The purpose of the official histories was ‘to fund experience for Government use’, 
a critical series to demonstrate the processes of trial and error.56 Many other aspects of 
propaganda from the Second World War have since been studied, although, unsurprisingly, 
it is the Nazi effort that has attracted most attention,57 whilst other countries have also 
received a fair amount of coverage.58 
 
The foremost studies on Second World War British propaganda are generally regarded59 as 
McLaine’s The Ministry of Morale60 and Balfour’s Propaganda in War 1939-45.61 Both 
were published in 1979, four years after the bulk of general wartime files were released at 
the Public Record Office (PRO), and both addressed the government’s wartime 
information services. Both focused on the MOI but different angles were taken. McLaine 
concentrated solely on domestic propaganda, whereas Balfour felt that British home front 
propaganda could not be understood properly without reference to the propaganda 
                                                 
55
 Pelling, H., reviewing McLaine, I., Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of 
Information in World War Two, History Vol. 95, 1980, p.187. 
56
 Hancock, W.K., ‘Preface’ (August 1948), in Hancock, W.K., and Gowing, M.M., Official War History: 
British War Economy, 1949. See Cantwell, J.D., The Second World War: A Guide to Documents in the 
Public Record Office, 1993, pp.215-218 for summaries of those files available in the Public Record Office 
which document how official histories were developed. 
57
 For example, Doherty, M.A., Nazi Wireless Propaganda: Lord Haw-Haw and British Public Opinion in 
the Second World War, 2000; George, A., Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made From Nazi 
Propaganda in World War II, 1959; Sington, D., The Goebbels Experiment: A Study of the Nazi Propaganda 
Machine, 1942; Welch, D., The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda, 1995; and Zeman, Z., Nazi 
Propaganda, 1964. 
58For instance, the propaganda of the U.S.S.R. by Baburina, N., The Soviet Political Poster, 1984, and White, 
S., The Bolshevik Poster, 1988; American propaganda by Nelson, D., The Posters that Won the War: The 
Production, Recruitment and War Bond Posters of World War Two, 1991; French propaganda by Moody, M., 
‘Des illusions.. Désillusions..: An introduction to parties, personalities and posters in collaborationist France, 
1940-1944’, Bardgett, S. (ed.), Imperial War Museum Review, No 4, 1989, pp.59-68; and Italian propaganda 
by Sciola, G., ‘War propaganda and Fascist myth: the poster collections of the Micheletti Foundation’, 
Bardgett, S. (ed), Imperial War Museum Review, No 7, 1993, pp.55-64.  
59
 For example, see Chapman, J., The British at War: Cinema, State and Propaganda, 1939-1945, 1998, p.5; 
Cole, R., Britain and the War of Words in Neutral Europe, 1990, p.5; and Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.3. 
60
 McLaine, I., Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 
1979. 
61
 Balfour, M., Propaganda in War 1939-45, Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany, 
1979. 
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produced by the British for German consumption, and German propaganda efforts at home 
and in the UK. Pelling notes that McLaine covers little of the MOI ‘after Bracken had 
taken over, perhaps because the author is more interested in its years of travail that in its 
years of success’.62 McLaine’s work relies largely on those documents available in the 
PRO: it does not pay much attention to posters themselves, aside from their use to illustrate 
a few points, and the obvious references to the first poster, ‘Your courage’ (figure 1).63 
Balfour worked for the MOI, from March 1939 to March 1942, as Temporary Principal in 
the General Division. From April 1942 until the end of war he was Assistant Director of 
Intelligence in Political Warfare Executive/Psychological Warfare Division of Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).64 He thus gained a good insight into 
two angles of the propaganda war. Balfour implies that propaganda did not really have a 
part to play in the outcome of the war anyway, but it must be taken into account that he 
may be trying to justify his part in the early years of the MOI.65 The consensus view of the 
MOI, which has doubtless been emphasised by these works, is that it was essentially a 
failure for the first two years of the war.66  
 
It is not the intention of this project to produce another administrative history of the MOI, 
as the centre of interest here is more the decision making and attitude of those in authority 
towards those they governed. This project builds on the works of McLaine and Balfour, but 
with a concentration specifically on the poster production departments, from which 
propaganda posters were produced in the belief that they would aid the general welfare of 
the nation (rather than for profit, as commercial posters are). In 1998, Chapman already set 
the lead in this field when he published a work based on his PhD thesis, in which he 
studied the cinema as a propaganda instrument, and its use by the MOI.67 This thesis took 
as a model the structure of Chapman’s text, with the first half of the book covering the 
administrative background to film production, and the second half divided up into several 
                                                 
62
 Pelling, H., reviewing McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.187. 
63
 McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, pp.30-31. The study of this poster was particularly based upon the following 
files PRO INF 1/300, ‘Minutes of meetings of experts on Home Publicity’, PRO INF 1/316, ‘Minutes of 
Branch 1 Meeting’, PRO INF 1/723, ‘Copies of Memoranda Home Section: HP (III) 29-HP(IV) 115’, and 
PRO INF 1/724 ‘Copies of Memoranda Home Section: HP(V) 23-141’. 
64
 Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, p.xi. 
65
 Ibid., p.438. 
66
 For instance, see Calder, A., op.cit., 1969, p.66 which informs us of the press attacks upon the ‘Ministry of 
Aggravation’, and p.86 where Calder refers to Cooper moving to the ‘hot seat’ of the MOI. Longmate, N., 
How We Lived Then: A History of Everyday Life During the Second World War, 1971, p.189, outlined the 
failures of the Ministry of Information, views emphasised by Smith, M., op.cit., 2000, pp.30-34, and 
Donnelly, M., op.cit., 1999, p.72. 
67
 Chapman, J., op.cit., 1998. 
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themes. This, and other works which have also considered the cinema68 and radio,69 are 
useful comparative studies as the poster is often seen to have been devalued with the 
coming of the radio. Although a consideration of the poster in relation to other media is 
outside the remit of this study, posters were not produced in a vacuum. Such works are 
important in understanding the links between posters and other propaganda media, in 
particular the ways in which images from posters were reinforced by other media, and how 
posters in turn reinforced other media.70 Such works give us an idea of how different media 
work and how posters fitted into the general scheme of things, and can demonstrate the 
advantages and disadvantages of the other media.  
 
Propaganda was one of the most important defining features of the twentieth century, and 
of its warfare in particular, and posters are one of the media that form the range of 
propaganda: ‘This century has seen the inexorable rise of the propaganda posters… This is 
partly because politicians – even those of totalitarian regimes – have never been able to 
take public support for granted’.71 Propaganda, of course, still has an important part to play 
today, as can be demonstrated by the importance that the Labour Party has attached to its 
‘spin doctors’.72 However, the term ‘propaganda’ has a confusing history, and it becomes 
crucial to see how propaganda has been defined in the past, and how it is used within this 
project, because often what could be considered propaganda is described, and disguised, as 
the more innocuous ‘education’ or ‘persuasion’. Posters of the Second World War were 
often not regarded as ‘propaganda’: as one respondent put it, there was ‘nothing like the 
WW1 propaganda posters’. There was nothing similar to the First World War poster ‘Your 
Country Needs You’ with Kitchener accusingly pointing to the viewer (figure 2),73 first to 
induce guilt and then speedy enlistment. The nature of the Second World War appeared 
different from the First World War. With conscription introduced before the war, ‘people 
                                                 
68
 For example: Aldgate, A., and Richards, J., Britain can take it: the British Cinema in the Second World 
War, 1986 (Second Edition); Coultlass, C., Images for Battle: British Film and the Second World War, 1939-
1945¸1989; Lant, A., Blackout: Reinventing Women for Wartime British Cinema, 1991; Pronay, N. (ed.), 
Propaganda, Politics and Film, 1918-45, 1982; and Taylor, P., Britain and the Cinema in the Second World 
War, 1988. 
69
 For example: Briggs, A., The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: Vol. 3; The War of Words, 
1970; Cruickshank, C., The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare 1938-1945, 1977; Hickman, T., What Did 
you do in the war Auntie? BBC at War, 1939-45, 1995; Nicholas, S., The Echo of War: Home Front 
Propaganda and the Wartime BBC, 1939-45, 1996; and Short, K.R.M., Film and Radio Propaganda in 
World War II, 1983. 
70
 James, A., Informing the People, 1996, looks particularly at leaflets and booklets, and Osley, A., op.cit., 
1995, at a variety of information, produced by the MOI during the Second World War. 
71
 Midweek: Lifestyle London, May 18 1998 (Extract, taken from ‘Power of the Poster’ File, V&A). 
72
 See Ingham, B., The Wages of Spin 2003, and Jones, N., Soundbites and Spin Doctors: How Politicians 
Manipulate the Media and Vice Versa, 1995. 
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mostly waited to be called up’, with ‘almost total agreement that the war should be 
fought’.74 Comparisons were also made with inter-war propaganda, as people did not 
appear to associate British government posters with the type of propaganda produced by 
the Nazis.75 Some felt that: 
there were not any propaganda ones by the British. All of the posters issued by the 
allied forces were true advice posters warning everybody of the Dangers [sic] that 
lay ahead. All propaganda came from Nazi Germany but thank God it was never 
believed by all true British subjects. … and propaganda was not advisable as it 
costs lives.76  
 
With this argument in mind, how exactly do we define propaganda, a subject on which 
there is wide debate? Since the early twentieth century propaganda has been defined as 
‘information, ideas, opinions, etc. propagated as a means of winning support for, or 
fomenting opposition to, a government, cause, institution, etc.’.77 With propaganda, it is 
not just what is said that contributes to the meaning, as ‘omission is just as significant as 
commission’.78 The word ‘propaganda’ itself is Latin in origin, meaning ‘to sow’ or ‘to 
propagate’, and was intended as a neutral term, first used in the Sacra Congregatio de 
Propaganda Fide, formed in 1662, meaning ‘the spread of the Roman Catholic faith’.79 
Most tend to see the original use of the word as innocuous, although the word gradually 
gained more pejorative connotations, and by the end of the First World War ‘propaganda’ 
truly was regarded as a dirty word, as people deemed enlistment efforts, for example, as 
                                                                                                                                                    
73
 Male, reply to questionnaire, April 1998. 
74
 Male, West Susex, reply to questionnaire, May 1998. This is a topic that has been addressed in many 
general histories: Calder, A. op.cit., 1969 p.25, claims that the Spanish Civil War had broken down many 
pacifist attitudes within the UK, p.33 claims that there was reluctant relief at the arrival of war. Noakes, L., 
op.cit., 1998, p.24, notes that there was a distinct lack of enthusiasm to the arrival of war. ‘Chapter 3: The 
Day War Broke Out’, however, in Longmate, N., op.cit., 1971, pp.24-34, details many different reactions to 
the outbreak of war, some positive, some negative, probably the most accurate view (largely based upon oral 
history). Samuel, R., op.cit., 1994, p.23, notes that fiftieth anniversary commemorations of the war effort 
were headed by Dame Vera Lynn, speaking on behalf of the soldiers, rather than the leadership. 
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 Male/Female Couple, Hampshire, reply to questionnaire, April 1998. 
76
 Male, Londonderry, reply to questionnaire, April 1998. 
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 Room, A., The Cassell Dictionary of Word Histories, 1999 p.490. Taylor, P.M., British Propaganda in the 
Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy, 1999, p.xii, noted that the Nato definition in the 1990s for 
propaganda was: ‘any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion, 
emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or 
indirectly’. 
78
 Taylor, P.M., ibid., p.45. 
79
 O’Donnell, V., ‘What is Propaganda?’, in Jowett, G. and O’Donnell, V., (eds) Propaganda and 
Persuasion, 
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lies.80 Jowett and O’Donnell claim that ‘[p]ropaganda deliberately and systematically seeks 
to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist’;81 it is not carried 
out for the mutual benefit of those involved. This gives rise to an interesting debate, 
although not tackled in this thesis: was the State interested only in what it could achieve for 
its own ends, or was the war really a ‘people’s war’? Calder was very sceptical, claiming 
that the government had found it easier to manipulate the people, having found out what 
they wanted through public opinion polls.82  
 
The Germans under the Nazi party were prepared to use the title Reichsministerium für 
Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (RMVP), the Nazi Ministry of People’s Enlightenment 
and Propaganda.83 The British, however, were much more circumspect, feeling that the 
word ‘propaganda’ had so many negative connotations that the title of The Ministry of 
Information must be used instead.84 Although the title ‘Ministry of Information’ was 
originally not felt to be ‘fully descriptive of the functions of this Ministry’, the titles 
‘Ministry of National Publicity’ and ‘Ministry of Propaganda’ were also deemed 
inappropriate. Crawford, head of an advertising agency, claimed that ‘Propaganda is a 
drug’, and a ‘Ministry of Propaganda’ was not wanted ‘in this country’, although ‘we 
might want a Ministry of Information, to give us the facts alone’.85 However, contradicting 
this, Fougasse built on his earlier definition of a poster by defining a propaganda poster as 
‘everything stuck up with the object of persuading the passer-by for the common good’,86 
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 For instance, see Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, ‘Encyclopaedia Britannica: propaganda’ 
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 Anonymous, ‘Propaganda Ministry Not Wanted - Sir William Crawford: But Ministry of Information 
Might be Welcomed’, Advertiser’s Weekly, Vol. 103, No. 1,357, May 25 1939, p.222. A Devon male, who 
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 Fougasse, A School of Purposes, 1946, p.11. 
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and others in government were not so hasty. For example, Rawdon-Smith, discussing the 
use of the word ‘propaganda’ within the British Council, complained that people must be 
persuaded to recognise that propaganda was a neutral term, or that the word should never 
be used again.87  
 
Propaganda studies became popular in the inter-war years, and this continued into the war 
years,88 by when various models of propaganda were available, discussed further in chapter 
two. The ‘magic bullet theory’,89 was favoured by Hitler, but the ‘multi-step flow theory’90 
was recognised by the Second World War. We will see the arguments surrounding the use 
of propaganda in the Second World War, and whether the government considered 
propaganda to be a weapon. Jowett and O’Donnell have produced what is considered the 
key text in the area of propaganda, now in its third edition.91 As with many works on 
propaganda, the authors are American,92 but British interest in the subject is growing all 
the time, with historians such as Taylor, Welch and Doherty producing works about 
propaganda.93 Vast numbers of books have been produced in recent years on the topic: a 
search on ‘propaganda’ on any of the major bookstores or libraries on the internet will 
return several hundred entries. These are mostly focussed on the twentieth century when 
the word became more commonly used, but the term can be applied backwards to, for 
example, the Spanish Armada.94 There are several reference books on the subject,95 with 
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Cole producing the most recent reference work, one that contains some inaccuracies.96 
Similarly, there is an increasing number of works on advertising theory, which some would 
argue is a form of propaganda.97 
 
Propaganda was a major feature of the twentieth century, particularly during wartime, and 
posters were the most visible propaganda device. As we will see below, many other facets 
of the European and British propaganda efforts in the First and Second World Wars have 
already been studied, but the posters, which many people still remember, have been 
considered of little more than picture book interest. Therefore, we must consider what a 
poster is, and why it can be defined as a source worthy of academic historical study. At 
first glance, defining a poster seems straightforward; a popular British dictionary 
apparently summed it all up as a ‘placard in a public place; large printed picture’.98 
However, the exact definition is slightly more problematic, and exactly what is defined as a 
poster can change with time and culture, although there is a general consensus along the 
lines of the definition above.99 Ades defined a poster as something destined for public wall 
space, the object of mass production (on whatever scale), with a function of promotion,100 
with Fougasse giving a similar definition as ‘anything stuck up on a wall with the object of 
persuading a passer-by’.101 Rickards gives the most comprehensive definition:  
A poster can be defined as a separate sheet, affixed to an existing surface, which 
must embody a message, not just a decorative image. It must be publicly displayed 
and multiply produced.102  
This does not entirely resolve the issue of determining what is and is not a poster, but it at 
least excludes such objects as ‘back in 10 minutes’ signs and graffiti. Sontag goes one step 
further in distinguishing between a poster and a public notice:  
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A public notice aims to inform or command. A poster aims to seduce, to exhort, to 
sell, to educate, to convince, to appeal. Whereas a public notice distributes 
information to interested or alert citizens, a poster reaches out to grab those who 
might otherwise pass it by.103  
All these definitions agree that the physicality of the poster is made of a large, paper 
object, but this definition also encompasses the post-war meaning which includes large 
sheets containing images which are used as cheap and cheerful wall coverings, particularly 
for students, often also defined as posters.104 Such images are limited to the private sphere. 
Although we recognise that such images are often from public events such as art 
exhibitions, within a bedroom they have lost their function as promotion. For the purposes 
of this project, we cannot separate the physical properties of posters from their function as 
promotional items, displayed in the public sphere, and we now delve deeper into a 
discussion of the functions of the poster.  
 
Villani viewed the poster as a ‘paper siren’, whilst Cassandre perceived it as a ‘publicity 
telegram’,105 an idea on which Green enlarged, describing the pictorial poster as a ‘visual 
telegram, a concise means of conveying a message through a simple combination of words 
and images’.106 The poster essentially operates in the public domain and in essence is ‘a 
product of communication between an active force and a re-active one’: the originator has 
a message to sell, whilst the target audience must be persuaded to buy the message.107 
Fougasse, one of the most prolific and influential writers on the purposes and technique of 
poster design in the wartime era,108 believed that the poster must be accessible to as many 
people as possible or it will not achieve its object, that of passing on the message 
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contained.109 Writing shortly after the war, he identified three obstacles that the poster 
needed to overcome: ‘a general aversion to reading notices of any sort’; ‘a general 
disinclination to believe that any notice, even if read, can possibly be addressed to 
oneself”; and ‘a general unwillingness, even so, to remember the message long enough to 
do anything about it.’110  
 
Poster historian Metzl determined five limitations within which a poster must work: the 
first was that the design and message must be simple; the second that everything on the 
poster must contribute to the single message it contains. The third was that the poster must 
be aimed at the ‘artistically insensitive’ as its success will not be judged on the value of the 
poster as art; the fourth that it must convince the buyer to accept the product without 
question; and finally it must sell fast.111 Barnicoat restates this idea, claiming that there is a 
constant battle between the simplicity of a design and the need to attract notice, for if the 
design is too straightforward it may be too dull to engage attention. Technical brilliance is 
not important, but the clarity of the message to a popular audience is.112 There are 
references to ‘poster art’ throughout this thesis, although many have questioned whether 
poster designs can be considered art at all, as ‘the layers of meaning which make the study 
of a work of fine art so rich and rewarding are not normally a feature of effective 
propaganda’.113 There was criticism during the war of those who assessed the war poster 
simply in terms of design and colour. Even if posters do produce aesthetic satisfaction, 
they have a greater purpose beyond that. Their ultimate purpose is commercial, or, in the 
case of Second World War posters, political. The war poster had a function beyond that of 
persuading the viewer to part with small change: ‘it must inspire the harassed and 
uneducated citizen to give five years or more of his life to make history … Posters, 
however clever, are a waste of paper unless they kill Germans.’114 However, design 
elements are important as ‘good posters influence the viewer in spite of himself’, they ‘do 
not have to be liked by the individual, but they must be noticed by all’.115 A well-designed 
poster will have attracted the attention before the viewer has had time to think about it.116 A 
good design will ensure not only that the poster is noticed, but that the poster is displayed 
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in the first place. In wartime, this was an important consideration in a democracy, as there 
was not that element of fear or legislation that forces the display of posters in totalitarian 
states.117 
 
Fougasse believed that the poster had three functions. The first was to attract the attention 
of the passer-by, which meant that the poster must stand out from its surroundings.118 The 
second was to persuade the viewer, not by trying to prove a point, but by suggesting the 
desirability of a course of action.119 The third was to keep the viewer persuaded for long 
enough to take action, which meant that the poster must contain only a single message, and 
be simple enough for the viewer to re-describe to others.120 Fougasse continually stressed 
the need to ensure that the viewer had a hand in decoding the poster by making the 
message only ninety per cent obvious, giving the viewer an incentive to work out the other 
ten per cent.121 This would flatter the intelligence of the reader, as, having taken part in 
deciphering the conclusion to the message, a sustained interest would be acquired in that 
particular message.122 As Timmers aptly summarises it, the poster must be a ‘dynamic 
force for change’.123  
 
Obviously, Fougasse followed his own advice, as his designs still tend to be immediately 
recognisable, and we can deduce that he was successful, at least in making his designs 
memorable. This was demonstrated by the questionnaires distributed as a part of this 
project: few artists were remembered, but Fougasse invariably was the name mentioned if 
any were remembered at all, and it was claimed: ‘How carelessly we should have talked 
during the war but for Fougasse’.124 In February 1940, some of the best remembered 
posters of the war, the series of eight Fougasse ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’ (figures 3 to  
10) posters, were produced by the MOI. It must be questioned as to how we define an 
effective and successful poster: the posters designed by Fougasse may be memorable, but 
can we describe them as successful, or effective? We ideally define the poster as a success 
if it achieves its purpose of getting the message across, achieving its target whilst acting as 
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a ‘paper bullet’. However, as the range of books available on the topic demonstrates, 
defining changes in public opinion and attitude can be hard,125 with changes in behaviour 
easier to define, but pinning any of this down to the poster is even harder. The only 
concrete evidence that a poster was deemed especially successful in the Second World War 
is if there was a demand for copies for display, or a necessity for reprinting. This thesis, 
therefore, does not look to measure the effectiveness of war posters, merely reactions to 
specific posters (and accompanying material), as available. 
 
The poster artist must always remember that his or her product is being developed for their 
present age, not for a museum, and must constantly keep in touch with contemporary life. 
Popular appeal is therefore essential, although this does not mean that aesthetic 
considerations can be disregarded.126 Continuing Cassandre’s definition of the poster as a 
telegraph, the poster artist is the telegrapher who dispenses the message given: s/he does 
not initiate the message.127 As we have seen, the artist needs to remember that the poster 
was not to be used for self-expression as so much art is,128 but to perform a purpose, that of 
the manufacturer, or government in this case, who has a product to sell, or an idea to 
propagate. It was the job of the artist to produce an image that would be remembered by 
the public.129 Heyman claims that ‘[d]esigners adapt quickly to changes in the social 
landscape to keep their posters a fresh and vital means of communication’,130 as if the 
product or idea being sold has been on the market for some time, then it must be re-
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presented in a ‘new and desirable’ light.131 However, there needs to be a balance between 
the element of surprise that a new idea can generate, and the use of a totally 
incomprehensible symbol,132 because if the meaning is obscured the poster loses its 
point.133 The well-known Soviet poster of 1920 by El Lissitsky, ‘Beat the Whites with the 
Red Wedge’ (figure 11) must appear clever, but very abstract, to most people. The 
meaning may have been clear only to those who understood the ideology behind it, and 
may explain why Soviet realist propaganda evolved soon afterwards.134 This is also true of 
many modern day campaigns, such as those produced by Benson and Hedges and Silk Cut. 
Legislation may prevent the depiction of the cigarette brand name, but the public is already 
so aware of the branding that this is not a problem: the black and gold, or the purple silk, 
are so recognisable already (figure 12). Such brand imaging is now fairly standard for most 
companies, promoting the name and desired associated image: supermarkets are a 
particularly good example of this, with advertising campaigns in 2000 associating Tesco 
with good value, and Waitrose with quality goods. Brand marketing was a fairly new 
concept in the Second World War, prior to which the focus was largely on the actual 
products sold. 
 
The conditions under which the poster is to be displayed must be fully taken into account 
by the artist: it is rarely seen alone, but tends to be in competition with other posters.135 By 
the turn of the century the following criteria had been established within the industry for a 
poster that would work in ‘hurried modern metropolitan life’, where people are bombarded 
by hundreds of different images. Posters must overcome this barrage to excite the attention 
of the passer-by, and communicate the message directly and unequivocally, whilst still 
influencing and persuading the viewer.136 In the 1990s, these ideas still held: ‘the most 
powerful and seductive posters continue to be those that create a strong, unified 
impression, not dependent on careful perusal but to be taken in quickly by people hurrying 
past or stopping briefly’.137 Different posters have different purposes, and so require 
different handling. A poster that is designed for the road needs to be extremely bold and 
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simple, whilst there are other places, such as bus stops, where the viewer has more leisure 
to study the poster, for which the technique can be quite different. The London 
Underground is a special case in point. In the tunnels between lines, and on the escalators, 
a single poster may often be repeated many times, as people are expected to hurry past, 
rather than stop to look. Yet on the platforms several posters are very text heavy as the 
viewing publics have the leisure to observe posters in detail (for example, figure 13). In 
chapter two on commissioning we will assess whether the government, or the artists 
employed by them, appeared to have understood this distinction. Eckersley, who 
established his reputation as a graphic designer in the Second World War, felt that it was 
important for the poster designer to recognise the different needs and limitations of a 
poster, and try to make the best of the circumstances.138 
 
By the 1940s, advertising professionals expected that a successful poster would contain at 
least some of the following features: continuity; flexibility; simplicity; appropriateness to 
subject; and the inclusion of a symbolic element.139 Pick, later involved in the MOI, was 
the key figure in the development of London Transport corporate advertising. He accepted 
that in situations where there is leisure to peruse a poster, it is possible to use additional 
text, although it should not form a distraction from the main design.140 Generally, though, 
as the poster has developed, symbols and slogans, a form of shorthand requiring an easily 
shared idiom based on cultural understandings, have become the staples of the poster.141 
This is why each poster needs to be understood in the context in which it was used. It is 
unfair to judge contemporary poster designs by the standards of past posters, as each would 
probably not have been successful if produced in a different age.142 Benjamin dismissed the 
‘power’ of many of the posters in the V&A exhibition, but accepted that she was viewing 
earlier posters with a jaded modern eye, where one is so accustomed to poster language 
that only ‘retinal shock’ will attract attention.143 A deeper appreciation of posters is gained 
through semiotics, in which the images and the subconscious messages that they provide 
about the attitudes of those that produce and view them, are analysed. 
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The poster is a product of the mechanical age, and was the most conspicuous, accessible 
and familiar form of pictorial production until the First World War. As the age developed, 
other mechanical objects, such as radio, eroded its importance. After the First World War 
there was the development of popular film and illustrated weekly papers, some of which 
had been in circulation prior to the war, including The Sketch (1893-1959), and The Tatler 
(1901-1965).144 By the Second World War, the chief point of public contact was the 
wireless,145 with the poster largely surviving as a support service,146 although it still played 
an important role, and further improvements in technique and usage had made it a more 
effective means of influence.147 The vast majority of advertising budgets were spent on 
press advertising which had a certain prestige attached to it, although the poster could often 
be seen to achieve a definite result with a small expenditure. In 1938, a total of £59 million 
was spent on advertising in Great Britain, of which only 8.3% was spent on posters, 
although part of the appeal of posters is that they are a cheap medium.148 The poster had a 
great advantage over newspapers, the radio and cinema, where there is an element of 
choice about participation: however, it is very hard to ignore a large, well-designed poster. 
Foster would echo this, claiming that far from losing its place in the field of mass visual 
perception, the poster has had a profound effect on other media. For example, press adverts 
at the turn of the century were little more than textual announcements, but the popularity of 
graphic design in the poster led to the use of the ‘display advertisement’, which, when seen 
alone, can sometimes be difficult to distinguish from a poster.149 Extensive use was made 
of the press in 1939 and 1940: with a host of new regulations coming out, the public 
needed to be informed about several different points every day.150 By 1942, the public had 
got used to most of the changes in their lifestyle, and with more restrictions on newspaper 
space, far more use was made of posters, with some campaigns even depending on them 
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entirely.151 Broadcasting and films were limited by the possibility of technical interference 
and the information would not be retained as the written word would be.152 Radio sets were 
still expensive, and spare parts, including batteries, were not easily obtainable under 
wartime conditions.153 Getting the message across also relied on someone turning the radio 
on. Active decisions were also necessary for cinema audiences, where people were paying 
to attend the film.154  
 
Overall, this project adds to the discussion of issues in social history, still of concern in the 
current climate. It takes its place amongst the wide-ranging historiography of both 
propaganda and the Second World War, contributing to a greater understanding of the 
experience of the British Home Front in the war. In the following chapter we examine the 
theoretical approaches that underpin the project, Foucauldian and content analyses, and 
explain how they are used in the project. The chapter considers how the identified archives 
and sources have been used in the research. The chapter reflects on the new sources 
produced for the project, including questionnaires, a database containing digital images of 
wartime posters and related information, and the use of the website www.ww2poster.co.uk, 
produced as a result of the project. In the second chapter, the British wartime poster as a 
tool of propaganda is set against the context of general world-wide poster developments. 
The chapter considers the graphic influences on the poster, identifying and analysing 
trends and technologies from both world-wide and British art and design that may have 
influenced British wartime artists. It considers whether there was a clear British style 
evident throughout the war, and whether graphic styles were imposed by the government. 
The chapter looks at the use of the poster by commercial firms, which may have worked as 
exemplars for the government. It also reflects on the use of posters by the state in the pre-
war years to see the experience the government may have drawn on.  
 
In the third chapter an understanding of the government’s commissioning and distribution 
policies will shed light on their grasp of developments in the poster industry after the First 
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World War. The MOI was the lead government department for propaganda, and this 
chapter looks at the work of the various departments within the MOI with responsibility for 
commissioning, designing, producing and distributing the wartime posters. We consider 
the process, from initiation to distribution, and whether outside agencies were involved at 
any stage. We question whether the location of posters was deemed important, whether 
distribution plans were made on a national or a local level, and whether it was voluntary or 
compulsory to display them. Through a consideration of the planning processes for the first 
poster produced by the MOI, ‘Your Courage, Your Cheerfulness, Your Resolution, will 
bring us victory’ (figure 1), we achieve some answers to the above questions. This first 
poster has generally been considered a failure,155 and we consider how accurate this view 
was, and whether it was a self-perpetuating failure achieved through, for example, a bad 
press. If the first posters were produced in a hurry, then the fact that they were deemed 
‘failures’ could be understandable, but the government had been planning these posters for 
a long time before war broke out.156 We trace how these first posters show how the 
government initially attempted to deal with the wartime public through propaganda, and 
demonstrate how they expected the public to behave in wartime. Having looked at the first 
posters that the government produced, the thesis continues with four case studies: urban 
and rural representations; industrial propaganda; fighting the ‘enemy within’; and dealing 
with the ‘problem’ of venereal disease (VD). The case studies skim many different posters, 
using approximately sixty to seventy per case study, aside from the VD case study, which 
uses twenty-five images. These illustrate the wide-range of discourses that the posters draw 
on, with the VD case study allowing more in-depth analysis. 
 
In the fourth chapter, the first case study, we reflect on the depiction of, and appeal to, the 
rural and urban elements of the UK population. If people were being asked, as a duty of 
citizenship, to fight, we have to question what they were being asked to fight for. The 
population has been heavily urbanised since the mid-nineteenth century, but the notion of 
‘England’s green and pleasant land’, expounded in songs such as Jerusalem, invariably 
appears to hold sway throughout the UK. The land is always central to national 
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identification in times of crisis, including war, and such rural images were used in wartime 
posters, including the series ‘Your Britain, Fight for it Now’ (figures 14 to 20). We have to 
question how far this was depicting the Britain people knew, or whether it was a Southern 
English phenomenon, and whether such images hold deeper meanings, harking back to 
perceived idyllic rural lifestyles.157 The ‘Your Britain’ series depicted not only the rural 
idyll, but hinted that the industrialised urban process was one of progress, something which 
in the post-modern age we now possibly disregard. The case study briefly considers the 
Beveridge Report, which formed the basis of the Welfare State, and how visions of a more 
socialistic future were depicted.158 It questions whether such images were nation-wide, or 
whether they were aimed towards particular regions. 
 
In the second case study we consider posters aimed at those working in industry, where the 
‘Battle for Production’ was going on behind the obvious military fronts.159 Those working 
in the factories needed convincing that the work that they were doing was as important as 
that on the front line. There is a considerable body of material available on industrial 
campaigns for the later years of the war, unlike many campaigns where there is either only 
early information or none at all. There is access to a wide spread of industrial posters, with 
Shaw providing a lot of information on how campaigns were initiated, implemented and 
received.160 The chapter considers how industrial workers were perceived, and tactics that 
were used to improve production when every part produced was essential. This includes a 
consideration of the use of Soviet posters that could be considered ‘atrocity’ posters, 
(figure 21) efforts to get women to work in industry, and men into the mines. In the third 
case study, the importance of ‘the other’ is evident as we look at how the ‘enemy within’ 
on the home front was depicted within the posters. We consider the history of the spy and 
the growth of intelligence services in the UK as concerns about the danger of the spy, 
largely linked to improved communications, grew in the early years of the twentieth 
century. The chapter largely focuses on the careless talk campaigns, which ran throughout 
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the war, considering how spies were identified, class and gender were represented, and 
whether humour was a suitable medium for the subject.  
 
In the fourth case study we will look at the campaigns produced by the government in an 
attempt to deal with the increased problem of VD in wartime, when the rate of infection 
rose.161 We have to question how far attitudes to sexually transmitted diseases have roots 
in the past. The project challenges the idea that supposed Victorian moral attitudes and 
prudery still held sway in the Second World War,162 and questions what popular attitudes 
to VD actually were. It was the first time that the issue of VD was publicised in posters, 
rather than simply in discreet literature in public conveniences. Through the fairly 
comprehensive range of VD posters from the Second World War, we can study different 
guises that the campaign took over the course of the war, and the feeling about what was 
appropriate for different media. There was much reaction to the big VD campaigns hosted 
by the MOI on behalf of the Ministry of Health, providing much information on public 
sentiment on the issue.163 The conclusion draws together the analysis of the project’s 
overarching themes, highlights the discourses that run through the study, and illustrates 
ways in which poster content and style worked together, drawing on longer term 
discourses, for a cohesive propaganda message. 
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Chapter 1: Methods and Sources  
This project uses Foucauldian notions of discourse analysis1 as a theoretical and 
methodological framework, and content analysis as a secondary method. This chapter 
describes the key concepts and benefits of such an approach, and maps the project in the 
light of the methodological approach. The chapter then investigates the sources used for 
the project, examining the poster collections available, and considering the impact of 
digitisation. Digitisation facilitated access to a wider range of sources that would otherwise 
have been accessible, and, in the form of a database, was used within this project. The 
chapter explores the primary sources available for establishing the contextual background, 
particularly the administrative records of the Ministry of Information (MOI). Finally, it 
considers the sources available for monitoring reactions to posters, and the steps taken to 
establish attitudes and reactions to the posters. 
 
‘Discourse’ is a postmodern construct that Foucault defined as ‘the group of statements 
that belong to a single system of formation’.2 It is a term used to indicate that ‘language is 
not a neutral way of describing the world and objects which exist in it’, but that such 
objects, and our understanding of them, exist only through the categories and concepts we 
use to describe them.3 Of key importance to this thesis is the recognition that the visual 
should be considered an element of language and discourse; and that access to images, and 
familiarity with them, are culturally based. Foucault maintained that rules of discourse are 
applied within historically defined periods and socially specific groups. These define and 
produce ideas of ‘truth’ and knowledge which govern, at any given time, ‘what is valid, 
sayable and possible’.4 Such rules are associated with institutions, which, structured 
themselves by discourses, also play a key part in the regulation of populations through 
discourse. For example, medical discourses are associated with hospitals, legal discourses 
with law courts, and religious discourses with churches. Discourse is different from 
ideology. Ideology questions ‘whose truth’ is being presented, constantly looking for the 
‘hidden’ power that constructs knowledge, with such knowledge legitimising unequal 
power relations. As Hall argues, Foucault rejected Marxist ideology on the grounds that 
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Marx always reduced everything to an economic basis, and to class struggles. Hall claims, 
however, that Gramscian hegemony, where a group gains predominance through consent 
and negotiation rather than force, was closer to Foucault’s position.5 
 
Discourses tend to be perceived as ‘binary’, where meanings are oppositional, generally 
defined by the ‘other’. To illustrate: masculinity is often constructed in opposition to 
femininity; scientific medicine versus quackery; modernity (and industry) is often opposed 
to tradition (and nature); collectivism is often set against individualism. Unpacking 
binaries requires the investigation of relational terms. There can be, for instance, several 
masculinities, and femininities, and other influences, for example the notion of ‘domestic 
femininities’ and ‘industrial femininities’. Rather than proceeding on the basis of dominant 
and dominated discourses, analysis unpacks the interplay of different discourses.6 This 
project identifies and investigates areas where boundaries were blurred, for example the 
use of both ‘high’ and ‘low’ art within graphic design. 
 
Discursive formulations emphasise the concealment of difference. A key element for 
working with discourse analysis is to identify the traces of what is not seen. Within a 
discourse, what is characterised as normal will define who/what belongs, and who/what is 
excluded. Discourse analysis views ‘silences’, made invisible by those with the power to 
define ‘what is’. Foucault viewed discourses as historically specific. In the 1930s, 
discourse would have defined the working woman as feckless, and as guilty of abandoning 
her husband and children. Working women now tend to be depicted as hard working, 
displaying admired traits, which are implicitly deemed ‘normative’. Researching what is 
rendered invisible can make explicit that the opposite, a non-working woman, is often 
presented as having undesirable traits, a work-shy non-contributor. During wartime, these 
identities were blurred as the government attempted to present women in both the home 
and the workplace.  
 
Within a Foucauldian frame identities are often represented as contested and competing, 
but there is usually one dominant identity that emerges, with one view presented as a 
certainty, as absolute truth. This ‘truth’ tends to emerge from socially powerful institutions, 
their power diffused through subjects self-regulation. These institutions depend on 
assumptions that the claims that they have made about their knowledge are true. This 
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highly visible discourse ‘infuses itself into reality such that it becomes unremarkable and 
even passed off as common sense’.7 For example, in wartime the most visible discourse 
was citizenship, which defined those who did not contribute in expected ways as not truly 
belonging. Myths, such as the spirit of the Blitz, may partially emerge from discourses of 
‘citizenship’ sustained through posters and other propaganda produced by a government 
that needed people to work for victory. 
 
Foucault believed that within society, govermentality works to produce people who are 
docile, useful and functional, as ‘the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a 
productive body and a subjected body’.8 He argued that ‘the body’ could be altered or 
subjected through power relations in society that could impose ‘constraints, prohibitions, 
or obligations’ on the body.9 Foucault declared that power relations could write on the 
body: ‘they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform 
ceremonies, to emit signs’.10 Particular traits within or external to the body would identify 
particular types,11 for example, the homosexual. Homosexuality was considered socially 
unacceptable in wartime Britain, remaining largely hidden, unspoken, invisible, and indeed 
illegal until 1967.12 Foucault was concerned with issues of sexuality, a term that he argued 
was developed from the dominant scientific and biological discourses of the nineteenth 
century. Finding support within ‘religious, judicial, pedagogical, and medical institutions’, 
new norms and values changed the way ‘individuals were led to assign meaning and value 
to their conduct, their duties, their pleasures, their feelings and sensations, their dreams’.13  
 
Foucault explained that knowledge creates subjects as we make sense of ourselves, and so 
regulate our behaviour, by referring back to various bodies of knowledge. This knowledge 
is produced within discourse and appears to be ‘the only’ correct way of doing things. For 
example, medical knowledge presents itself as having the singular power to heal, derived 
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from ‘its bases, justifications and rules, from which it extends its effects’.14 Foucault did 
not see power as simply a negative force, as a ‘mode of subjugation’ or domination.15 For 
Foucault, discourse creates subjects as well as objects, it both constrains and produces, and 
is a constellation of knowledge and power, which is not possessed by groups or 
individuals, but is exercised.16 It is something that produces both positive and negative 
effects, working in the face of resistance. It is all-pervasive, not imposed from the top 
down,17 and the existence of power and knowledge presuppose and produce each other.18 
Discourse ‘subjects’ speakers to its regulatory power, whilst offering them a ‘subject 
position’ from which to make sense of the world.19 In his early work Foucault argued that 
an author could not be defined as a creator, but as the provider of a label for a group of 
statements.20 The author does not hold the power of knowledge, but is the subject of 
discourse. Foucault’s later work re-introduced the idea of reflexive subjects with a 
possibility of resistance and change, and he demonstrated that subjects can be ‘authored’ 
by themselves, rather that simply being ‘powerless victims’.21  
 
Within a Foucauldian frame, as discourses are historically specific, so also are their 
subjects, displaying certain attributes consistent with the construction of knowledge at that 
time.22 Discursive formulations mediate the construction of identities, disciplining their 
subjects into a particular way of thinking and acting, promoting a specialist language, 
defining what knowledge and practices are, and are not, appropriate for ‘subjects’.23 
Foucault believed that subjects would regulate themselves, encouraged by society to fit in 
the discursively defined concepts of what is ‘normal’. For example, within wartime 
society, ideals of citizenship defined what was ‘normal’: it would be unusual not to want to 
be fit, healthy and prepared to die for your country. Technologies of normalisation create, 
classify and control irregularities in the social body. They isolate and correct anomalies 
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‘through corrective or therapeutic procedures’, that look like they are ‘impartial techniques 
for dealing with dangerous social deviations’.24 For example, VD is presented as a 
‘dangerous disease’, as different from other diseases, but this can largely be seen as a result 
of religious discourse. Behavioural changes need to be made by subjects in order not to put 
themselves ‘at risk’. Subjects become ‘masters of their own slavery’ as they exercise ‘self-
surveillance’,25 requiring them to act upon themselves, ‘to monitor, test, improve, and 
transform’ themselves.26 
 
Discourses are located within epistemes, which Foucault described as ‘something like a 
world-view, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge’. Within a period of 
history a certain coherence runs through theories of knowledge, united by common norms 
and assumptions, uniting discursive practices, and informing our thought practices 
unconsciously.27 Such epistemes appear and disappear suddenly and arbitrarily, 
superseding each other with no sense of progress, or expectation of the evolution of a 
higher level of reason. The notions of the modern episteme inform the wartime experience; 
an age when, rather than everything being determined by God or nature, ‘man’ is 
responsible for knowledge and thus can determine his/her own behaviour. 
 
Foucault’s earlier work has been described as ‘archaeology’, with his later thinking termed 
as ‘genealogy’.28 Foucault described archaeology as ‘a pure description of discursive 
events’.29 Investigating the archive, archaeology is non-interpretative, seeking ‘to describe 
rather than interpret’, searching for the rules that dictate discourse. Foucault believed that 
texts need to be investigated for their surface meanings, demonstrating the ‘chance 
emergence of events’, rather than showing the ‘progress’ of history.30 Such texts do not 
just exist or survive: the organisation of such documents through the archive is key. 
Archaeology involves the intrinsic description of a document:  
The document is not the fortunate tool of a history that is primarily and 
fundamentally memory: history is one way in which society recognises and 
develops a mass of documentation with which it is inextricably linked.31  
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There are two principles of archaeological research. The first is that it seeks to ‘provide no 
more than a description of regularities, differences, transformations, and so on’. The 
second is that archaeology eschews ‘the search for authors’ and concentrates ‘instead on 
statements (and visibilities)’ and is thus non-anthropological.32  
 
From the early 1970s, Foucault defined his work as genealogy, emerging as a ‘history of 
the present’, growing from the methods of archaeology,33 rather than a complete rejection 
of his earlier ideas. Genealogy is interested in the relation between past and present, and 
‘interrogates the past from the vantage point of the needs and perplexities of the present 
situation’,34 rather than being purely descriptive. Following the ideas of Nietzsche, 
Foucault claimed that no facts exist, there are solely ‘interpretations of facts’. We must 
take into account how political interests have influenced our understanding of ‘facts’ and 
knowledge as ‘[t]here is no act of ‘knowledge’ which is not also an act of power.’35 For 
example, myths such as “we all pulled together during the war” can lead to calls for a 
return to a time when “everything was better and people were nicer”, and provide nostalgia 
which fuels the heritage industry. This project is largely archaeological as it seeks to 
describe the posters, and the institutions that produced them, within appropriate contexts. 
 
This project is heavily grounded in available source material, and as a result it could have 
been simple to write empirically. Empiricism can be seen as a discourse that emphasises 
the discovery of the visible, especially within the humanities where the desire for ‘proof’ 
emphasises what can be substantiated by visible (scientific) evidence. We must recognise, 
however, that many sources are available only from powerful institutions. In this chapter, 
we will investigate the archives used, recognising that they are not neutral. Foucault 
describes the archive as ‘the general system of the formation and transformation of 
statements’.36 The archive involves the organisation of information, ‘representing and 
signifying [the ideas of] the episteme in which it was generated’.37 History 
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organises the document, divides it up, distributes it, orders, arranges it in levels, 
establishes series, distinguishes between what is relevant and what is not, discovers 
elements, defines unities, [and] describes relations.38  
Documents are accumulated and serialised or classified according to the concerns, or 
agenda, of those organising the information. This provides a system of categorisation that 
both determines and is determined by what is ‘normal’.39 In Appendix 2 we consider the 
sources used for the project, and reflect on the establishment and collection policies of the 
archives. Collection and categorisation policies contain implicit assumptions about what 
should be presented and how, which have an impact on what is available now, how it can 
be found, and the materials available for researchers. We will see, for example, how the 
Imperial War Museum (IWM) have highlighted or made available particular images and 
posters for artistic or other reasons, possibly making such images more significant than 
they were at the time of their production, when they may have been insignificant objects 
for the viewer.40  
 
Building on this Foucauldian frame, discourse analyses underpins the methodology of the 
thesis. Discourse analysis is defined as 
the social and linguistic description of norms governing [the production of 
discourses], and may include [a] focus upon the social and political determinants of 
the form discourse takes; for instance, the hidden presuppositions that the persons 
addressed are of a certain class, race or gender.41  
Discourse analysis does not question why power works, it focuses on how power works. It 
looks to how structures and knowledge are implicated in each other. Discourse analysis 
focuses on the details, questioning assumptions that are made, what is perceived as normal, 
as ‘the every-day’. It questions how texts and images construct specific views of the social 
world and what the elements of these are. It focuses on how these are constructed as real, 
truthful and persuasive, whilst bearing in mind that images suggest, but never show, 
particular assumptions about the audience. This frame underlies the analysis in this thesis 
of the MOI which was a powerful wartime institution with an assumed audience. An 
investigation of this institution and its credentials for propagating knowledge regarding 
propaganda posters, their contents, and advertising in general is key. 
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Discourse analysis aims to challenge taken-for-granted statements and meanings, and 
disturb claims to objectivity. Through an analysis of archival systems, discourse analysis 
investigates the production of knowledge. It pays clear attention to images, and the context 
in which they are embedded. There is a central concern with the production of social 
difference through visuals, as we investigate how a discourse constructs blame and 
responsibility, stake and accountability; how it categorises and particularises; how it 
constructs social difference; and how it produces its claims to truth, and what does not fit 
into this picture of ‘truth’.42 In producing this thesis, we must recognise that we are 
involved in our own discursive formulation. Within a Foucauldian frame, it can be argued 
that this thesis does not produce ‘truths’, only more arguments.43 As this project has done, 
Rose maintains that the researcher must immerse him/herself in the sources in order to 
identify the key themes in words and images, and should not focus simply on one or two 
privileged images. Rather, there should be a focus on how specific meanings are given, on 
clusters of information, looking for associations and within, and connections between, 
clusters.44 
 
No method can completely deal with an analysis of visual images. Discourse analysis 
largely ignores the technological aspects of the production of images, although Rennie 
investigates this through a study of the printing of posters.45 The difficulty with discourse 
analysis is that it can be difficult to know where to stop setting the context. Links can 
become rather tenuous, and as Rose claims, it can be difficult to allow connections to be 
empirically grounded in social practices. Within this project it has, at times, been necessary 
to set boundaries for the context. Rose criticises the lack of ascription of causality in 
discourse analysis, feeling that the method is too ‘descriptive’, as it focuses on the how 
rather than the why of happenings. At times, the relation between discourse and its context 
can be unclear. An over-focus on the institutional production of the image can lead to 
ignoring the image itself, something that this thesis has taken care to avoid by ensuring that 
all contextual material is related to the posters themselves. Rose claims that discourse 
analysis tends not to be concerned with conflicts within institutions. It is clear, however, 
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that this is not the case, both from previous discussions of discourse, and from within this 
thesis, where the difficulties within the MOI are considered.46  
 
Within this thesis, content analysis is used to ensure a focus on elements within images. 
Content analysis is defined as counting what the viewer thinks he/she sees. It was 
originally developed to analyse written and spoken texts.47 It often generates statistical, 
numerical and quantitative data, particularly for computer-aided projects. This project uses 
content analysis as a secondary method, in a qualitative manner. It is used in conjunction 
within a database to identify the key themes, words and images used within the posters. 
Content analysis is methodologically explicit, with rules and procedures to be followed, 
although this project does not necessarily use all steps specified by Rose. The process is 
documented throughout so that the viewer’s own ‘way of seeing’ is made obvious. 
Defining the set of images to be used for this thesis was fairly simple: those available in 
archives, books and on the internet which fell within the limits of the thesis title. Ideally 
the set of images should be complete, otherwise it is difficult to claim that arguments and 
conclusions apply to all posters, a requirement that was problematic for this project. As 
with much historical data, posters were widely scattered, and in many cases unavailable. 
For this reason, we cannot argue that conclusions will necessarily apply to all posters. 
From this available set of posters, appropriate cluster samples were defined. The early 
(first) posters are selected by date. The industrial and ‘enemy within’ posters were selected 
in relation to the strongest available thematic, contextual and reception material. The VD 
case study appeared to provide a near complete documented set of posters produced for the 
VD campaign. The rural and urban case study was selected through reasonably clearly 
defined search terms. Sampling methods are usually expressed in scientific terms, but in 
this project the source availability and the research question defined the sample. 
 
Categorisation and coding of the images are crucial to content analysis. Categories should 
be ‘exhaustive, exclusive and enlightening’, and analytically interesting. Information can 
be defined in a descriptive manner, listing what is ‘there’, or in an interpretative manner, 
using analytical categories. The database for this project largely uses descriptive terms, 
although it is recognised these can be subjective, but the categories used service the 
purposes of the project, because the project’s research questions structured the definition of 
categories. Rose suggests that text also needs coding, but in this case text is placed in a 
                                                 
46
 Rose, G., op.cit., 2001, p.161. 
  36
separate field. Language is interpreted and analysed in terms of discourse when required. 
In order for data entry to be consistent, an explicit description of codes is made available to 
make the working clear (see Volume 2: Part 2).  
 
Results from content analysis are often statistical, as elements are counted, although it is 
not necessary to count every component just for the sake of it. Again, research questions 
define the queries that run through the database. The database necessarily limits the 
research, able only to look at what is in an image, although a lack of something may be 
even more significant. Content analysis and discourse analysis work together because this 
enables to the project to look for the gaps, silences, and contested identities. For this 
project, discourses are identified in case studies through the use of key words from 
database images. This was a two way process. Firstly, contextual research provided a pre-
knowledge of discourses to identify through keywords. Secondly, keywords were 
identified through the database as words, phrases and images were repeated, thus 
formulating rules. This enabled an interplay between extant knowledge and a more 
‘grounded’ approach from the images themselves.  
  
The main benefit of content analysis is its ability to deal with large numbers of images with 
some consistency, and demonstrate the emergence of patterns. However, there are a 
significant number of weaknesses to content analysis. Content analysis by its nature 
focuses only on the compositional elements of an image, but in this thesis this is 
complemented by discourse analysis which considers the production and audiencing of the 
image. Content analysis reduces rich visual material to a series of codes, although we can 
qualify this with the careful selection of categories. Content analysis does not distinguish 
between strong and weak examples of a category, it does not address the interconnections 
between elements of an image, and the overall impression or emotion of the image is lost.48  
 
Having defined the methodological approaches used in the project, we will now map how 
the thesis draws on them. The project is deemed to be largely archaeological, with 
descriptive analysis of what was available to the government in terms of propaganda and 
the poster at the outbreak of war. The institution of the MOI is analysed: how posters were 
commissioned, designed and distributed. Within the case studies ‘rules’ are formulated as 
we identify the repeatability of statements for VD and ‘enemy within’ campaigns and those 
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using or appealing to urban, industrial, or rural populations. The project is driven by some 
genealogical concerns. For example, myths about the spirit of the blitz, the perceived 
incompetence of the MOI, and the supposed complete failure of the first poster, are 
challenged.  
 
The project is set within a modern episteme, where science, professionalism and 
communication are emphasised. For many, God no longer controlled ‘destiny’; people thus 
had the power to change events. Propaganda in a democracy was essentially about getting 
people to change their own behaviour without compulsion, in the knowledge that it was for 
their mutual benefit. The terms ‘propaganda’ and ‘poster’ have been influenced by 
different groups, and have meant different things to different people at different times. 
Discourse analysis enables the project to demonstrate that the activity to which propaganda 
referred existed before the term ‘propaganda’ did. Within the case studies, the project 
considers how issues that made their way into poster campaigns had earlier been defined as 
‘problems’ that needed addressing. We will look at those institutions that gained the power 
to influence the ‘problem’, the ‘solution’, or the design of the poster providing the 
‘solution’. Foucault’s particular interest in the body and sexuality in particular made the 
VD case study a pertinent choice. 
 
This chapter continues with an investigation of the sources and archives used for this 
project, bearing in mind Foucault’s claims that the organisation of the archive is a 
reflection of the concerns of those arranging the information. We reflect on how the 
archives have been formed, with past and current collection, categorisation and access 
policies that have determined what is available (or not) for the project We consider how 
the database is constructed, how it is used to identify discourses, including within the 
visual form and function of the posters, looking for strands that overlap and invisibilities 
and silences. 
 
Within the multitude of national and local archives and museums, there are many different 
sources of posters relevant to the project, ranging from small displays within local 
museums,49 to the national museum of war, the IWM. As this project is intended to 
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consider the national case presented in wartime to the people of the UK, national archives 
have been ranked above the local. There is the danger that such use of sources will make 
the project rather London-centric, but care has been taken to consider sources referring to 
nationalised campaigns. Posters are collected and stored for a variety of reasons, according 
to the way in which archivists may expect them to be studied. For example, in 1972 the 
IWM stated that its collections were available to students of art, history, psychology and 
sociology.50 The Victoria and Albert Museum (V&A) is a major art and design museum, 
and it was questioned in 1998 why, as such, it was holding an exhibition of posters. Some 
critics felt that posters could not be described as ‘art’, but were a product of business 
activity.51 This leads into a debate on the nature of art, which is entirely a subject in its own 
right. Although considered briefly in the next chapter, this is not the central concern of this 
thesis. It does, however, illustrate the diversity of ways in which the study of posters can 
be approached. Posters can be examined as artistic objects, discussed with reference to the 
artistic movements of the age that produced them,52 or admired simply for their 
illustrations. They are often, for example, used as convenient visual depictions for relevant 
wartime topics.53 Although the majority of posters appear to have been collected for their 
artistic value, sometimes they are collected for their historical characteristics. This was the 
case with the posters produced in the 1980s under apartheid by the South African Poster 
Collective. They were assembled by men who risked prison to produce and gather good 
examples. The Collective decided that the criteria of selection for their book 
had to include whether a poster accurately reflected the times, and whether it 
captured in its words, images, its design, shape or colours, a significant moment in 
our struggle.54 
 
In this thesis posters are largely treated as historical documents or artefacts, important 
items of cultural history, to be studied within the context of the political and social age of 
warfare in which they were produced. While it would be possible to write a history of the 
poster that uses only the posters themselves, the aim of this project is to see posters in 
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context, to assess their planning and reception, as well as their design. This requires a 
wider research base. For this reason, this project rests on a variety of sources including the 
posters themselves, MOI administrative records, newspapers, and Mass-Observation (M-
O) research. This wider research is needed as we cannot, for example, gauge planning from 
the poster alone, or see design in an MOI memo. In any study, a decision has to be made as 
to whether the historian will allow the sources to dictate the flow of the project, or whether 
s/he will search out particular sources to answer a set of pre-determined questions. In this 
project, there was a balance between these strategies. Direction was given to the search for 
sources by outlining a series of questions at the start of the project, but sources can and did 
sometimes throw up new and unexpected avenues to follow.55 Conversely, limitations may 
also be imposed by the way archives are maintained and categorised, the perceived 
importance (or otherwise) of collections, and policies of access.  
 
Expected sources, such as the full IWM collection of posters, were difficult to access, 
which inevitably affected the direction of the project, and led to the investigation of other 
specialist collections where they were available, discussed further in Appendix 2. This 
project required access to as many posters as possible to ensure that any conclusions about 
patterns of, say, poster production, could readily be assumed to be accurate. This was 
important in order to avoid the kind of criticisms made by such commentators as Darracott 
and Loftus, who have noted that many general statements about posters and poster histories 
are ill-founded due to the sheer number of posters in existence.56 It is very rare for the 
historian to be able to construct a full history of any series of posters, as demonstrated by 
Mace, who wished to follow the development and use of trade union posters. Mace 
discovered that despite the prominence of posters in rallies, it was the exception rather than 
the rule for posters to be allocated storage space.57  
 
Posters have always been designed to meet a need of the moment. They were never 
intended as unique or precious objects, and as such they fit the Ephemera Society’s 
definition of ephemera: a ‘transient minor document of everyday life’.58 The survival of 
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such objects is erratic, with collectors generally preferring the unique to anything produced 
in multiple copies. The uniqueness of a particular poster affects its price. The posters 
which fetch the highest prices are those which are scarcest, although ‘“rarity” can fluctuate 
with dramatic effect on prices’.59 Originally art museums excluded art with a commercial 
purpose, but many new forms of art, including photography, are now routinely collected by 
certain institutions,60 such as the V&A. Posters were always designed for public spaces. 
We need to question how much the archives that store them have recognised this. Posters 
are often printed on cheap paper, and are extremely large and fragile, with the exception of 
some posters produced at the start of the twentieth century which were intended to be 
collector’s items, and were consequently printed on heavier paper than was usual in order 
to aid their survival.61 This can make the display and handling of such objects difficult, and 
posters tend to remain in museum drawers, rather than on public display.62 As Koshatzky 
maintains, it is only a happy chance when a poster survives its purpose as a selling tool: by 
rights it should be obsolete once it has fulfilled its advertising purpose. Yet the poster often 
influences later ages as a historical document, as a reflection of its time,63 directly 
mirroring social and cultural change whilst disseminating the ideas and images that 
characterised modern periods.64 As Hensher noted: 
[E]very historical event and social movement sooner or later finds some kind of 
reflection on the hoardings, and even a trivial and ephemeral poster advertising a 
play, film or chocolate drink can tell us more about society than volumes of 
historical analysis.65  
 
In 1972, Darracott and Loftus noted that there was no international survey of holdings of 
posters. Due to their unwieldy nature, and the sheer mass available, it was impractical.66 As 
technology has continued to develop, however, the problems of access are being dealt with 
through the digitising of images. Digitising has made images widely accessible through 
                                                                                                                                                    
cannot’. University of Reading, ‘Department of Typography and Graphic Communication’, 
http://www.rdg.ac.uk/AcaDepts/lt/home.html?centres/ephemera_studies/index.html, accessed January 11 
2004, gives details of The Ephemera Centre, opened at the University of Reading in May 1993 by Asa 
Briggs. 20,000 items collected by Maurice Rickards are at the heart of the collection, promoting the academic 
study of ephemera, an emerging discipline. 
59
 Gleeson, J., Miller’s Collecting Prints & Posters, 1997, p.92. 
60
 Heyman, T., Posters American Style, 1998, p.6. 
61
 Paret, P., Lewis, B. I., and Paret, P., Persuasive Images: Posters of War and Revolution from the Hoover 
Institution Archives, 1992, p.xii. 
62
 Heyman, T., Posters American Style, 1998, p.7. 
63
 Koshatzky, K., Ornamental Posters of the Vienna Secession, 1974, p.11. 
64
 Ades, D., The Twentieth Century Poster: Design of the Avant-Garde, 1984, p.7. 
65
 Hensher, P., ‘The Poster as a Pin-up’, Mail on Sunday April 19 1998, p.40. 
66
 Darracott J., ‘Introduction’, op.cit., 1972 (1981 edition), p.5. 
  41
projects such as the Visual Arts Data Service (VADS), established in March 1997,67 now 
known as AHDS: Visual Arts.68 The VADS project was an indicator of the level of 
credibility that visual sources have gained in the humanities in recent decades.69 Many 
Second World War posters have survived in a variety of archives throughout the country, 
although again, there is no survey of holdings. My project attempts to start to remedy this 
by producing a database, discussed below on page 46.  
 
Collection policies have fluctuated over time in response to changing demands, internal 
and external. As the need to account for public funds grows, general museum policies, and 
specific collection policies, have all become much more defined. In Appendix 2 we 
identify the rationales for the existence of each archive and museum used in the project, 
along with specific policies for the poster collection, both at the time of collection, and at 
the time of writing. We consider the benefits and limitations of the sources used, as many 
museums and archives have a very defined focus, and do not intend to have all 
encompassing collections. Each archive aims to have an ‘awareness’ of appropriate 
sources, rather than over-lapping with similar collections. Archives work together to 
ensure that a wide range of sources can be stored between them.70 
 
The background to the involvement of the state in propaganda is largely established 
through a study of the administrative records of the MOI held at the PRO. The strivings of 
government can be seen, particularly its attempts to set up a new propaganda department, 
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intended to echo other departments already in existence.71 A detailed study of the records 
relating to the General and Home Publicity Divisions, the departments in charge of 
planning and producing posters, enables an understanding of the contextual background to 
the posters.72 In Appendix 2, we provide a brief history of the PRO, explaining some of its 
record selection processes. Often the fruition of plans for individual posters cannot be 
tracked through the records, although whether this is because they do not exist as the 
records were not considered important enough to retain, or whether it is due to the filing 
system, has not been determined for this project. In order to choose the most useful files 
from the many available, original classes were selected from those mentioned in the key 
texts, such as McLaine,73 and by utilising Cantwell’s guide to PRO wartime records.74 The 
introduction of an online catalogue in 1998 facilitated easier and more transparent 
searching than using paper files.75 
  
Hansard, the record of parliamentary debates, adds another dimension to the administrative 
picture. It demonstrates those issues regarding the MOI that were so important that they took 
up scarce wartime parliamentary debating time and identifies those who were involved in the 
issues. An index search revealed many debates with a bearing on the MOI. Of particular 
interest are the occasions on which a poster caused such a public or political furore that it 
was awarded parliamentary time. For instance, in May 1941 Dr Edith Summerskill criticised 
the ‘Be Like Dad, Keep Mum’ campaigns for their depictions of women in posters.76 
Autobiographies produced by some of those involved with the MOI provide insights to the 
viewpoint of those who were intimately involved with the events under study and give us an 
awareness of how they perceived their role.77 When using biographies, we must take into 
                                                 
71
 This information can be gained from PRO INF 1: ‘Ministry of Information: Files of Correspondence 1936-
1950’. 
72
 References to the General Division can be found particularly in PRO INF 1/116, ‘Re-roganisation of the 
Communications and General Division’, and references to the Home Publicity Division in PRO INF 1/294 
through to PRO INF 1/328. 
73
 McLaine, I., Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 
1979. 
74
 Cantwell, J.D., The Second World War: A Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office, 1993. 
75
 The National Archives, ‘PROCAT: Reader’, http://catalogue.pro.gov.uk/, accessed July 17 1999. The 
introduction of an online catalogue simplifies accessed to the wide range of PRO records. This, however, is 
still based on the original filing system, established over decades, there is no guarantee that the indexer will 
have thought that searches on topics such as this would be required.  
76
 Hansard: 371 H.C. Deb 5S. May 7 1941, Cols 838-9.  
77
 For instance, the first three ‘failed’ Ministers of Information produced autobiographies, in which they tried 
to justify their position. Cooper, D., Old Men Forget, 1953; Macmillan, H.P., A Man of Law’s Tale, 1952; 
Reith, J.C.W., Into the Wind, 1949. Lysaght, C., Brendan Bracken: A Biography, 1979 provides a biography 
of Bracken’s life, although he destroyed most of his personal papers. Nicolson, N. (ed.), The Diaries and 
Letters of Harold Nicolson. Volume II: The War Years 1939-1945, 1967, contains the diaries of Harold 
Nicolson, a senior member of the MOI, published by his son. 
  43
consideration what information was made available to the author, what the author’s 
particular interest in the subject was, and what co-operation, or otherwise, was gained from 
the subject, or the family.78 Even more significant for this project are biographies of poster 
artists, and a collection of this information can be found in Volume 2, Part 2. This is an 
area where the internet has been key,79 as there are few biographies of wartime artists, with 
those best-documented including Abram Games,80 Hans Schleger,81 Fougasse (Kenneth 
Bird),82 and Kauffer,83 although this information can often concentrate more on their post-
war work.  
 
The government was interested in monitoring reactions to their campaigns, and often 
turned to surveys, particularly those deemed ‘scientific’. These were seen to offer proof 
because of their quantitative nature, although this masks the fact that categories are a social 
construct. Mass-Observation provides a key source for historians interested in human 
responses to events in the war. The MOI asked M-O to help determine public opinion 
during the first years of the war. Several career civil servants felt that M-O was too much 
‘on the left’,84 and not a sufficiently disinterested enough source, so it set up its own Home 
Intelligence Division (HI) in May 1940. For the first few years of the war, M-O provides a 
set of rich resources. During the time that M-O was involved with the MOI it monitored 
the response to the first government posters, ‘Your Courage’, (figure 1), and ‘Freedom is 
in Peril’ (figure 22).85 M-O produced a report for the Advertising Services Guild on the 
government’s domestic propaganda in 1941.86 It is important to establish how the public 
pulse about posters was taken. The reservations that the government had about using M-O 
need to be considered along with the question of whether it has any implications for the 
records available now. The collecting methods of M-O need to be understood in order to 
assess how the information it provides can be analysed,87 and these are discussed in 
Appendix 2.  
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Mass-Observation believed that their work was of a more ‘revealing quality, different from 
the bald replies obtained by ordinary market research interviewing techniques’.88 It was 
violently attacked in 1951, however, by the social scientist Abrams, for its qualitative 
stance.89 This was possibly because their sample questioning was derived from only two 
places: Bolton and Finchley. It is unclear how far they correlated results with research in 
other areas. Despite these possible drawbacks, the information provided within M-O file 
reports and topic collections has provided much material on reactions about which it would 
be impossible to find data elsewhere. Electronic search catalogues were used, searching 
within document titles only, using terms taken from posters already seen, and 
recommendations from M-O staff. Quantitative results were provided by the British 
Institute for Public Opinion (BIPO), which originated from the Gallup poll successful in 
the USA since 1935. These were used by the MOI alongside M-O’s qualitative results, 
although it is unclear how often. Many of BIPO findings, both from the war and 
afterwards, have been published. These demonstrate that the questions were largely 
concerned with gathering general opinions, which may have impacted on plans for posters 
campaigns, although there are no specific questions about posters.90  
 
Contemporary newspapers provide some official views of reactions to some posters, 
although we cannot assume that they reflect the viewpoints of the general population. The 
inclusion of articles discussing posters in wartime newspapers, in which space was very 
scarce, indicates that the editor felt that there was public interest in the subject, and 
therefore that they had some impact on public life. Some of the press coverage simply 
heralded the arrival of campaigns, often with little more than an image,91 although articles 
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were more likely to be critical.92 A thorough study of several contemporary wartime 
journals, such as the trade journal Advertiser’s Weekly93 and Art and Industry,94 was made. 
These commented, both positively and negatively, on some of the government strategies 
for propaganda, and on specific posters that the government produced. Advertiser’s Weekly 
has, in particular, provided much information which has aided the dating of some poster 
campaigns, as have the other journals to a lesser extent. The articles help to set the posters 
in the context of other government and commercial advertising, demonstrating the extent to 
which commercial businesses supported the MOI through the donation of funding, staff 
expertise, poster sites, and the repetition of slogans in their own advertising. The journals 
also provide some information about poster designers of the era, although they still focus, 
unsurprisingly, on the major artists. Selected extracts from these and other newspapers can 
be found in two scrapbooks containing various newspaper and journal clippings, held in 
the IWM. These were collected by the Secretary of Edwin Embleton, who was the Studio 
Manager at the MOI for the duration of the war.95 Embleton was responsible for the 
design, poster and visualising group for both the general and overseas production divisions. 
These files indicate the type of praise and criticisms to which he reacted.96 Unfortunately, 
many of these clippings are unsourced and undated for no thought was given to 
preservation until they were obtained by the IWM.97 To identify the source of most of these 
would require a search through every wartime newspaper, looking for the smallest scraps 
of information, well outside the scope of this project.  
 
This chapter now continues to examine the new sources produced as a part of this project.  
London Transport posters are contained within a searchable database. It was an aim of this 
project to produce something similar for Second World War government posters. Although 
the IWM is now digitising a substantial portion of their collection of posters,98 at the outset 
of this project they appeared to be concentrating more on fine art works, rather than 
wartime posters. Initially, a paper database was used, but this did not provide a flexible 
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enough solution, and with user-friendly software on the market, a computerised database 
was employed (see Volume 2, Part 2). Historical researchers have used computerised 
databases since the 1960s, although at that point it was possible only to ‘number crunch’ 
quantitative information such as census returns. This was still the key use of computerised 
databases at the start of this project. Developments in software have enabled wider use, and 
by 1994, databases of visual sources had already been developed.99  
 
Data must be standardised as much as possible to work within a database. This is difficult 
as historians tend towards non-standardised data in historical material, and thus no 
database is ideal for historical data, even specific historical databases such as Kleio.100 For 
financial reasons the only affordable database package for this project was Microsoft 
Access. Fitting in the data required some compromises with the source, as Access is largely 
intended for real-life data, which rarely includes informed assumptions. Posters are largely 
unstructured sources. Slogans are often reused within posters and this can be standardised 
but they are often accompanied by ‘complementary text’ which required an extra field. 
Images can be standardised to a certain extent: for example ‘woman’ can be an image 
entry. This, however, loses any nuances as to the type of woman, so describing the poster 
image requires some thought. We may recognise something as the same - say, ‘London’ 
and ‘Ldn’ from the context of the document - but the computer will not recognise even 
marginal changes. In this case a decision was made to allow several different variations of 
the same item, rather than to alter the data to fit the standardisation. 
 
Particular problems that have been identified with databases for historians include 
organisational renaming, a noticeable problem in the Second World War, for instance in 
1941 the National Safety First Organisation became the Royal Society for the Prevention 
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of Accidents (ROSPA). Temporal change has been identified as another problem, although 
within this thesis we do not have the problem of identifying dates in a particular calendar, 
with poster production we do have a problem identifying dates at all. The solution here was 
to designate four separate fields - earliest, latest, best guess, and reasoning - simply to date 
the posters. It is not possible to set up a detailed chronology of different poster campaigns 
and their relation to the timing of other propaganda campaigns because this was recognised 
as outside the scope of the project. A third problem that has been identified is a linguistic 
problem: we must be particularly careful of anachronisms within the data.101 
 
Databases allow flexible access points to the data, for instance, accessing the poster 
through queries for either the artist or slogan, or both. It was anticipated that such a 
database would produce a detailed chronology of different poster campaigns and their 
relation to the timings of other propaganda campaigns. The lack of such information, 
however, prevented this being as comprehensive as expected, and computers can make use 
only of information that is available and explicitly recorded.102 Databases can help 
organise information, although the expected end result will affect the structure. In this 
project it was hoped to search for information on, for example, all posters designed by a 
certain artist, should the information be available. In many cases several of the facts, 
including information as to artist, date and print run, were simply not available, even after 
a thorough study of the records held at the primary archives discussed above.103 This was a 
constraint, as it is difficult to argue, for example, that poster design improved over time 
without knowing the chronological range of the posters. To overcome this, various 
strategies were employed in attempting to determine the date of the posters, the majority of 
which are undated. Their reproduction in a contemporary magazine might indicate that that 
is the latest possible date at which they were produced, as they are unlikely to appear 
before they were produced. In some cases, however, Advertiser’s Weekly and other 
newspapers heralded a forthcoming campaign, in which case the date was sometimes 
available. The next tactic was to consider the text: for example, dates, legislative measures 
or particular military campaigns mentioned were dated within a brief wartime chronology. 
Images were also examined to see if there are any clues in the items pictured. For example, 
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a particular make of bomber would preclude a poster from having been designed before its 
introduction. This is all rather speculative and requires general knowledge about wartime 
equipment. This has been deemed largely another project in its own right.  
 
For this project, questionnaires were deemed a cost effective method of gaining some 
insights from those who remembered the war, and this is discussed in more detail in 
Appendix 3. The questionnaires were originally intended to provide the basis for 
interviews, but other sources were deemed more worthwhile within the time available. 
Tosh argues that public records give too much prominence to administrative 
considerations, and there is a need to turn to other sources to know more about the political 
pressures to which those in power responded, in particular, first hand oral evidence for 
recent history.104 The PRO contains many documents that deal largely with administrative 
issues, which provide much information on governmental involvement but little on the 
thoughts of the populace, a gap which  M-O goes a long way towards filling. As noted 
earlier, all such information will have been through selection processes, and what remains 
does not necessarily answer the questions in which the project is particularly interested. A 
questionnaire provided the chance to ask questions relevant to this particular study, and 
also to assemble a new archive for future historians, although problems of storage, access 
and dissemination (including data protection issues) needed to be taken into account.105 
However much material the historian manages to accumulate, definitive answers will 
remain elusive106 but the more sources that are available, the more confidence the historian 
can have in information when it is corroborated by other sources.  
 
The effect of time on memory when using answers from the questionnaires needs to be 
considered, as ‘small events that have less impact are more likely to be forgotten than 
significant events. Recent events are reported better than events that occurred in the more 
distant past’, although not necessarily as people get older.107 The ‘collective’ histories of 
society, from which myths arise also need to be taken into account. There are many of us 
who did not live through the war who also know many of the poster slogans, probably 
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taken from populist books. The credibility of answers can be affected by nostalgia, and by 
hindsight: British people were among the victors in the war, and that may affect the way 
things are remembered. The “voice of the past” is inescapably the voice of the present 
too.108 The term ‘myth of the blitz’, for example, is still disputed by some of those who 
remember the war years:  
Despite modern attempts at “de-bunking”, wartime spirits were mostly high. 
Certainly, we did not walk about with permanent smiles, in addition to the usual 
horrors of war … times were hard, and there were invasion fears, bombs, V-1s and 
V-2s. However, there was never any thought of surrendering…: we always thought 
we’d win the war; and posters - like other official forms of propaganda - played an 
important part in keeping-up morale.109  
 
Having discussed the methodology of the project and sources available, the following 
chapter will discuss the place of propaganda in British history and the place of the poster in 
British history. 
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Chapter 2: Placing the British Experience of the Propaganda Poster in 
Context 
This chapter builds on the conceptual aspects of propaganda and the poster discussed in the 
introduction, to foreground the British experience of propaganda. In particular, it compares 
the democratic experience of propaganda to the totalitarian experience. This chapter then 
continues by contextualising the British experience of the poster in the years leading up to 
the Second World War. This necessitates a brief investigation of the development of the 
poster world-wide, with a particular focus on European and avant-garde designs, which 
may have impacted on British designers. The poster is considered as both a commercial 
tool, and as a weapon in the government armoury, alongside other methods of 
communication and mass-media. 
 
Propaganda is as old as history and several studies investigate propaganda through the 
ages.1 In many minds propaganda is associated first and foremost with the Nazis,2 then the 
Soviets,3 and certainly with totalitarian states.4 As we saw in the Introduction, propaganda 
was not only a tool of the totalitarian states. Propaganda itself is neutral, it is how it is used 
that is significant. The British had certainly used propaganda in the past, although whether 
it had been labelled as such is a different matter. Propaganda is not only transmitted 
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through the medium of print, but through rituals, pageantry, symbolism, flags, music and 
parades, to name but some forms. Bartlett claims that it ‘has been customary for 
democratic countries to neglect official political propaganda until they are faced by some 
serious crisis’,5 and that this therefore makes it extremely difficult for those who are called 
on to direct propaganda in times of crisis. With the changed nature of war, mass war, in the 
First World War, propaganda obtained a new significance.6 It still took three years in the 
First World War before a Department for Information was formed in 1917, and it did not 
become a Ministry of Information (MOI) until 1918. Previously there was a variety of 
‘agencies which - constantly merging and splitting - discharged the various functions 
related to morale, news, censorship and propaganda’.7 The MOI was formed to instil some 
order into the chaos, and had been intended to control and influence opinion at home, and 
in allied, neutral and enemy countries.8 The Nazis believed that the British experience of 
propaganda in the First World War was so good that Goebbels took it as his model for 
Nazi propaganda.9  
 
Whereas totalitarian propaganda is often backed by violence, democracies need, at the very 
least, to give the impression that viewers have a choice.10 The population had to be cajoled, 
encouraged and persuaded rather than being forced. The state needed co-operation from its 
populace.11 Jackall describes the era from the Great War to the Cold War as ‘the axial age 
of propaganda’. Throughout this age state propaganda machines developed as major 
powers competed ‘for the allegiance and good will of their own civilian populations’. 
Democratic states needed civilian morale in order that ‘the vast industrial apparatus that 
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produced ships, weapons and bombs and thus made total war possible’ could function.12 
Historians have argued that the disbanding of the MOI at the end of the First World War 
showed a distaste by the British for state propaganda, but discussions were still held in 
1918-19 regarding the possible formation of information machinery to serve the whole of 
Whitehall.13 Departmental publicity machinery grew in the interwar years. By 1939, 
virtually every Whitehall department possessed ‘some form of established information or 
publicity machinery’.14 The Government recognised the need to use propaganda as ‘the 
service departments were under some pressure to maintain a good public image and 
satisfactory recruiting levels’. There was a recognition of the need for ‘effective 
advertising’, covering areas such as health education, road safety and telephones, in order 
to inform the public about new regulations, encourage them to take advantage of new 
services, and instruct them how to use them correctly.15 
 
Although Lt. Commander D.S.E. Thompson wrote that ‘Propaganda is not properly 
understood in this country outside the ranks of the 5th Columnists and subversive 
organisations’,16 in the inter-war years the advertising industry had increased in 
professionalism.17 Studies increased knowledge of theories and methods of propaganda, 
although Grant would argue that most began with the assumption that it was dangerous, 
and therefore concentrated on providing remedies and antidotes to its power,18 rather than 
in trying to discover means of utilising it. There was a fear that individual political parties 
would use propaganda for their own advancement, and therefore it was felt that the state 
should not participate in national propaganda. Investigations in persuasion were 
particularly focused upon attitude research in the 1920s and 1930s: ‘Emphasis was placed 
on conceptually defining attitudes and operationally measuring them’.19 Propaganda has 
been studied as history, political science, psychology, sociology, and as a study of 
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ideology.20 Propaganda was, and is, used for a variety of reasons, in particular persuasion, 
education, information, celebration, encouragement, morale boosting, and identification of 
enemies. A variety of techniques of propaganda are used, in particular appeals to the 
emotions of hatred, fear, anger, guilt, greed, hope and love, and the appeal to the intellect.21 
Theoretical models were developed in the interwar years, and we discuss two of them here, 
the ‘magic bullet’ or ‘hypodermic needle’ model, and the ‘socially-mediated’ model. 
 
In the 1920s the ‘magic bullet’ theory appeared to be popular (Model 1, Appendix 4), 
although O’Donnell claims that it was not as widely accepted by scholars as many 
academic studies indicate. The theory viewed human responses to the media as uniform 
and immediate, with E.D.Martin claiming that propaganda was offering ‘ready-made 
opinions’ to an ‘unthinking herd’. The theory was not based on empirical research, but on 
scientific discourses, which assumed that people were uniformly controlled by biologically 
based ‘instincts’, reacting more or less uniformly to ‘stimuli’.22 Foucault ‘maintains that 
there is no unmediated access for the human mind to a genuinely knowable original and 
truthful reality’.23 Research in the 1920s established that audience variables, such as the 
demographic background of the audience, influenced the way that people behaved.24 In the 
1930s Aldous Huxley recognised that propaganda ‘canalises an already existing stream’; it 
is only effective on those already in tune with the ideas expressed. Propaganda encourages 
its audience further along the direction that they are already moving, and reinforces partly 
formed ideas.25 Brown echoes this, claiming that nobody can create emotions which are 
not already there. The propagandist ‘is limited to evoking or stimulating those attitudes 
suited to his purpose out of the total spectrum existing in his audience, attitudes which may 
be innate but are more usually socially-acquired’.26 Propaganda can be successful if does 
not concern deeply rooted convictions. If it does not affect the audience too much, they do 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., pp.1-2. 
21
 See, for instance, Brown, J.A.C., Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing, 1963, 
p.23; Bartlett, F.C., op.cit., 1940, p.24; p.74. See Giles, G., ‘Through Cigarette Cards to Manliness: Building 
German Character with an Informal Curriculum’, in Goodman, J., and Martin, J., Gender, Politics and the 
Experience of Education: An International Perspective, 2002, pp.73-96. When German schools were 
bombed, the education system broke down so children were educated with cigarette cards, ‘designed as 
character-building and ideological tools’, ‘blatantly tied to anti-British propaganda efforts’. 
22
 O’Donnell, ‘Propaganda and Persuasion Examined’, in Jowett, G., and O’Donnell, V., op.cit., 1999, p.164. 
23
 Munslow, A., Deconstructing History, 1997, p.120. 
24
 O’Donnell, ‘Propaganda and Persuasion Examined’, in Jowett, G., and O’Donnell, V., op.cit., 1999, p.164. 
M-O FR 1536, ‘Have you a mind of your own: Article by Kathleen Raine in Modern Woman about the 
influence of propaganda’, December 1942 noted that ‘Hitler acts on the assumption that by propaganda 
people can be made to accept anything. We British like to think that we have a mind of our own.’ 
25
 Doherty, M., op.cit., 1997. 
26
 Brown, J.A.C., op.cit., 1963, p.23. 
  54
not care so much about the issues involved, although they need to be made to care deeply 
about the issues.27 In other words, propagandists are drawing on long standing, pre-
existing, discourses. In propaganda, suggestion cannot create, it can ‘only arouse, combine 
and direct tendencies which already exist’, as people will not ‘follow something that is 
genuinely opposed’ to their character.28 In the 1940s, influenced by psychological 
discourses, these ideas were formalised, by Lazarsfeld (Columbia University), into the 
multi-step model, which illustrated audience variables (Model 2, Appendix 4).29 Having 
briefly considered some of the propaganda theories, we now move on to consider some of 
the key propaganda devices identified. 
 
The Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) was formed in New York in 1937. Although 
disbanded in January 1942, soon after Pearl Harbor, it was influential, and its findings are 
still widely quoted in propaganda texts. Concerned about the threat of propaganda to the 
democratic way of life, the IPA published a monthly bulletin, in the second issue of which 
they established the seven common ‘devices’ of propaganda.30 The first of these was ‘name 
calling’, which would give a bad name to items, ‘individuals, groups, nations, races, 
policies, beliefs and ideals’ (hereafter ‘product’) in the hope that the audience would reject, 
rather than rationally consider, them.31 The second was ‘glittering generalities’, where 
viewers were expected to associate, without questioning, products with a concept such as 
‘democracy’. This would assume that the propagandist understood the term in the same 
way as the viewer.32 The third was ‘transfer’, whether the authority, sanction and prestige 
of something the audience was likely to respect or revere (such as science or religion) was 
applied to the product being promoted. This could be used both positively and negatively 
as, for example, the Nazis racist policies were rationalised by both science and religion.33 
Bartlett notes that social prestige could be externally conferred onto propaganda from a 
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‘social institution which is already widely revered in their society, or which has already 
established some permanent character of unchallenged authority’.34 Symbolism used in 
propaganda was largely borrowed from established institutions, rather than being a product 
of the propaganda itself.35 
 
The fourth propaganda device of the IPA was the ‘testimonial’, where a respected or hated 
person would endorse or refute a product.36 Often a form of celebrity endorsement, the IPA 
asked viewers to question what qualifications such celebrities had for giving an 
endorsement.37 The fifth was ‘plain folks’, where the propagandist would attempt to 
convince the audience that their ideas were good because they are just ‘one of the 
people’.38 For example, in the Second World War, Churchill, unlike Hitler, generally 
appeared in public in civilian clothes, rather than a military uniform. The sixth was ‘card 
stacking’, which involved the selection and use ‘of facts and falsehoods, illustrations or 
distractions, and logical or illogical statements to give the best or the worst possible case 
for an idea, program, person or product’.39 The seventh was the ‘band wagon’, which 
would appeal to the innate desire to ‘follow the crowd’. Viewers, usually within a 
particular group, would be shown that ‘everyone else is doing it’, and ask why they are 
not.40 
 
Having established some of the debates surrounding the notion of propaganda and some of 
its key theories at the time of war, we now consider the poster as a tool of propaganda. The 
poster has an enduring value, as:  
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[b]ehind each poster lies two converging lines: the political or cultural development 
to which it refers, and the aesthetic development it represents. The poster itself is 
the point at which the two lines meet.41  
As Anderson noted, the printed word shaped the past,42 and by 1940 the contemporary 
world was a partially literate society where the printed word had ‘established very nearly 
everywhere an institutional authority’. Bartlett argues that people generally accepted, 
without question, what was read in newspapers, articles and books. Published pictorial art, 
‘the poster, the photograph, the film’, may have ‘a similar and for the most part 
unquestioned authority’.43 This suits propaganda, where a common trick is to replace all 
argument by statement, as the audience cannot be allowed to see another side to the 
argument, they cannot be allowed the possibility of reflection.44 
  
This next section draws on the methodological framework outlined in chapter one to think 
about aspects of form and style. It sees poster design as an encoding through which ‘truths’ 
were produced, and form and style as social and political entities through which ‘power’ 
works. We will analyse the encoding of the visual in terms of the utilitarian, the disruption 
of traditional ideas, the political, and as a medium for transmitting ideas. Here, we will 
illustrate ways in which poster design disrupts notions of high art and images produced for 
the populace. This relates to one ‘contest’ between artists and designers over the power to 
define the poster and the way it later drew on older traditions of ‘high’ art. Here, we will 
trace the ‘institutionalisation’ of poster design in terms of groups’ power to produce 
posters. As the Introduction outlined, there is a wide ranging debate about the purpose of a 
poster, and indeed what constitutes a poster itself, is. This is partly dependent on the 
differing views as to what can be considered the predecessors and origins of the poster: 
‘[i]n one sense the poster is a modern invention; in another it is as old as history.’ Some 
have identified forerunners and precedents for the poster. It ‘could be said that any pictorial 
representation publicly displayed has something of the poster in it, especially if the object 
is propaganda.’45 This has led to diverse identifications such as cave paintings,46 biblical 
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precedents,47 evidence from the previous ‘industrialised’ nations, 48 shop signs,49 printed 
notices,50 and political cartoons.51 Most of these, however, were produced singly. It can be 
argued that the poster only became a truly modern mass medium in the nineteenth century, 
having developed as societies and technologies evolved. 
 
It could be conceived as dangerous to impose an artificial unity on the many different 
contradictory movements that influenced poster design, appearing under the umbrella of 
modernity or modernism. Nevertheless, there are several key trends and ideas. These 
include the rejection of tradition; and the superiority of new ideas that stress the 
importance of novelty, change, immediacy, non-permanence, progress, and the importance 
of the future, often accompanied by secular and utopian beliefs. Democratisation, 
industrialisation and urbanisation were significant to modern movements, and in many 
cases scientific rationality, technology and the machine were at the centre. There are key 
debates as to whether modernist art should be formalist or functionalist, particularly in the 
English avant-garde movements. Avant-garde movements were seen as the more radical 
elements of modernity, with a more obvious social purpose. They encouraged evolutionary 
ideas, and non-conformity, particularly against the stylistic expectations of the public. 
From 1910 onwards the avant-garde was defined as a rejection of the past and the cult of 
the new.52 
 
The work of political British art movements, such as the Artists International Associated 
(AIA) and the medieval modernists, are often ignored in favour of more radical 
Continental movements. This gives the impression that the British absorbed trends from 
international movements of graphic design without thought for the political movements 
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from which they had arisen. Jobling and Crowley, and Saler make it clear that the 
continental movements did have a significant impact on British graphic design but the 
British did have their own way of doing things.53 Unlike the Continental movements that 
emphasised radical revolution, the British emphasised slow, evolutionary change, 
following a long tradition of pragmatism in which modernist thought was allied with non-
threatening Protestant values and commercial structures.54 Modernity created not only new 
technology, but also a new set of conditions, rising from the French Revolution, which 
included a recognition that working people needed to be taken into account and catered 
for.55 In the UK, industrialisation and urbanisation both created the need, and provided the 
audience, for methods of mass communication. More consumer goods were produced, 
which needed to be sold, and advertising developed to target the new condensed urban 
market.56 Within a frame of modernity the modern poster is little more than one hundred 
years old, the product of a mass market for consumer goods and services.57 As a tool of 
mass communication, the poster targeted, and still targets, large audiences with common 
experiences.58  
 
Early posters, from the fifteenth century until the 1870s, were largely typographical. 
Illustrations, if used at all, were largely woodcuts. By 1900 the pictorial poster was well 
established, heavily influenced by developments in the 1820s when illustrated books were 
promoted by posters ‘created by artists of recognised talent who brought to [them] at once 
effectiveness and prestige’.59 Technological changes, notably the discovery of the 
lithographic process by Alois Senefelder in the eighteenth century, made illustration 
simpler. This process became quicker, cheaper and easier, until the cost was reduced to a 
commercially acceptable level by 1866, when Cherét perfected the process and set up a 
printing establishment in Paris,60 an establishment that had a key place ‘reserved’ for the 
poster design artist.61 Many regard Cherét as the ‘father of the poster’. The first to design a 
truly ‘modern’ poster,62 he was largely responsible for introducing the simplification of 
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elements to draw attention to the message; for giving vitality to the main figures; and for 
losing distracting backgrounds and thus focusing the eye on the main figures. The lettering 
was also perceived to be important, with a need to fit in with the overall design, whilst 
being clear and legible from a distance, as seen in figure 23.63 Cherét, however, was not the 
first serious artist to turn his hand to poster design. British artist Frederick Walker designed 
The Woman in White in 1861,64 (figure 24), a poster which was shocking to many, as it was 
the first in which the image took over from the text.65 It was also the first time that a Royal 
Academician had designed a piece of artwork specifically for advertising: many did not 
believe that his talents could be lent to such a low branch of ‘art’. Royal Academy work 
had apparently been used in posters before, but such works had had a primary purpose as 
art works; their use as poster art being only secondary.66  
 
Metzl blamed the ‘excessive’ concern for propriety in the Victorian age, combined with a 
feeling that only established authority could dictate taste, for inhibiting the self-expression 
of artists and stifling development of British poster design until the First World War.67 In 
Victorian art and design, ‘decoration was a virtue that symbolised the comfortable 
Victorian life’.68 The Arts and Crafts movement, founded in the 1850s, remained largely 
consistent with the Victorian desire for ornamentation, but in a more simplified form, 
creating a ‘total work of art’ (see example, figure 25).69 William Morris and John Ruskin, 
influential figures in this movement, supported the idea of an ‘English art for England’, 
and of ‘fitness of purpose’, ideas that were later espoused by many of the Continental 
avant-garde movements.70 Morris’s prejudices against industry dominated English design 
from this point until the turn of the century.71 Symbolist art became important in the 
nineteenth century, reintroducing iconography as a pictorial element. Symbols, such as 
mythological figures from the past, could sum up feelings such as patriotism, which could 
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not be depicted realistically,72 such as ‘John Bull’ (figure 26), used in the First World War 
to induce patriotic feelings.  
 
Art Nouveau, which arose in the 1880s, was of global influence. It set aside nineteenth 
century historicism and contributed to the early concepts of modernism.73 Perceived as 
something ‘completely new’, it had borrowed heavily from the oriental arts, as 
demonstrated by Toulouse-Lautrec (figure 27), an important figure in poster design. He 
introduced the concept of economy of line and detail in the 1890s. Inspired by Japanese 
woodcuts, which involved ‘the startling use of perspective in selected areas of the 
composition, the absence of shadow, [and] the dominant role of bright colours’,74 after 
Toulouse-Lautrec the poster was used with increasing frequency and was accepted as a 
design form worthy of exhibits and critique.75 The primary purpose of a poster is 
communication, but it appears that most posters gained critical approval for their aesthetic 
appeal, rather than any appraisal of their value as publicity. Also inspired by Japanese 
design, the Beggarstaffs76 simplified designs to the essential elements, using flat blocks of 
colour, leaving it to the imagination of the viewer to fill in the details (figure 28).77 The 
Beggarstaffs dispensed with the British obsession for placing poster designs within a 
frame,78 where a picture was usually used as a poster, with the printers (‘the experts’) 
adding the lettering later, rather than the text being an integral part of the design.79 
Between 1895 and 1906, ‘the history of poster art changed from an intriguing, exotic, 
historical and often introspective style, to one that marked the beginnings of the rational, 
functional, dynamic and eclectic approaches to modern design’.80 Manufacturers did not 
appear to care about good design, either wanting ‘recognised art’ to sell their products, or 
simply concerned with ‘selling their products in the most convenient and often the most 
garish manner’.81 The Beggarstaffs were not particularly popular with manufacturers, as 
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they refused to depict the product itself, but they had a significant impact on British poster 
design in the 1890s.82  
 
By 1900 the ‘flower of Art Nouveau began to wither’, and there was a more functional use 
of design, with Charles Rennie Mackintosh reviving the use of the cube in his posters.83 
There was increasing professionalism in what was now regarded as an industry. The poster 
had become very popular, there was more standardisation in the format of the poster, and 
collectors’ magazines such as The Poster were being produced.84 Manufacturers had begun 
to appreciate the importance of advertising, although most still believed that the printers 
could be relied upon to produce clear designs. The title ‘commercial artist’ now existed, 
although the artists themselves claimed that there was limited room for manoeuvre in 
poster design as manufacturers continued to insist on a realistic depiction of their product. 
With the concept of brand packaging still fairly new, companies needed to promote their 
packaging and, later, the development of brand characters.85 
 
Prior to the First World War, John Hassall was influential, bringing the bold colour style of 
Cherét to the UK. Although many would have considered his artwork inferior, 
characterised by a ‘lack of sensitivity’, this can be considered a bonus for poster design.86 
Hassall’s essentials for a successful poster were simplicity and bold colours to ‘hit the 
passer-by right in the eyeball’ in ‘England’s misty climate’, evidence of which can be seen 
in figure 30.87 Hassall was likely to have been influenced by the German Plakatstil (poster 
style), of which Ludwig Hohlwein was a major proponent (see figure 31). The hallmarks of 
Plakatstil were ‘bold lettering, a simple central image, and distinctive eye-catching 
colours’ competing for attention amongst other items in the street.88 By 1914, the poster 
was accepted as a valid tool for propaganda, being cheap and easy to disseminate, and 
‘Europeans’ were used to seeing posters everywhere. The fundamental elements of design 
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- concise text and simple illustration - had been acquired.89 This may have been true for the 
majority of posters, but there were still poor examples around. It is likely that the more 
interesting designs attracted attention and so were remembered and kept, rather than the 
poorer specimens. 
 
Art and graphic design have influenced each other, although different primary functions 
are defined for each: art as creation; graphic design as communication.90 During the inter-
war period, several important movements influenced poster design, particularly the 
typographical elements.91 Defining the movements clearly is difficult, as they tended to 
influence each other, and it is rare for ‘pure’ forms to survive. With rapid reaction and 
change, due to the speed of communication within Europe, many of these movements were 
short-lived.92 The abandonment of figurative design in favour of an abstract approach to 
space and form had a great impact on the course of art and design. Such movements were 
also influential in demanding an art that could contribute to a better society.93 In post-
revolutionary Russia and post-war Europe, there was a search for a new social order, 
resulting in idealistic movements in both politics and the arts: the ‘rise of the common man 
required a universal language of symbols expressive of the newly articulated goals of the 
utopian society’.94 Pictorial posters and films were important for disseminating the 
Communist message across the country, requiring only low levels of literacy, and with 
little chance of local interference with the central message. Pictures were believed to be the 
best medium to get the message across, with seventy-five per cent of the society 
unschooled.95 The Orthodox Church had recognised this for centuries, successfully putting 
its message across through the means of religious icons, as seen in figure 32.96. Never 
intended as mere aesthetic objects, these worked within the framework of belief and 
worship to which they belonged.97 
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Before the imposition of Socialist Realism in the artistic and literary movements in the 
Soviet Union in 1932, there had been many important revolutionary avant-garde 
developments, which emphasised the excitement of the new. Suprematism, developed in 
1913, (figure 33), was a purely abstract form of art utilising simple geometric shapes in the 
belief that figurative realism was little more than a copy of existing reality, whilst the 
painted surface was a living reality itself.98 Malevich, creator of the movement, is quoted 
as saying:  
[T]he simplest geometric forms - a square, a triangle, a circle, and intersecting lines 
- composed into dynamic arrangements on the flat surface of the canvas or into 
spatial constructions… are to express the sensation of speed, flight and rhythm.99 
Constructivism replaced Suprematisim by 1918, becoming popular in the 1920s. This 
rejected such purely artistic and spiritual intentions, concerned with applying art for 
constructive purposes,100 as the artist was a worker with responsibilities. The Constructivist 
movement demonstrated that ‘visual elements such as line, colour, shape and texture 
possess their own expressive qualities’.101 Although it was banned from the USSR by 
1925,102 the movement had world-wide influence, as international exhibitions were held, 
publications were produced, and several of its leading theorists, including Laszlo Moholy-
Nagy,103 taught at the Bauhaus (figure 34), in Germany in 1919.  
 
The Bauhaus was set up as a school to teach good design, along the line of William 
Morris’s Arts and Crafts workshops, although with more emphasis on the machine.104 The 
Bauhaus encouraged simplicity in graphic design, utilising blank space whilst pursuing the 
goal of absolute legibility,105 and photography and montage largely replacing realistic 
drawings as illustration.106 Prior to the Bauhaus gothic typefaces were still widely used in 
the German speaking world.107 Under the influence of Moholy-Nagy, a new typeface 
(‘New Typography’) was designed, consisting of a single alphabet, clear, legible, and 
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lower case, which enabled cheaper printing with only a single set of typesets needed. It 
was stressed that letters should not be forced into shapes to suit the aesthetics of the poster, 
but that their functionality was more important. Many Bauhaus theorists were so convinced 
of the strong visual impact of such typography, that the text was felt to take on the function 
of the image,108 especially when combined with the possibilities of setting text at bizarre 
angles. The dismissal of the upper case has always been considered too radical to be 
widely applied in the UK,109 but London Transport was ahead of the Bauhaus, producing 
the functional Johnston typeface (figure 35) in 1915.110 Banished from Germany in 1933, 
along with all other abstract movements, by the Nazis who favoured realist designs, ‘art 
that could easily be understood and whose depictions of men and women exemplified the 
Germanic race’,111 this enabled the movement to have a far-reaching international 
influence, as the artists enamoured of its ideas spread round the globe. Moholy-Nagy, for 
example, sought asylum in England in 1935, and spent two years as a successful 
commercial, graphic and exhibition designer, before moving on to the USA.112  
 
The De Stijl movement (also known as neo-plasticism), formed in the Netherlands in 1917 
by Theo Van Doesburg,113 was a major influence on the Bauhaus movement, partly due to 
the influence of El Lissitsky on Moholgy-Nagy.114 All representational components were 
eliminated from paintings, reduced to their elements: straight lines, plane surfaces, 
rectangles, and the primary colours (red, yellow, and blue) combined with neutrals (black, 
grey, and white), the work was to be understood entirely on its own terms (figure 36).115 
The Bauhaus and De Stijl movements produced posters largely for their own use, rather 
than for advertisers, but their influence is still felt in the modern poster. Concentrating on 
the function of the poster as communication, they abandoned the ornamentation of Art 
Nouveau.116 Cubism (1907-1914), illustrated in figure 37, radically altered the treatment 
and perception of form and space. Although mainly concerned with fine art, most of the 
members of later avant-garde movements had been influenced by Cubism at some stage.117 
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Artists ceased to depend on direct observations from nature,118 with geometrical 
compositions taken from natural forms. This expressed the idea of the object rather than its 
pure physical form, which Ashley Havinden felt was important to poster design, where the 
designer wished to do more than simply show the subject. Cubism allowed for the object to 
be reduced to something that could be seen at speed.119  
 
Futurism, begun in Italy in 1909, exalted the speed, ‘power, force and motion of 
machinery’, glorified violence and was opposed to harmonious composition.120 Italy, as a 
new country, vigorously protected its past heritage, legitimising itself with the previous 
heritage of Rome and the Renaissance. This revolutionary movement, which wanted to free 
itself from the shackles of history, was a shock.121 The Futurists found posters a suitable 
medium as, unlike so much ‘traditional’ art shut away in museums, posters were in the 
public sphere. Futurist typography ‘sought to disrupt traditional notions of harmony, space 
and composition on the printed page’.122 Unlike the Bauhaus, which used a single 
typographical alphabet for clarity, futurists used as many different colours and typefaces as 
were necessary were used to get emotions across, see figure 38. For example, a bold and 
ragged typeface would suggest a scream,123 whilst still maintaining clarity. Often allied 
with Mussolini’s Fascist movement,124 the Futurists wished to put the spectator ‘in the 
centre of the picture’, and get the viewer to engage with the image, in much the same way 
that a poster designer would wish.125 The Vorticist movement, an offshoot of Cubism, 
began in England in 1914. Vorticism was in favour of the energy and mechanisation that 
the Futurists demonstrated, but criticised them for showing machines as ‘moving blurs’, 
rather than the cold, angular objects they were.126 Vorticism was the first organised 
movement towards abstraction in English art, and subsequently had considerable influence 
on the development of British modernism.127 McKnight Kauffer, who created many 
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designs for the London Underground, is often allied with the Vorticist movement, and one 
of his designs can be seen in figure 39. 
 
Dada arose in Zurich during the First World War, a nihilistic and ‘desperate reaction to the 
horrors of war’.128 Dadaists were reacting against ‘norms’, such as the typical layout of the 
page, and they were intent on disrupting a social order that was capable of ‘wholesale 
murder’.129 It reacted with the use of ‘absolute nonsense’, loving the absurd, negating all 
values regarded as inviolate until that point, including patriotism.130 As seen in figure 40, 
in Dada, typographical rules were overturned. Lettering no longer performed simply as 
text, but made ‘images which formed a sense of their own’.131 It involved the use of 
extreme abstraction, and introduced the concept of photomontage.132 The Russian film 
director, Eisenstein, claimed that  
montage was based on the premise that one image combined with a second 
produced a conclusion or third image, which bore no relation to either of the first 
two separately but was the summation of the first two used together.133  
 
In figure 42 we see an example of Surrealism, a movement that arose in France in the early 
1920s as a new and positive reaction to the negative forces of Dadaism.134 As with 
Cubism, it tried to go beyond the surface planes,135 uniting the ‘conscious and unconscious 
realms of experience’,136 embracing ‘the absurd, the accidental and the illogical’.137 Its 
influence allowed poster designers to go beyond the physical, realistic depictions of a 
product, with, for example, manipulations of scale assisting in promoting the message, as 
seen in figure 43. Symbolism and experimental geometrical shapes, in particular the 
mechanisation of man, also developed. For example, Cassandre’s ‘Dubo-Dubon-
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Dubonnet’ (figure 44) can be described as ‘simplified realism’ which remained a popular 
poster art force until the wartime years.138 Statistical imagery, derived from the Viennese 
Isotype system, was introduced into the UK in the 1930s,139 and photographic technique 
improved. Such images were acceptable to the avant-garde in a way that figurative painting 
was not:140 ‘Photography was the perfect medium for reproducing reality and giving the 
reader a terse, pointed message’.141 Towards the end of the 1930s, Darracott claimed that 
international exhibitions and publications had fostered a European style in poster design.142  
 
The Continental movements influenced the British, enabling poster designers, for example, 
to use strange juxtapositions of design, rather than straightforward representations of 
products.143 There is considerable disagreement about the extent to which this occurred. 
Hillier claims that although many traditional artists, such as Wilkinson, Cooper, and 
Newbould, were still working in the UK, the French influence of Cassandre was strongly 
felt.144 Ades claims that in the UK and the USA there was a general failure to adopt 
modernist design. Similarly Hollis claims that New Typography was only superficially 
understood in the UK, and although many posters ‘weakly emulated French Cubism’, 
tradition remained the most powerful influence.145 Although it was accepted that the poster 
was adopting a new and important role, generally posters were still dependent on their 
commercial function.146 In contrast Paret argues that the poster had been politicised by the 
Second World War through its ideological use in the inter-war years by the Soviets and 
Nazis.147 LeMahieu claims that  
[w]hatever their political affiliations, Left or Right, the avant-garde in England 
retained the moral distance, social detachment, and aesthetic superiority 
characteristic of traditional elite culture.148  
Saler challenges this with the claim that ‘visual modernism in England during the interwar 
period tended to be interpreted within a utilitarian and moral framework.’149 The British 
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did produce some adventurous designs, such as Kauffer’s Vorticist designs (figure 39) - 
but the work tended to remain largely detailed and nationalistic. Rickards, however, lays 
this fault at the feet of the clients, such as Shell and London Transport, rather than the 
artists.150 
 
Saler argues that the English avant-garde was the most successful in Europe in the interwar 
period, in terms of breaking down the distinctions between art and life, with the public the 
most accepting of the idea that non-representational forms conveyed moral messages.151 
The English did link art with politics, with many in the modern movements desiring a 
better social democratic order, but they tended not to go to the extremes visible on the 
Continent and so were less threatening. The:  
English avant-garde promoted a very “English,” gradualist vision of social change, 
in which art, allied to commerce, would permeate life, subtly transforming society 
into an organic and harmonious community.152  
Careful to emphasise the utilitarian values, and thus economic function, of modern design, 
important in a country whose dominant values underscored industry and practicality,153 
British art discussions were not politicised in the way that those on the Continent were. 
Unlike German Dadaism and French surrealism, movements oppositional to the dominant 
culture, the English intellectuals were as much a part of the Establishment as they were 
critical of it.154 Barnicoat claims that the ‘posters produced during the Second World War 
did not add anything to the achievements already established in the development of poster 
design generally’.155 Ades goes further, arguing that the outbreak of war ‘brought to an 
abrupt end experimental graphic design’ and ‘a conservative realism’, such as that 
employed by Frank Newbould, once again gained dominance in posters.156 The influences 
of the inter-war art movements can be clearly seen in many designs, however, such as 
those by Abram Games, who utilised modern graphic techniques in his wartime posters. 
  
The poster had come under attack in the early years after the First World War, seen as a 
part of the system of propaganda believed to have fed atrocity lies to the population, when 
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many believed they had been tricked into signing up.157 First World War recruitment 
posters had included much romanticised imagery, which sent many into war unprepared. 
After the First World War there was a reaction against romanticism in art, and a desire for 
more realistic modernism.158 As seen earlier, British design had been deeply committed to 
Victorian decorativism for almost a century, but in the post-war era there was a reaction 
against this, and the country embraced a functionalism consistent with the needs of modern 
industry.159 Art Deco arose in the UK after the First World War, acceptable to the middle 
classes, it was an unthreatening alternative to the increasingly abstract styles growing on 
the Continent (figure 45). It took styles from many of the modern art movements, 
presenting them in an acceptable form that was particularly suitable for advertising.160 
 
In the First World War the chief communications media for the British state were the 
poster and the newspaper. Weill claims that until 1914, the state had made no official use 
of the illustrated poster. Official posters had been used, but these were strictly typographic, 
and did not use the general techniques of commercial advertising: they ‘contented 
themselves with proclaiming the law from their specially reserved places’. As the 
government ‘played virtually no role in commerce or industry, its duty stopped there’.161 In 
the First World War, the letterpress poster and the press were still used to impart detailed 
instructions to the public, but the government also made much more use of the pictorial 
poster. Hutchinson claimed that prior to the First World War, the first ‘total war’, posters 
had appealed to little more than the commercial common denominator, and that the war 
pressed it into serious service, as a weapon, for the first time.162 McQuiston, however, 
demonstrates that the women’s suffrage movement was probably the first to use ‘the styles 
and techniques of commercial advertising posters to service a distinct political cause or 
anti-establishment viewpoint’.163 The art nouveau styles prevalent in the early years of the 
century softened the ‘ugly suffragette’ theory (see figure 46). Posters produced by the 
Labour Party prior to the First World War had served a political cause before the 
suffragettes utilised them, although many appear to be little more than enlarged cartoons, 
as we see in figure 47. There were others that were much more hard-hitting, summarising 
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the main issue in a single word: ‘Workless’ (figure 48).164 An author in Art and Industry in 
1940 claimed that First World War posters could be perceived in a romantic light 
compared to the ‘typographical go-to-it injunctions’ (figure 49), influenced by modern 
design, of the Second World War. The First World War seemed to be ‘a struggle between 
men and men, and machines scarcely appeared at all’. The economic background appeared 
‘non-existent’,165 although there are some spectacular examples of posters dealing with 
savings, including the clever use of money transforming into bullets (figure 50). Machinery 
also made its appearance in some posters, although, as the first war of the machine age, the 
propaganda style of previous wars was still used in the Boy’s Own tradition (figure 51) and 
it does appear to be quite rare.  
 
In the First World War the poster had developed, not only to sell the idea of the war to the 
public, but also to sustain it despite the massive drain on life and money. Commercial 
artists were approached to sell the ideas, as conscription was not introduced until 1916, 
before which British men were to be shamed into volunteering with implications of 
cowardice and loss of honour, with posters designed in a similar vein to the white feathers 
handed out to ‘cowards’.166 Alternatively, through atrocity propaganda, they were to be 
scared into what the Germans would do to their friends and families.167 Metzl argues that 
many First World War posters failed as, although they were very dramatic and shocking, 
they left nothing to the viewer’s imagination: they were too literal.168 Circulating atrocity 
stories, such as those regarding the bayoneting of babies, do not appear to have shown 
themselves much in British posters.169 British efforts at atrocity posters were very weak, 
(figure 52), when compared to the vicious American creations, such as figure 53, but even 
then they were only a fraction of the posters produced, most of which were more mundane. 
Graphic realism, demonstrated in the posters of Brangwyn (figure 54), was also not very 
common, as ‘[d]eath was to be sold like Bovril, with nice, healthy, cheerful placards’. The 
belief in the cheerful, public school atmosphere of life in the army was continued as 
censorship kept the realities of trench warfare away from the public. As we see in figure 
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55, the First World War was presented as a sports match between the British and the 
Germans, and glamorised in posters which used allegorical-heroic approaches, for instance 
through the images that likened the activities of the soldiers to those of George and the 
Dragon (figure 56). Even realist images were romanticised: for example, men copied 
images (the bandwagon effect) of soldiers going into battle with arms raised in salute, an 
attitude in which they were unlikely to remain alive for long.170  
 
Bernstein regards the years from 1932 to 1939 as the high point of British commercial art 
with Shell-Mex, headed by Jack Beddington,171 and London Transport, headed by Frank 
Pick,172 two of the major influences on poster design in the UK in the inter-war period. 
Posters are often described as the ‘art gallery of the street’,173 and both organisations went 
to some lengths to ensure that not only were serious artists, such as Eric Kennington, 
employed, but lesser-known artists were also given a chance. Pick, noting that industry had 
driven the artist out of his traditional role, felt that it could build a new role for the artist as 
a poster designer. With posters inexpensive to produce, this was not a huge financial 
risk.174 Freeman compares the patronage given by Shell-Mex and London Transport with 
that of the Medicis in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries;175 while Saler describes Pick as 
a ‘medieval modernist’, part of Britain’s long-standing association of art with everyday 
life.176 A reputation was gained, particularly by London Transport, for producing 
experimental and esoteric aesthetics: presenting works by artists such as Kauffer, in a style 
Hollis describes as ‘vulgarised Cubism’.177 Although this reputation was deserved for some 
designs, for every experimental design there were about a dozen ‘conservative’ designs to 
cater for more general public tastes.178 Many good pieces of ‘high art’ do not really work 
as poster design, but such images were still used by both companies, with the image 
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presented as though in a frame, (figure 29), and the message not integrated into the design 
but rather added as a title.179  
 
Both companies were concerned with selling their corporate image, selling their products 
only incidentally,180 then a fairly new concept. Shell made no visual reference to their 
product, instead linking the word ‘Shell’ with a series of ‘professional types’ who would 
use the product, indicative of the type of branding with which we are familiar today.181 The 
functional Johnston typeface was designed specifically for use by London Transport to 
distinguish company information from other information, including on posters, which were 
seen as part of a means of producing a positive corporate image.182 Roger Fry, of the 
Bloomsbury movement, felt, in 1926, that such corporate advertising was designed to 
detract attention from the inferior quality of service provided for increasing amounts of 
money, although this was a minority view.183 Many believe that Pick’s efforts to use 
modern art on the Underground familiarised the public with modern art, and thus 
facilitated public understanding of such art movements.184 Pick himself did not object to art 
being baffling on the first encounter, providing that it did not lack ‘meaning and direction’, 
but felt that many modern art works demonstrated a ‘moral laxity’ on the part of artists. He 
was interested only in those works of art that were fit for their purpose, utilitarian and 
universally acceptable.185 Mass-Observation showed various art works in a northern town, 
and found that modern art works provoked the most reaction, even if they were not 
liked.186 In respect of advertising, the aim is to get the message remembered, and thus this 
could be viewed as a bonus. 
 
It was not until the 1920s that the profession of ‘graphic designer’ became known and 
respected, partly through the efforts of Beddington and Pick. Previously, the title 
‘commercial artist’ had occasionally been used, but generally, art other than for ‘art’s sake’ 
was dismissed as a ‘weak’ branch of the arts. Bernstein claims that this title of ‘commercial 
art’ was appropriate as it separated the poster from ‘pure art’ and reminded the poster 
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designer of the poster’s purpose,187 although C.R.W. Nevinson claimed that the portrait 
painter who accepts a commission to enhance drawing-rooms is as much a ‘commercial 
artist’.188 Pick found it difficult to persuade ‘fine artists’ to engage in commercial design, 
and it was not until after the war started that art became less exclusive, was redefined as 
design and thus became a respectable career option.189 Schools aided the integration of 
‘designer’ with ‘artist’, demonstrating a more integrated curriculum, which blurred 
distinctions:190  
Art and Handicraft should no longer be considered as separate subjects with 
different outlooks - “they should properly be regarded as part and parcel of one 
important branch of teaching”.191 
 In 1935, the government formed the Council for Art and Industry (CAI), to which Pick 
was appointed Chairman. Their first project was to conceptualise art education in schools, 
using ideas that Pick and others had been expressing for many years. Calling for the 
integration of art with every activity in schools, they now had the authority of the 
government.192 After 1936, Pick changed his mind, and re-imposed distinctions between 
the ‘hedonistic artist’ and the ‘professional designer’. He claimed that modern art was 
immoral and degenerate and called for the old romantic style of narrative illustration to be 
used in posters. These ideas permeated government departments and by the end of the war 
the distinction between fine and commercial art was re-imposed.193  
 
The freelance designer was generally considered by contemporary advertisers, purchasing 
the services, to produce better work, and had more prestige than the advertising agency. By 
the end of the 1930s, however, advertising agencies were taking most of the work, and 
advertising was subsequently criticised for too much standardisation and lack of 
imagination.194 The designer (generally) lost status as agencies often took the credit for any 
designs produced, with freelancers simply employed in order to complete the work that the 
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agencies required. Consequently many designs are un-accredited and un-signed,195 a habit 
that remains for the many posters produced in the Second World War.196 
 
The increasing professionalism of the industry meant that campaigns tended to have more 
specific targets, with success measured by sales results.197 During the interwar period, 
many were keen to emphasise in the inter-war period that ‘propaganda … required 
assessment not by aesthetic standards but by effects’.198 With no market research in the 
1920s, the effects of posters could not be quantified. Even now, however, we cannot 
assume that everyone involved in the production of the poster, or those who viewed it, felt 
the same, ‘and the extent to which a poster expresses either a general opinion or an 
idiosyncratic view cannot always be sorted out’. The origins of a poster remain difficult to 
trace, and information about such facts as production runs and distribution are not easy to 
obtain, making any poster’s effectiveness very difficult to determine.199 This is a universal 
problem in the study of posters, where it is difficult to measure the effect that a poster can 
have, as it rarely stands alone, but is one of many media used to promote a message. 
 
Previously we noted the early use of posters by the Labour Party, dismissing them as little 
more than cartoons. In the inter-war period, party-political posters were developed and 
were much more hard hitting, a tradition which has continued to the present day. Some of 
the posters produced by the parties, the Labour Party in particular, such as Workless, 
(figure 48) are still very memorable. They reflected the industrial developments of the day, 
depicting the wireless (figure 57), emphasising that they were in touch with the modern 
world. As a party in opposition, for all except nine months in 1924, the party could make 
more hard-hitting statements through their posters, influenced also by their more 
ideological agenda, than the Conservative Party.200 The latter were concerned with 
maintaining the status quo, (figure 58), and emphasised individual effort.201 Political 
advertising is very adversarial, unlike brand marketing, where there is a wide range of 
competition. Elections are generally a two-horse race, and thus attacking the other side is a 
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feasible strategy: the ‘evil plans’ (name-calling) of the other side make better propaganda 
than the positive plans of the party.202  
 
There were state-sponsored propaganda schemes during the inter-war period, although they 
were largely concerned with overseas, rather than home, issues. The Empire Marketing 
Board (EMB) produced many posters,203 with designs purposely sober and restrained, in 
the traditional style, designed to make the populace aware of the products of the Empire 
(figure 59).204 A large new campaign to foster ‘telephone mind[edness]’ was instigated for 
the General Post Office (GPO) in April 1931 by Clement Attlee, Postmaster General.205 
Once again this was ‘dignified’, and attracted criticism from Crawford, head of an 
advertising agency, amongst others, for its lack of modern design.206 Attlee wanted to show 
that the state was using publicity, although he did not particularly care if it was a success or 
a failure, believing that it would demonstrate the ‘fallacy’ of publicity.207 In 1933 the GPO 
employed Stephen Tallents, author of The Projection of England,208 a man who was later 
to have an important role in promoting the UK abroad, as Public Relations Director.209 In 
1935 he left the GPO, highly critical of the posters used so far. He felt that the artists who 
designed the posters did not have enough practical knowledge of the GPO’s activities, and 
had mistakenly assumed that GPO would want ‘conventional’ designs, and therefore were 
not able to promote the activities of the GPO fully.210 It was a very different story for the 
EMB and GPO film units, headed by John Grierson, who insisted on ideological freedom 
for the films produced. Grierson believed that the government of the day could be 
separated from the state itself, resulting in a social democratic agenda produced in the face 
of a laissez-faire Tory government.211 Both the EMB and the GPO, whose film units later 
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formed the basis of the Crown Film Unit under the MOI Film Division,212 had commercial 
gains to be made from publicity, but the same could not necessarily be said of health 
propaganda. The British government in the inter-war period practised health promotion due 
to public service responsibilities, although Grant claims that the financial outlay here was 
very low compared with that in some other countries.213 It had been stressed in 1924 that 
health propaganda should follow best commercial practices but many of the posters 
employed at the time in health campaigns were ‘aesthetically unappealing and over-
crowded with information’ and therefore ‘unsuited to capture the attention of the mass 
audience’, see figure 60.214 In chapter seven, we will focus on the VD posters in the 
Second World War, and consider if these criticisms still applied.  
 
Wainwright, having visited an exhibition of First World War posters, claimed that the ‘gulf 
between those vulgar, absurd and gaudy bludgeonings of the last war, and the posters of 
this, is almost as great a difference between the two wars themselves’.215 The MOI 
produced a wide variety of works and styles, with few restrictive measures placed on 
poster designs submitted. Freeman claims that the MOI recognised the value of posters and 
‘in accordance with the established working procedure they enlisted the services of many 
freelance designers’.216 These included Fitton, Henrion, Lewitt-Him, and Fougasse, and 
many of the foreign designers who had arrived in the UK in the 1930s, fleeing European 
totalitarian movements. While many went on to the United States, they impacted on British 
design, leading to wider experimentation, which continued during the Second World War. 
The commissioning of artists is discussed further in the next chapter. After the inauspicious 
start of the ‘Your Courage…’ poster (figure 1), considered further in chapter three, posters 
relied on information over persuasion, promises rather than threats, and rational appeals 
over fear.217 Metzl claims that in the Second World War there was no need for the war to 
be sold in the same way as had been necessary in the First World War, as people were 
conscripted in for most activities.218 As a result, the poster had a different role to play: ‘[i]t 
may even be that the function of many posters was simply to be seen, to contribute to an 
atmosphere of involvement in the war effort’.219 
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Democratic propaganda had a different role to play, than that of totalitarian states. Using a 
range of propaganda techniques, British posters did not appear to have a ‘clear ideological 
purpose’, unlike those in Germany.220 In Germany, the Nazi government took complete 
control of art, an ‘area of society that was economically, politically and militaristically 
unthreatening’. The only other country to elevate art to such a status was the Soviet 
Union.221 It is still not clear what state involvement there was in dictating art movements in 
the UK, as there is little information that has survived. Alternatively there may have been 
nothing to survive, if the British government did not care about ideological biases. As a 
result, we tend to assume that a design style was used simply because it worked, with scant 
regard for the ideological movements that had produced the techniques, although Saler has 
disproved this view to some extent. It is even more difficult, if not impossible, to establish 
what the British public thought of graphic design at any time but we can establish what the 
government thought the people would accept.  
 
With a great diversity of design styles, it can difficult to identify a particular British 
wartime poster ‘brand’. Here we must beware of sweeping statements, as wartime posters 
were both traditional and modern, often within the same campaign. The likelihood is that it 
was the interesting designs that were kept and commented on. British posters were 
functional and pragmatic, and although many retained traditional elements, modern traits 
were evident. This included simpler, bolder, less crowded designs using cleaner lines. 
There was a more integrated, concise, graphic, and creative use of text. Representational 
rather than realistic designs were possible, as abstracted elements, scale manipulations, and 
photography were used. More standardisation in technique and sizing was evident as a 
result of the increasing professionalisation of the industry. 
 
As we can see, the poster at the start of the Second World War was not the product of any 
one institution. Throughout this chapter we have seen boundaries blurred between high and 
commercial art, and artists often had dual roles. Their high art methods influenced their 
commercial roles and vice versa, although artists did not necessarily use the same signature 
for both types of work. Various art movements had questioned the moral, ideological and 
functional purposes of art and communication, as had manufacturers and the government 
who used the poster medium. Education had impacted, with decisions on the separation or 
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inclusion of high and commercial art within courses. Science had provided technological 
advancements which improved the ability of the poster to be a mass communication 
medium. 
 
Working within a modern episteme, where science, professionalisation and communication 
for the benefit of all concerned was emphasised, the languages of the artistic styles outlines 
in this chapter contribute to these meanings of modernity. The message was more 
important than the style, but the style contributed to the message, and the form of the 
message supported the posters’ function as a meaningful form of communication. Avant-
garde poster artists in particular looked to art to contribute to a better society, and used art 
to disrupt existing traditions, and approved of the poster as a less exclusive, more 
accessible form of art. In contrast to the more traditional, ultra-realistic, artistic styles, 
modern designs, particularly abstract designs, even if not liked, provoked reactions, which 
reinforced the posters’ function. Having discussed the artistic contexts of poster design the 
thesis moves on to consider the administrative history of the MOI, with an emphasis on 
how posters fitted in to the organisation’s structure, and on how the poster’s role was 
determined in the Second World War. 
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Chapter 3: Commissioning, Design & Distribution, with a particular 
focus on the MOI and the first posters produced  
This chapter focuses on the production and distribution of government publicity in the 
Second World War. The Ministry of Information (MOI) was expected to be the central 
governmental publicity machine, an institution that sought to regulate its population 
through discourse. In this chapter we briefly consider its formation and role, including how 
it drew on previous experience, and gained the power to influence British propaganda, but 
concentrate more explicitly on the publicity producing divisions. Within this chapter, we 
reflect upon how the MOI looked to promote self-regulation amongst British subjects, 
providing them with information, in order to produce what Foucault would term ‘docile’, 
‘useful’, ‘functional’ and ‘productive’ bodies contributing to the British war effort. Having 
seen how the MOI generally worked, and the place of the poster division within that, we 
will move on to consider how the division commissioned, produced, distributed and 
displayed posters throughout the war, focusing particularly on the posters produced in the 
first few weeks of the war. 
 
Most historians dealing with the subject of the wartime MOI have started from the premise 
that the MOI was a shambolic and disorganised division, unprepared for the start of war.1 
Like any wartime creation, the MOI underwent many changes, and it is certainly difficult 
to define the structure of the MOI, even just one portion of it, as it continued to reorganise 
in the face of press criticism. Early on in the preparation stages the planners recognised 
that the public needed ‘a definite conviction that the whole question of Government 
Information’ would be ‘in firm and efficient hands’. Tying in with the ‘magic bullet’ 
theory outlined on page 53, it was believed that the citizen would need to be ‘clearly and 
swiftly told what he is to do, where he is to do it, how he is to do it and what he should not 
do’.2 The Fleet Street Press, however, threatened by the possibility of state regulation and 
censorship, aggressively targeted the MOI, although news and censorship were no longer 
functions of the MOI after October 3 1940.3 Local newspapers looked to the MOI as 
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‘helpers’ rather than ‘oppressors’, and thus the reputation was higher in the provinces.4 
With many ‘how-to’ books produced during the inter-war years, suggesting that anyone 
with a measure of common sense and intelligence could be successful in advertising,5 the 
‘average man’ also believed that, although he could not criticise the service departments, 
he could criticise the MOI.6 Historians, including Chapman, are now challenging the idea 
that the MOI was a dysfunctional failure. Chapman used the Films Divisions of the MOI as 
a reference point to demonstrate how ‘a democratic state created a workable and efficient 
propaganda organisation almost from scratch… one which played its full part in achieving 
eventual victory.’7 Controversy and failure always create more interest for historians, but 
more attention should be paid to the achievements that the MOI actually made.8 
 
Planning for the establishment of the Ministry of Information in a time of war started on 
October 14 1935, with the formation of a sub-committee of the Committee for Imperial 
Defence (CID).9 The formation of the MOI has been well documented in several texts,10 
but we consider here some issues that are central to this thesis. Several disparate agencies 
had been involved in propaganda in the First World War, with home propaganda the 
responsibility of the National War Aims Committee, established to combat ‘war 
weariness’.11 There was no Ministry of Information until 1918, an unpopular organisation 
with the British governing élite who found its work distasteful and ‘un-English’.12 Despite 
Beaverbrook’s desire for the MOI to have a post-war function, the MOI was disbanded 
almost immediately the war ended.13 Interwar developments in physical communication 
methods and theories of propaganda suggested that for any future large scale war, the 
                                                                                                                                                    
have a better effect on civilian morale, since some at least of the critical reactions to the posters have been 
caused by the attacks on the Ministry’, with ‘The reptile press’ handwritten in the margin. For more 
information, see Balfour, M., Propaganda in the War 1939-45, Organisations, Policies and Publics in 
Britain and Germany, 1979, p.62, and McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, pp.35-42. 
4
 PRO INF 1/849, ‘Secret Memo drafted by Nicolson’, January 16 1941. 
5
 Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.33. 
6
 Cooper, D., Old Men Forget, 1953, p.286; Macmillan felt this rang true from his own experience in the 
Second World War. Macmillan, H.P., A Man of Law’s Tale, 1952, p.166. 
7
 Chapman, J., The British at War: Cinema, State and Propaganda1939-1945, 1998, p.vii. 
8
 Ibid., p.40. 
9
 PRO CAB 16/127, ‘MIC 1 Committee of Imperial Defence: Sub-Committee to prepare plans for the 
establishment of a Ministry of Information.’, October 14 1935. 
10
 Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, pp.53-56; Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.223-246; McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, pp.12-
33; Taylor, P.M, ‘If War Should Come: Preparing the Fifth Arm for Total War 1935-1939’, Journal of 
Contemporary, History, Vol. 16, 1981, pp.33-45; Willcox, T., ‘Towards a Ministry of Information’, History, 
Vol. 69, October 1984, pp.398-414. 
11
 Grant, M., op.cit., 1994, p.29. See also Taylor, P., ‘If War Should Come’, op.cit., 1981, p.33. 
12
 Taylor, P.M., The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-1939, 1981, 
p.13. 
13
 Ibid., p.46. Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, p.54 noted that the Nazis, impressed with the British First World 
War propaganda effort, based their own model on it 
  81
efficient conduct of propaganda activities, for which the MOI would be key, ‘might prove 
to be scarcely less important than those of the fighting services’.14 The new MOI planners 
wished to profit from their example, but the records were unable to be found, either 
destroyed or lost in transit during the intervening decades,15 although some information 
was collated.16 
 
Enthusiastic volunteers planned the MOI alongside full-time work.17 Sir John Reith 
proposed that the home front took ‘clear precedence’ over foreign fronts,18 but his 
suggestions were rejected in favour of a paper by Leeper of the Foreign Office. Leeper 
stressed a similar set up to governmental publicity prior to 1917. He did not appear to have 
assimilated the fact that the MOI would be aiming at an entirely different audience to that 
of the First World War, more directly concerned with the Home Front rather than simply 
recruitment. As Campbell-Stuart noted when he resigned from the MOI in 1940, ‘what had 
done very well for the Kaiser’s war would not do for the Führer’s’.19 Robertson noted a 
comprehensive propaganda policy, using the most up to date publicity, would be required 
immediately on the outbreak of war. The MOI could not take up where it had left off in the 
last war, as there had been enormous developments, including the advent of broadcasting, a 
‘great and enormous channel’ and film had progressed greatly.20 Leslie, of the Gas, Light 
and Coke Company, had been involved in the shadow organisation for the MOI. He had 
got the impression ‘that the plans were ambitious… in their evident intention to include 
within the Ministry every possible channel of communication between the Government 
and the people’.21 
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During the inter-war years, information activities had become an accepted function of 
government.22 After the Post Office established a public relations division in 1933,23 
practically all government departments had established a press liaison section.24 Grant cites 
the existence of these various agencies as a major problem in the formation of a centralised 
propaganda department in the Second World War. Each department wanted to conduct 
propaganda in their own way and objected to centralisation. They felt that those 
responsible for designing propaganda policy needed to have control over its production as 
well.25 From the variety of these agencies arose the idea for national agency, with 
increased inter-departmental workings forming the basis for the MOI.26 Tallents and Reith 
called for a centralised department, particularly with regard to posters and films, which 
were ‘of a highly technical character’, and required ‘expert staff’.27 Pre-war, the Ministry 
of Labour, the Armed Forces and the ARP all ran ‘overlapping and wasteful’ campaigns 
that competed for recruits, with each department explaining the campaign only from angle 
of their interest.28 The MOI expected to ‘be regarded in principle as the centre for all 
Government publicity concerning the war’, undertaking publicity for wartime departments. 
Peace-time departments with publicity organisations were expected, at least initially, to 
continue their own work.29 The publicity work of government departments was considered 
by the Select Committee, specifically: the Admiralty, the War Office, the Post Office, the 
Board of Education (which included the National Fitness Council), and the Ministry of 
Labour. Although often the objective and type of publicity used were the same, the 
methods used were fundamentally different.30 Experts in the United Kingdom were also 
consulted, particularly the Post Office (GPO), and it was even suggested that their poster 
production machinery would be taken over.31 Note had also been made of peace time 
activities of agencies such as the British Council, and a wide range of commercial 
companies and agencies, including LPTB, Shell-Mex,32 Imperial Airways, and Kodak.33 
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Much of the Ministry’s planning was done in secret as the government were fearful of 
public reactions when seen to be using ‘propaganda’, as seen in the previous chapter, a 
word which had received many negative connotations since the First World War. In 
January 1938 a progress report established that a lot of work had been done,34 although 
when the MOI was mobilised for two days over the Munich crisis in September 1938,35 it 
was shown that there was still much to be done. Although a false alarm, this raised the 
question of whether the MOI could be left unformed until war had already begun, or 
whether it could form prior to war. There were problems with either decision, the former 
leading to confusion due to a lack of preparation, the second ‘essentially meant war, and 
the Government could not allow the impression to form that it had resigned itself to such a 
probability’.36 A plan presented by Sir Stephen Tallents, a senior civil servant with a lot of 
previous publicity experience, to avoid the unpreparedness of the MOI shown at the 
Munich crisis, was rejected as it involved some take-over of the work of the peace-time 
departments.37 Blamed for the Ministry’s problems, Tallents was dismissed, replaced ‘by a 
man with no prior experience of propaganda’.38 
 
It was known that the next war would be fought by the civil population, and it was 
expected to be a war of nerves, where maintaining public morale was to be of ‘primary 
importance’. The government would have ‘to go far beyond anything that has been done in 
the past’, using ‘every existing and conceivable type of advertising publicity and 
showmanship’, which would have to ‘be utilised and co-ordinated’, producing the 
argument for a central controlling office for information.39 Lord Macmillan claimed that 
not many people felt ‘the urgency and importance of this fourth armament’ or recognised 
‘the severe and practical preparation which its effective use involve.’40 Cooper conceived 
                                                                                                                                                    
33
 PRO INF 1/712, ‘Publicity in the United Kingdom’, undated. 
34
 PRO INF 1/1, ‘Progress Report’, op.cit., February 1938. 
35
 McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.16. 
36
 Taylor, P., ‘If War Should Come’, op.cit., 1981, pp.38-40. 
37
 PRO CAB 16/127, ‘Fifth Meeting of the CID sub-committee to prepare plans for the establishment of a 
Ministry of Information in a time of war’, 14 December 1938. 
38
 Taylor, P., ‘If War Should Come’, op.cit., 1981, p.45. 
39
 PRO INF 1/10, ‘Functions and Organisation of the Ministry. Memorandum by E.B. Morgan’, early 1939. 
40
 Quoted in McLaine, I., op.cit., 1979, p.15. Interested parties echoed this sentiment. See anonymous, 
‘Government has Realised Advertising’s Possibilities’, Advertising Review, February 24 1940, p.13, quoting 
Chapman, G.R., Secretary of the Advertising Association. Chapman described wartime publicity and 
propaganda as Britain’s ‘fourth arm’, still relatively unused, unlike in German, where such power had been 
‘used for an evil rather than a good end’. See also, anonymous, ‘Wartime Advertising, in Battledress, Forms 
a Second Front’, Vol. 118, No. 1,535, October 22 1942, p.71, quoting Sir Harold Mackintosh, President of 
the Adveritisng Association. 
  84
of the MOI as one of the fighting services: Goebbels propaganda machine was successful 
because he fought with a vast army at his back, unlimited expenditure, and no opponents in 
the field.41 The government could not ‘afford to have the British public less united and less 
enthusiastic than the German public’. The Home Publicity Division (HPD) complained that 
they had to ‘compete with an enemy machine, costing millions a year, which touches and 
influences every phase of the national life and which has taken years to build up’.42 
 
The MOI was not formed until the outbreak of war, with Lord Macmillan appointed as 
Minister of Information on September 4 1939,43 at which point the MOI was composed of 
an Executive and an Advisory Council. See Appendix 6 for the layout of the Executive 
Council on September 8 1939, comprised of thirteen Directorates, composed of four major 
groups.44 The MOI went through several Ministers in quick succession. Macmillan, with a 
Tory seat in the House of Lords, was criticised as he was unable to defend the position of 
the MOI in the House of Commons.45 On January 5 1940 he was replaced by Reith, 
previously director-general of the BBC.46 Reith looked to Chamberlain for support in 
standing up to the Service departments,47 and fought to achieve War Cabinet rank for the 
MOI.48 He complained that the MOI had no real authority,49 and could not properly 
function without access to all the relevant information.50 On May 12 1940, Churchill 
replaced Reith with Duff Cooper, providing the place on the War Cabinet that Reith had 
coveted.51 Criticised, particularly for the quality and quantity of MOI staff,52 Cooper noted 
that there was plenty of advertising talent within the MOI, but that it was an uncontrollable 
‘monster’.53 He blamed many failures of the MOI on Churchill, who he believed was not 
interested in the subject.54 On July 20 1941, Brendan Bracken was appointed Minister of 
Information. Unlike his predecessors, Bracken, a close associate of Churchill’s throughout 
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the 1930s,55 could get the press56 and the Prime Minister to listen to his ideas, was 
confident in tackling the Ministry’s adversaries, and scorned ‘the exhortation of the British 
public’.57 
 
As the MOI underwent many changes, there were very few divisions that remained in 
place from the beginning to the end of the war. It was planned that the MOI would be 
developed in two stages, with Publicity and Collecting Divisions to be established later, 
but as soon as possible after war was declared.58 In 1935, it was expected that the Publicity 
Division would ensure that the national cause was properly presented to the public both at 
home and abroad. Government and enemy actions were to be explained, examined, and 
criticised. Its role would be ‘to watch for subjects in which publicity is required’; ‘to 
prepare material’; and ‘to arrange the distribution of such material through the appropriate 
channels’. It was expected that there would be separate sections dealing with each type of 
propaganda medium. The head of each section would advise whether the topic was suitable 
for his medium, and suggest topics for which it was suited. It was anticipated that there 
would be a general section to determine all policy and allot media in consultation with 
heads of sections.59 In November 1937, preparatory work began,60 and in July 1938 the 
planning of the HPD was begun in earnest.61 Geographical departments would plan and 
guide publicity, whilst the technical departments would execute, in consultation, the 
plans.62 Publicity producing and publicity using divisions, although separate, needed to be 
‘thought of as complementary to, rather than independent of’ each other. Producer 
divisions, with their expert knowledge, were able to give valuable advice as to the form 
which the material could best take, and could suggest fruitful lines of policy. They could 
not, however, turn out material that had not been sanctioned by the publicity division for 
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whose use it was intended, being mainly executive agents of the users.63 The HPD did all 
publicity work, including leaflets, exhibitions, press advertising, posters, pictures, 
photographs and documentary films. It was deemed ‘very desirable’ to all the various 
media under one Controller, to ensure that their use could be balanced within ‘any 
particular publicity campaign’.64 The HPD was expected to use outside agencies, both at 
home and overseas, some specialised, and would be ‘directly dependent’ on the ‘guidance 
of the Collecting Division, both in deciding its policy and in assessing its results’.65  
 
The MOI undertook three main types of campaigns. There were campaigns initiated 
within, and conducted entirely by, the MOI. There were campaigns undertaken by the 
Ministry at the request of other Government Departments, including evacuation for the 
Ministry of Health, salvage for the Ministry of Supply and ‘Dig for Victory’ for the 
Ministry of Agriculture. There were also campaigns initiated locally by the Regional 
Information Officer (RIO) on behalf of the MOI, or at the specific request of the Regional 
Commissioner for Civil Defence or of Regional officers of other government 
departments.66 The MOI queried whether the campaign was essential, and, if so, whether 
legislative or administrative action was necessary, with publicity providing the 
explanation. If legislative action was necessary, but refused, propaganda campaigns were 
rejected as propaganda campaigns were not a suitable substitute. Once a campaign was 
agreed on, decisions needed to be made as to whether the campaign should consist of 
explanation or a persuasive emotional appeal. Inadequate explanation was deemed 
pointless, but emotional appeals were considered to have been overused. Any resistance to 
government requests needed to be understood, whether material or mental factors.67  
 
Before undertaking work originating from other departments, the MOI required an official 
letter asking them to undertake responsibility, and ‘explaining precisely what their policy 
is and what they want us to do’.68 The HPD would then decide, in consultation with the 
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General Production Division (GPD), after submission to the Director-General, whether to 
accept the campaign. The GPD would consider 
the conditions leading up to the request; whether the conditions are such that 
publicity can be effective; what kind of publicity can be effective; the extent of the 
publicity necessary; the effect of the proposed campaign on other campaigns.69 
If accepted, the Directors of HPD and GPD would then consult with representatives of the 
requesting department to get ideas and greater detail, although the MOI was not committed 
to using the ideas suggested. The HPD would then meet with the GPD, Editorial, Films and 
Radio Relations where everyone could pool their ideas and draw up a rough outline of the 
campaign, allocating responsibilities to each producing division. Each would then work out 
the detail of their share of the campaign, and reconvene to settle the order, before 
submitting to the Director-General for approval. The GPD would take responsibility for 
posters, undertaking technical work that would be displayed on voluntary sites, and 
instructing advertising agents to do work on a commission basis where necessary. The 
HPD would direct and co-ordinate the general working out of the campaign and for work 
(such as a letter from the Queen to evacuees parents) outside of the technical production 
divisions.70 Treasury sanction would then be sought. Once agreement had been reached 
between the MOI and requesting department, the GPD had a responsibility to see that the 
plan was carried out, consulting an agreed panel of experts if necessary, and keeping the 
originating department informed.71 
 
By 1940 the HPD was part of the General Division,72 its duties distributed between the 
three functional divisions, the Regional Administration Division and RIOs.73 The Home 
Morale Emergency Committee (HMEC) was formed in May 1940,74 essentially an ad hoc 
committee that made detailed recommendations in order to deal with public morale.75 
Deciding that exhortations were pointless, they decided that people wanted direction and 
concrete orders.76 By mid-1940, the HPD had broken down, and the HMEC expanded to 
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become the Home Planning Committee (HPC).77 The HPC felt that their role could only 
work if they had financial control, and if all important proposals for campaigns were 
discussed at weekly meetings,78 achieving their goal on August 26 1940, when no fresh 
financial commitments could be made without the HPC’s approval.79 The HPC met daily 
after the Policy Committee, when it discussed the measures required to carry out policies 
which had been decided on, referring back to the Policy Committee for further guidance, if 
necessary.80 
 
The Treasury ruling passed in 1940 required that all government advertising, other than 
that issued by the National Savings Committee, should be issued through the MOI.81 The 
MOI never gained actual control over the publicity of the Ministry of Food, or the National 
Savings movement,82 whilst other departments appear to have used the MOI only as a 
formality.83 There is evidence that, initially at least, the Ministry of Food was prepared to 
work with the MOI. It understood that the role of the MOI was ‘the defence of the home 
front’, in which food was an important ‘object of attack’. To assist the MOI to carry out its 
publicity functions the Ministry of Food supplied ‘information and notes as the basis of 
argument’. They then worked in close consultation, but it was the ‘affair’ of the MOI ‘to 
prepare the statement of the case based on our notes and to “put it over”’.84 The division of 
responsibility was explained in December 1940 as: ‘most changes in habits (good or bad) 
are promoted by other Ministries, e.g. rationing, curfew, … changes in beliefs, e.g. belief in 
official communiqués, are the direct concern of this Ministry’.85 The financial 
responsibility was unclear as there was no scheme for the partial allocation of expense, 
such as the production by one Ministry and distribution by another. For example, if there 
were to be a general campaign against waste, anti-food-wastage posters would be part of 
the general scheme, and their cost would be borne by the Ministry of Information, or the 
Stationary Office Vote. On the other hand, should the Ministry of Food decide to persuade 
                                                 
77
 PRO INF 1/71, ‘Extract: Planning Committee: Wednesday, August 21 1940: Composition and Functions’, 
August 1940. Frank Pick was the head of the HPC. 
78
 PRO INF 1/249, ‘Functions of the Planning Committee, note to Walter Monckton from M. Balfour’, 
December 1940. 
79
 PRO INF 1/253, ‘Memo from Sir Kenneth Clark to DDG: Home Planning Committee’, undated but 
probably August 1940. 
80
 PRO INF 1/252, ‘Copies to P.S. and Lord Davidson from Sir Kenneth Clark’, April 10 1941. 
81
 PRO INF 1/3, ‘General Division – Progress Report from January 1 to February 21 1940’, February 1940. 
82
 Balfour, M., op.cit., 1979, p.61. 
83
 PRO INF 1/3, ‘General Division’, op.cit., February 1940, p.67. 
84
 PRO INF 1/343, ‘Letter from the Ministry of Food to Sir Findlater Stewart at the MOI’, October 31 1939. 
85
 PRO INF 1/251, ‘Ministry of Information, Plan for Home Publicity’, [December 1940], (emphasis in 
original). 
  89
the public not to waste certain special food commodities, the publicity would have to be 
financed by the department.86 Waterfield regarded financial responsibility as an important 
issue as it determined whether the MOI was regarded as the ‘mere servant’ of other 
departments, or whether it should be regarded as a ‘responsible department’.87 The danger 
was that if departments had asked for a campaign to be given coverage and the MOI did 
not oblige, they would ‘run campaigns themselves’, when the MOI had felt that ‘the 
absorptive capacity’ of the public had been exceeded.88 
 
In July 1940, the MOI appeared unsure as to who exercised control over posters, 
particularly Government and trade posters.89 The MOI did not have the power to change 
the wording of anything that passed through the department, and, in June 1931, Cooper 
was driven to asking that the Ministry of Information be given more power, or that it be 
disbanded altogether.90 In 1942, there was still lack of control, as it had been agreed to 
comply with Churchill’s decision not to promote post-war aims, but the ABCA posters 
‘Your Britain, Fight for It Now’ (figures 18 to 20) were still produced through the MOI.91 
It is unclear when the Campaigns Division formed, but it was in place by the end of the 
war. Exercising central control, it ensured that every campaign was given its ‘proper 
relative importance’ amongst all government campaigns, avoiding possible conflicts. Each 
campaign was planned to make proper use of all suitable media, with associated 
commercial and government groups protected from uncoordinated demands. Available 
advertising agencies were used ‘with due regard for the proper spread of Government 
patronage’.92 The Campaigns Division, also responsible for press advertising, was ‘directly 
and technically responsible for the production and distribution of millions of leaflets and 
posters’, and spent ‘over half-a-million ponds per annum on poster site hire’.93 
 
At the outbreak of war, it was expected that £250,000 would be spent in the first two 
months of war, including £185,000 on propaganda,94 of which £50,000 was expected to be 
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spent on posters.95 In the first six months of war, £27,036 was spent on posters, including 
the costs of design roughs, artist’s fees, site hire, distribution and other costs.96 In 1942, 
£4,000,000 was spent on publicity (a 33% increase on the previous year), of which 
£120,000 was spent on posters, art and exhibitions, with the MOI working as an agency for 
eighteen government departments.97 In 1942, probably within the last quarter, £1,009 was 
spent on art work for posters, £25,306 on site hire, distribution and other costs.98 In what 
was probably the first quarter of 1943 £1,724 was spent on art work, and £37,455 on site 
hire, distribution and other costs.99 By 1943, 10% of the entire MOI publicity budget was 
spent on the home front, out of which 4.32% was composed of expenditure on posters.100  
 
By May 1939, planning staff had been employed in the GPD, including a General 
Production Manager to co-ordinate technical planning, an assistant with a specialised 
knowledge of outdoor publicity, copywriters, research workers and a part-time artist to 
execute roughs (see Appendix 7).101 By mid-June the register of artists and collected 
samples of their work was ready, and the first poster-roughs complete.102 In normal 
commercial practice, three months was considered usual from ‘the decision to start the 
production of a poster and its appearance on hoardings’. After consultation with HMSO, it 
was hoped that it could be possible to effect the production of a poster in a fortnight, and 
once war had started, possibly in one week.103 In some cases this was achieved, with a 
campaign on behalf of the Ministry of Home Security printed and distributed within ten 
days of financial authority.104 The GPD remained in place throughout the war.105 With an 
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administrative and technical staff of 30, it was ‘responsible for the writing and production 
of all printed matter’, including articles, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and posters, ‘to meet 
the requirements of the four primary Divisions’. The GPD could, and did, call ‘to its aid 
professional advertising firms which specialise in the form of publicity which it is decided 
to employ’.106 For posters, newspapers and other publicity, the Department acted as 
‘advertising agent to other Ministries’ and was ‘responsible for the preparation and 
execution of campaigns of varying character and extent’ to meet requirements. The work 
undertaken in the Ministry was intended to be in the ‘nature of review and control’, as it 
was not intended to ‘undertake production direct’ except in the absence of ‘suitable 
external facilities’.107 In November 1940, discussions were under way as to whether to 
rename the General Production Department, the Poster and Publicity Division. This would 
be comprised of five sections: ordering, execution and checking of work; distribution of 
publicity material; management of campaigns and general administration; publication of 
periodicals, copy and ideas; design, layout and lettering in the studio.108 Vaughan 
complained that this tile was ‘hardly descriptive of the work we do’, and suggested that 
Publicity Division alone was appropriate if renaming was necessary.109 The DG said that 
he preferred the old title of GPD and ordered that it continued to be used.110 The GPD 
included the understaffed Outdoor Publicity Department where ‘the poster requirements of 
19 Government Departments are at present being negotiated and handled by only 2 seniors, 
3 J.A.S. and 6 juniors’. Few campaigns operated ‘without poster publicity’, but posters 
were handled by ‘understaffed juniors’, and £300,000 worth of paid-for posters sites, and 
voluntary sites were ready for use, but not being professionally maintained.111 
 
Edwin Embleton, Studio Manager for the GPD, was responsible for preparing contracts 
and ensuring that work was fulfilled by artists and copywriters on time.112 On occasions it 
was difficult to recruit113 and retain workers. Advertising specialists, although they ‘wished 
to remain patriotic’, were earning half of what they could earn commercially, and as a 
result Embleton was losing skilled men, particularly as civil service rules did not allow for 
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workers to take moonlight work.114 The GPD was often over-stretched, but Woodburn 
believed that this called for better quality, rather than quantity, officers, which cost-cutting 
measures did not allow for.115 Reginald Mount worked full time for the MOI throughout 
the war, and Eileen Evans and Austin Cooper joined later.116 Outside the MOI other 
freelancers were used, including Tom Eckersley in the Air Force, Pat Keely at the GPO, 
Abram Games the only ‘Official War Office Poster Artist’, with Frank Newbould his 
assistant. The artists all maintained their identity as freelancers in a large design 
organisation ‘which appears to have positively nurtured creative work’. Designers recall it 
as a happy working time, designing for a serious purpose, and working largely without 
restriction. Freeman comments that ‘perhaps because the MOI was new and its policies 
were evolving it was receptive to innovative design ideas.’117 Outside agencies were 
employed on creative production by the GPD as much as possible, but practical limits were 
imposed by the necessity for close co-operation with user divisions, the need for secrecy 
and confidentiality with certain material, the need for speed and cost.118 By March 1941, 
with a larger staff, the studio was able to contract out less work. Straightforward work such 
as the ‘finishing up of lettering’ was still given to outside studios, releasing studio artists to 
concentrate on fresh creative work,.119 It is unclear whether artists were commissioned or 
offered their services in every case, although how poster artists had been selected pre- war 
by other government departments were considered.120 The MOI desired to be a  
centre with which writers and artists desiring to use their talents in the national 
cause can be in touch with a view to securing information, advice and such other 
facilities as it may be possible to give them.121  
The MOI was expected to get the best value, and to obtain quotations from artists as non-
competitive tenders always ‘attract criticism’,122 although later it was said that competitive 
tendering was expected to increase the cost.123 
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Dame Laura Knight, an established classically trained artist, was asked, in October 1939, 
whether she was ‘interested in the possibility of producing a Pictorial poster to be used in 
Government publicity?’124 Later, a ‘preliminary sketch’ was requested, common practice in 
government departments, for which ten guineas would be paid. A further sixty guineas 
would be paid for the finished design, processed only if the design was passed.125 Knight 
complained that she never made preliminary sketches as size ‘makes so much difference to 
composition’.126 After debate it was noted that exceptions for any artist, however 
distinguished, could not be made as it would be unfair to other artists who had to work 
under the conditions.127 Knight was given ten to twelve days to produce a rough picture, 
allowing 8” for wording, and signed a formal contract giving up the right to copyright.128 
The wording, in some cases at least, was not considered an integral part of the design, with 
five guineas paid for the ‘lettering for a 20 x 15 poster’.129 Kenneth Clark was given £100, 
expected to last six months, to pay artists who produced roughs that were not used as 
posters, for which payment would not normally exceed five guineas.130 This was the figure 
offered to Harold Pym, contacted through the War Artists and Illustrators, for a rough 
design depicting an ‘aerial dog fight’, double crown size, for display in the Middle East, 
with the MOI ‘under no obligation’ to accept the rough.131 Publicity artists were not in a 
reserved occupation. In February 1941, the War Office was asked to allow Harold Pym an 
extra fortnight’s leave to complete poster work he was preparing for the MOI, after he was 
called into Service at short notice.132 In July 1941, having already handled poster work for 
the MOI, the War Artists and Illustrators wanted to present further specimens of their 
artists work to the MOI.133 Despite complaints that there was a lack of skilled poster artists, 
Harrington, who had ‘considerable experience in poster design and advertising layout 
including lettering’,134 was told there were no vacancies in the Studio.135 He was an artist 
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who had experience of industrial publicity, and had ideas for amplifying the ‘Go to it’ 
slogan.136 McKnight Kauffer offered his services to the MOI, but as an ‘alien’ he was paid 
on a fee rather than a salary basis, and found himself doing ‘hack work’, and thus left for 
America in late 1939.137 He did not feel that the best use was being made of his skills, and 
had he felt he was indispensable at the MOI he would have stayed on.138 By June 1942 the 
seriousness of the situation was recognised and a series of letters was sent out to skilled 
men in the forces, asking whether they were happy to have their name put forward to be 
released from the forces to work for the MOI.139 
 
Finished poster designs would be forwarded to His Majesty’s Stationary Office (HMSO) 
‘together with specifications of quantities for printing and distribution’.140 In planning to use 
HMSO, it was questioned whether it could continue to provide the required service at ‘a 
very much accelerated rate’. The HMSO normally took about three weeks to produce about 
30,000 coloured posters,141 which were also more expensive and time consuming, but more 
effective.142 Lord Davidson suggested that speed could be improved by employing printers 
direct, without going through HMSO. Vaughan, however, noted that HMSO had the best 
machinery ‘for ascertaining at any time the state of availability of the print trade’, and 
urgent work could still be placed with printing firms nationwide who were able to take it 
when necessary.143 Posters were to be produced using HMSO stock copy, with a high 
standard to be maintained as work would be associated with the department. Proofs were 
provided to printers to check the accuracy of type-setting. Writers were to be prevented 
from regarding them as an opportunity to alter the original subject matter, which would 
cost more time and money. Before sending to the printer, all proofs were signed by the 
author, reader and production assistant.144 
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The control of paper was important, particularly once paper was rationed on February 12 
1940,145 with paper more important to the MOI than any other department.146 It was not 
anticipated the printers would have any difficulty finding paper at the start of the war, 
although paper for colour printing required time to mature, and delays would occur if 
sufficient stock did not exist.147 The GPD was responsible for the MOI ration, and 
corresponded with HMSO, the Paper Control and individual printers.148 With 26.5 tons of 
paper used for posters by December 1940, decisions had to be made as to whether the 
stocks of the MOI or the requesting department were used. It was anticipated that printing 
stocks would come from the HMSO, or from commercial firms hired at MOI instigation.149 
With shrinking newspapers, more use was being made of posters on commercial sites by 
late 1941, with an average poster display using seventeen tons for a thirteen week 
campaign. The MOI had handled eighteen major campaigns in the preceding twelve 
months, and assuming similar figures in the future, it was expected that 306 tons per 
annum would be used, possibly with increased demand.150 A letter to the DDG noted that 
paper controls should not be allowed to interfere with campaigns. If campaigns had been 
deemed necessary and Treasury sanction had been given, Royds would need only to ensure 
that ‘quantities of printed material involved are absolutely indispensable to the success of 
the campaign’, and whether reductions could be made that would not ‘fatally’ impair it.151 
 
Standard commercial sizes, particularly Demy and Crown were to be used to ensure speed 
of production, unless circumstances dictated differently.152 Posters of a hoarding size were 
to be prepared only for long-term campaigns, with posters of a shop-size to be distributed 
in anticipation of, for example, food campaigns.153 The government needed to ensure that it 
was not seen infringing the law, and the size of posters was limited to a maximum size of 
four-sheets (60” x 40”) under ‘Paper Order No. 16 of May 25 1940’. In June 1940 there 
were ‘home morale’ campaigns for which the government wished to publish 16 and 48 
sheet posters, which were in excess of the maximum permitted size, so a special licence to 
print was required. Vaughan suggested that the government should be allowed to do so, in 
the same way that Military Authorities were allowed to ignore speed limits and use 
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unlimited petrol despite public rationing.154 Government departments were not bound by 
the law prohibiting large-scale posters, but bill-posters were ‘inclined to complain on the 
score of wasting paper’, and this was deemed a ‘valid interjection’.155 Advertiser’s 
complained at the size restrictions. They recognised the need to conserve paper, but felt 
that this could be better achieved by giving rations to companies to use as required, rather 
than by limiting the size of posters. It was argued that filled hoardings added colour to life 
and by covering bombed buildings would improve morale. The MOI was felt to be setting 
a bad example by fly-posting,156 as the public was cajoled by the press to save paper, but 
every week there was ‘some unnecessary publication’ by the government.157 In November 
1941, legislation was introduced forbidding the use of similar posters near each other.158  
 
The distribution of posters was thus vitally important, as Vaughan noted to Woodburn, 
when there was a threat to the use of Mr Scarborough, who had worked unpaid for the 
MOI for the first five weeks of war. Scarborough was ‘completely familiar with the whole 
detail of the distribution of the Ministry’s posters’. This included distribution to  
factories, mills, banks, chain stores, licensed houses, hotels and restaurants, local 
authorities, employment exchanges, schools, post offices; and bulk distribution 
through the regional offices of the National Savings Association, the British Legion 
and the Boy Scouts Association. 
Scarborough’s work involved the controlled despatch of posters to ‘ensure even coverage 
of the country’; the minimisation of waste through the despatch of ‘precise quantities and 
sizes’ requested by exhibitors of posters; and ensuring that exhibitors were not sent more 
posters than they could show.159 Whether this plea was successful is unknown, but by 
August 1940 the Distribution Section within the GPD was responsible for the ‘distribution 
of all material produced or bought by the Ministry’,160 and the distribution of posters was 
generally centralised at Headquarters. Mailings were made direct from the HMSO to firms 
or organisations nation-wide who undertook to display posters either on commercial or free 
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sites. Distribution through local committees was deemed practicable only in the following 
cases: where a poster was only to be displayed in ‘certain areas’ or ‘on a particular type of 
site’, when voluntary bodies were expected to co-operate. In certain emergency cases 
locally held poster stocks could be distributed,161 with general stocks of posters with space 
for over-printing of urgent messages prepared.162 MOI posters could be obtained by 
applying to RIOs, and could be displayed at exhibitions, in the course of relevant 
campaigns, and on freely offered private sites. The MOI was responsible for distributing 
not only its own posters, but those produced on behalf of other departments.163 The dangers 
of a central printing and distribution system were recognised in a war where aerial 
bombardment was a certainty and Regional and Local Organisations were to be allowed 
autonomous control if communications were cut with central headquarters.164 Invitations, 
signed by the Minister, were potentially to be sent to local Advertising Agents and 
newspapers ‘to hold themselves in readiness to produce any material, hand-bills, etc. 
within a few hours if necessary’.165 
 
Once year-round campaigns were to be run, it was hoped to employ an Outdoor Publicity 
Agent, achieving economic benefits and ensuring that poster sites were used 
continuously.166 Vaughan described the three leading British Advertising Agencies 
equipped to handle Outdoor Advertising as S.H. Benson Ltd., Crawfords Ltd., and the 
London Press Exchange, of which Bensons was considered to offer the most complete 
service. Other agencies which had ‘less complete facilities for Outdoor Publicity’ would be 
used for press advertising.167 Other ‘responsible and efficient’ advertising agencies to 
‘whom Government business could be entrusted with confidence’,168 not previously 
mentioned, were listed, although the list was not intended to be exhaustive.169 It was 
possible that billposting firms could be hired, including The Borough Billposting Co, 
Walter Hill Ltd., and Willings Ltd. The need to provide work to smaller agencies was also 
considered, although they were not as well-equipped for handling large campaigns, 
particularly at short notice. Provincial agents were considered ‘difficult to employ’, but 
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would be used if campaigns were locally limited. With the GPD involved in the selection 
of agents, campaigns could be worked on by more than one agency, but not more than 
four.170  
 
Bensons had previously done work for the War Office and had been paid 10% of the gross 
plus a service fee of 5%. This fee covered all the ‘costs of packing, despatching and 
carriage of posters’. The work involved the selection of suitable sites in agreement with 
bill-posting contractors, monthly inspections, and recommendations of free sites. The 
inspections ensured that sites remained clean and in good condition, and the opportunity to 
improve the site position if other advertisers released a site.171 Bensons initially did work 
for the MOI, but were replaced by a cheaper firm of billposting contractors. Vaughan 
complained that the new contractors ‘had no system of inspection of sites and no men to 
carry out such a system’, whilst Benson’s retained 22 men. Uninspected sites could not be 
used in an emergency, and GPD felt the MOI was being ‘penny wise and pound foolish’ in 
employing contractors Newton and Walter Hill for a commission of 10% instead of 
Bensons at 15%. The Committee agreed that an inspection service was vital, and just 
needed to establish in writing that no one else could give the same service as Bensons 
before they were made sole agents for the MOI.172 The Advisory Committee decided that 
they would not employ billposting firms who were also site owners. Bensons and Outdoor 
Publicity were to be given responsibility for all government billposting work, but were 
expected to take in smaller firms to give a fair spread of the work during the war.173  
 
By 1942 posters were expected to be displayed ‘wherever free posting can be obtained and 
for economy reasons should only be fixed at points where there is a considerable amount 
of pedestrian traffic or large bodies gathered together’. This would include 
railway stations, cinema and theatre entrances, shopping thoroughfares, schools, 
church notice boards, town halls, women’s institutes, lecture centres of Civil 
Defence Units and all places where bodies of people are gathered together for 
special purposes.174  
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Questionnaire respondents noted that they had seen posters all over railway stations, and 
many town locations were mentioned. Few mentioned rural locations, with ‘none seen in 
smaller villages that I remember’.175 On some occasions, it appears that the distribution 
process was not careful enough, as appeals to ‘save water’ were regarded as particularly 
unnecessary near a Scottish loch with an inexhaustible water supply.176 
The Planning of the First Posters 
The Second World War was often perceived as a classless ‘People’s War’ because, 
regardless of any prevailing inequality and exploitation, ‘the nation is always conceived as 
a deep, horizontal comradeship’.177 Propaganda was needed to appeal to the masses, 
including a reasoned appeal that would ‘show the extent to which every man and woman is 
a participant in the war’, and the importance of a combined team effort.178 Although it was 
‘impossible to foresee’ what conditions would prevail during the first weeks of war, it was 
felt necessary to prepare for the worst. The MOI was to assume that the public would be 
subjected to an appalling series of shocks, resulting in shattered nerves, a lack of 
confidence in ultimate success, and therefore a lack of will to work for victory.179 It was 
expected that there would be ‘an imperative need for a copious issue of general reassurance 
material’, particularly in the early months of the war, which would be the sole 
responsibility of the MOI.180 Disregarding Leeper’s conviction that it was impossible to 
prepare effective propaganda in advance,181 the government started planning for the first 
posters in earnest in early 1939.182 By mid-June 1939 the first poster-roughs were ready for 
inspection.183 
 
In April 1939, members of the HPC were asked to come up with a selection of slogans and 
motifs from which to build poster designs. The first posters were to ‘stand out strikingly 
from among the numerous posters which would be issued by other Departments’.184 
Posters were to ‘bear a distinctive uniform device’,185 making it ‘difficult or impossible for 
the enemy to print reproductions’. Pictorial distinction was to be achieved by using leading 
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artists whose work would be associated with the MOI; typographical distinction by the use 
of a ‘special and handsome type’.186 Initial designs were to include a message ‘from the 
King to his people’.187 It was decided that the message should ‘go out as far as possible in 
the form in which the King himself would send it’, but using fine type rather than imitation 
typescript. Rather than a photograph, a crown would head the poster. Sir William Codling, 
suggesting a short, single-sheet message, prepared suggestions in a suitable format.188 
Later in the war, it was recognised that the nation was ‘constituted through shared and 
anonymous suffering and heroism’, and thus the booklet Front Line, produced by the MOI 
in 1942 contained only one quote from Churchill, and no pictures of royalty.189 
 
The above poster was to be accompanied by a ‘reassurance poster’, which would ‘steady 
the people and assure them that all necessary measures to defend England’ had been 
taken.190 The aims for the first poster were ambitious. It was agreed that the first poster 
slogan, supported by the pictorial design, should if possible: ‘attract immediate attention 
and evoke a spontaneous reaction’; ‘exert a steadying influence’; ‘incite to action’; 
‘harmonise with general preconceived ideas among the public’; ‘be short’; and ‘be 
universal in appeal’.191 The initial poster was to stress ‘an attitude of mind’, rather than an 
aim, as it was assumed that the public would appreciate the issues involved at the start of 
war. Nicolson advocated that the initial ‘dignified design’ should be supplemented by a 
poster with a ‘more colloquial appeal’, such as one ‘incorporating a historical progression 
from the medieval English bowman to the typical modern citizen.’192 Posters would also 
include a ‘statement of the duty of the individual citizen’, which would be non-pictorial 
and in more than one colour, and a poster warning against enemy propaganda.193 
 
Although experts were consulted for slogans,194 the slogan for the first poster was 
suggested by Waterfield, a career civil servant. Concerned that posters along the lines of 
‘Keep Steady’ were uninspiring, and implied that the nation was on the defensive, 
Waterfield called for ‘a rallying war-cry that will bring out the best in everyone of us and 
put us in an offensive mood at once’. He suggested three ideas: a play on Kitchener (figure 
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2), with ‘Your King and Country need you all’, appealing not just to the men to fight, but 
to ‘every man, woman and child’. Second, he suggested that it was the will of the nation 
that would win or lose the war, and suggested ‘Your Courage, Your Cheerfulness, Your 
Resolution will Bring us Victory’. Third, he felt there was a need for a reminder that it is 
the task of the nation to destroy Nazism and everything it stood for. Waterfield did not 
believe that he had the wording right on any of these, but favoured the last.195 
 
As production could take a ‘considerable time’, designs were to be printed, and distributed 
regionally, in advance, ‘so that, when necessary, the posters could be placarded throughout 
the country with a minimum of delay’.196 The initial posters were expected to be of ‘an 
exceptional size’, and to be ‘displayed on more than ordinarily extensive sites’, such as the 
sides of buildings, such as figure 61. It was planned that HMSO would be responsible for 
the printing of posters, and that an advertising concern would be called on to arrange for 
the display of posters after they had been printed. Mr Surrey Dane and Mr Huxley were 
responsible for work on the first posters, and agreed to secure the services of artists capable 
of doing quick roughs for poster designs.197 It was agreed that the poster art-work should 
be of a high standard, at least equal to, or better than, the highest commercial standard, but 
that it should make an essentially popular appeal.198 
 
Posters were expected to be displayed for eight weeks at a time. Original plans were to 
commission five designs, with expert advisors pressing for immediate printing for all five, 
a valid ‘insurance premium in view of the immensity of the risk’.199 The Ministry, 
concerned that this ‘might involve considerable waste in view of possible changes of 
policy’,200 was ‘content’ to ask for authority to print from only one design. The proviso 
was that another four designs were commissioned immediately, rather than waiting for the 
start of hostilities, as they were unsure ‘how quickly suitable designs’ could be produced 
under wartime conditions.201 As was good commercial practice, the first poster was to be in 
six colours.202 Anticipated costs for the first poster were £20,600 for printing, packing and 
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storing five million posters, and £225 for the design.203 Figures were prepared by Surrey 
Dane of Odham’s Press, on the Publicity Planning Committee of the Ministry, and were 
largely accepted by HMSO as reasonable.204 Fees to artists for design needed to allow for 
accepted roughs and finished art work, adaptation to different sizes and proportions, 
including reproportioning of lettering. Commissioned roughs needed to be paid for even if 
‘not accepted for the finished design’.205 A significant number of extra posters were 
required for ‘renewals’ for outdoor display in order to keep sites in good order.206 
The Distribution of the First Posters 
Surrey Dane worked in consultation with Benson’s preparing estimates for costs, for the 
nation-wide campaign, to include Wales and Northern Ireland.207 It was expected that the 
MOI should pay in the normal way for sites, but seek preferential rates as was usual for 
large orders.208 Estimates were prepared according to traditional commercial costs, 
although it was anticipated that prices could fall on the outbreak of war. Both voluntary 
sites and commercial sites were categorised.209 The posters, once printed, were ‘parcelled 
and stored in London ready for immediate dispatch to local distribution centres’ at an 
appropriate time in the emergency period.210 Posters were to be distributed in bulk ready 
for local distribution: commercial sites through Bensons, railway platform sites, old EMB 
sites, newsagents boards, Office of Works, Ministry of Labour, local authorities, LPTB 
Underground and buses and trolley buses, from 15” x 10” to 48-sheet sizes. Smaller 
amounts, from 15” x 10” to 16-sheet sizes were to be distributed to the GPO, schools, 
cinemas, works, co-operative societies, hotels, public houses and builders. Posters sized 
15” x 10” to double crown, were provided to banks, van sides, shop windows and interiors, 
places of worship, National Savings Committee, hospitals and clinics, and 50,000 of a 
special design for display in empty and wrecked houses.211 It was calculated that, once the 
sites were secured, and the finished posters delivered to Benson’s, a nation-wide display 
could be effected by that firm within twenty-four hours. Voluntary, non-commercial sites 
were considered important, particularly in rural areas, where commercial sites did not 
cover. These sites included shops and shop-windows; government and municipal 
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buildings; village halls, women’s institutes and private houses. Posters on these sites would 
be standardised to crown and double crown sizes. The danger of such sites was the 
juxtaposition of official publicity posters with other miscellaneous posters, ‘detracting 
from the effect of the former’.212 Although in general the largest site was most effective, 
small posters outside the newsagents’ shops below eye level attracted special notice people 
were used to reading such placards all the time in order to get news.213 
 
The poster with a proclamation from the King was to be ‘plastered everywhere in order to 
drive the contents into everyone’s head’.214 By August 1939 war was regarded as 
inevitable, and by 9 August the finished drawings were submitted to Macadam for final 
approval. Any adaptations to proportions would then be made and the posters printed.215 
By 23 August the proportions to be printed were decided. The percentages were: ‘Freedom 
is in Peril’ (for remote areas), 12% (figure 22); ‘Keep Calm and Carry on’, 65%; and ‘Your 
Courage, etc.’, 23% (figure 1).216 The Treasury had approved costs for a single poster, 
three designs were produced, exceeding estimates by under £50. “Our Fighting Men 
Depend on You” for factories, works, docks and harbours, was also printed, for which no 
allowance had originally been made.217 By September, ‘Your Courage’ and ‘Freedom is in 
Peril’ were already being posted throughout the country. ‘Keep Calm and Carry on’ was 
printed and held in reserve for when the necessity arose, for example, a severe air-raid, 
although it was never actually displayed. Soon after war was declared, the small poster 
‘Don’t Help the Enemy, Careless Talk may give away vital secrets’ (figure 62) was 
approved by the War Office and was ready to put into production. 58,000 copies had 
already been distributed by September 17, and 75,000 copies were to be despatched daily 
from September 26.218 By the end of September 1939, roughs for further designs had been 
prepared and approved, including messages from the King and the Queen, designs 
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specifically for factories and docks, and designs specifically for each branch of the armed 
services: reassurance, not recruiting, posters.219 
The Reception of the First Posters 
Coverage is extensive in the archives on the first few posters produced by the MOI,220 and 
so also receives much subsequent historical comment, much of it negative.221 Mass-
Observation (M-O) had been asked by the MOI, on September 26 1939, to ‘report on the 
red Government Posters and their effects, in general; to report on dissatisfaction with the 
posters and the reasons for them in particular’. On October 1 1939 MOI said that it could 
no longer use outside agencies, but M-O decided to complete the work, following the 
original terms of reference, believing that the work was essential.222 Working without 
financial or official support, M-O observers worked without authority, and ‘against the 
difficulty of spy-fear’.223 The ‘Your Courage’ poster was remembered by several 
questionnaire respondents, although no other early posters were mentioned. They were 
seen in the window of the Butcher’s shop in Eastleigh, ‘on the way to school or work in 
Winchester’,224 in the engineering works,225 and believed to be the result of a political 
speech.226 The poster was clearly remembered from Barnstaple in Devon, when, as a 
schoolboy, his ‘home town… blossomed with crimson posters’. He remembered that ‘these 
posters were much maligned’, although the reason was unclear.227 
 
A journalist from the Daily Mail was critical of the ‘Your Courage’ slogan for being too 
complex, passing the poster six times every day, he was still unable to precisely remember 
the slogan.228 Someone from the Ministry of Health, critical of the HPD as responsible for 
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the ‘Your Courage’ posters, believed that it was run by people ‘full of vague ideas’, with 
little ‘practical experience in the conduct of publicity campaigns’.229 Within the M-O 
survey, ‘Your Courage’ was the second most-mentioned remembered slogan, and nearly 
all comment was disparaging. The message had been impacted by sheer repetition but 
whether it had been remembered in the right spirit was questionable: it still existed 
everywhere, and was deemed mostly annoying and inappropriate for the wartime 
situation.230 The wording of ‘Your Courage… will bring us victory’ was criticised. There 
was some evidence the combination of ‘your’ and ‘us’ ‘suggested to many people that they 
were being encouraged to work for someone else’, with the ‘your’ referring to the civilian, 
the ‘us’ to the Government. It was pointed out that the slogan ‘Your King and Country 
needs you’ had avoided such a defect and in future, more care should be taken to avoid 
slogans that disassociated the civilian from the government. ‘Freedom is in Peril’ was also 
deemed ineffective, blamed on ‘the abstractness of the words, not one of which had any 
popular appeal’.231 Even during the planning stages the criticism had been raised that 
‘Freedom’ was rather an abstract concept and was ‘likely to be too academic and too alien 
to the British habit of thought’.232 
 
As usual there was little indication as to what the public felt about such exhortations, and 
little appreciation found its way into print. The Times had described the posters as 
‘egregious and unnecessary exhortations’, ‘insipid and patronising invocations’, which 
were unneeded and wasteful of funds, comparing the posters unfavourably to those 
produced by the French.233 The Times leader paved the way for questions about the 
campaign in the House of Commons, regarding the cost of the current campaign, and 
expected costs of future campaigns. Grigg defended the cost of the campaign, expected to 
be no more than £23,000 by its termination in October, most for site rental.234 The Daily 
Express header the day after Grigg’s announcement of cost was ‘Waste and Paste’. The 
exhortations were described as ‘foolish’ as people ‘are prepared to fight’, but when they 
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turned up at recruiting offices they were turned away as the government was not ready to 
accept them..235 Brigadier V.M.C. Napier, commented, via a letter to The Times:  
Is it wise, to say the least, to placard the countryside with posters calling on the 
courage and resolution of the individual when no appreciable demands have yet 
been made on these qualities?236  
The MOI had expected the nation to have to deal with immediate bombardment, but this 
did not happen. Once the Phoney War was over, Advertiser’s Weekly noted that the nation 
had finally arrived at the point of ‘courage, cheerfulness and resolution’. People could 
finally obey the exhortations of posters that had become all too familiar to ‘us’ over twelve 
long months.237 
 
Responsibility for the failure of campaigns was placed squarely with the government as it 
meant that, either the people had not been made to feel the urgency of the message, or that 
‘the leaders have not spoken in a language which the people can understand and respond 
to’.238 Beable, the President of London Poster Advertising Association, felt the MOI 
should be given due credit as well as criticism. They had acted quickly with the posters, 
working within the necessity for wording and design to be simple for prompt reproduction 
and quick absorption. The colour scheme (pillar box red and white) was clever in contrast, 
both attractive and effective. He felt that the poster had succeeded in getting the public 
‘war conscious, war energetic, yet war calmly minded’, as it had certainly been noticed by 
the journalists.239 Possibly reacting to criticism that they had spent too much money on 
posters, in October 1939, it was decided to cancel the programme of press advertising and 
the use of commercial poster sites. Steps were taken to give publicity to the material 
already prepared, through designs suitable to voluntary poster sites.240  
 
Original problems for the MOI can be attributed to the instability in the organisation, 
primarily the result of press criticism. After the original questioning of its role, it appeared 
largely unremarkable, at the time, that the MOI should have the power to be the central 
agency for information. The MOI was thoroughly planned, and built upon extensive 
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government and commercial experience. Clear administrative and production processes 
were instituted, and the importance of using suitable people, to produce the right message 
at the appropriate time, in the best location, became clearer as war continued. Initially, the 
MOI transferred the authority of royalty to the propaganda messages. As the war 
progressed, discourses of royalty were subsumed into discourses of the people’s war, tied 
in with discourses of citizenship, where ‘shared responsibility for the continuity of the 
nation remained the most important of these duties’.241 Democratic, governmental and 
citizenship discourses clearly emanated from the MOI, with the audience not forced, but 
subject to self-regulation, although subject-positions were assumed by the MOI. 
Discourses of the ‘public’ were important, as public opinion was sought in planning and 
reaction to campaigns. Within the MOI, economic discourses, including those of rationing, 
played an important part in dictating what was possible. Patriotic discourses were called 
upon to get artists to contribute, with democratic discourses allowing artists near-autonomy 
in design, building upon notions that they were the ‘experts’. Having looked at the first 
posters that the government produced, the following section of the thesis contains four case 
studies: urban and rural representations; industrial propaganda; fighting the ‘enemy 
within’, and dealing with the ‘problem’ of venereal disease. 
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Chapter 4: Representations of ‘Your Britain’, Urban and Rural  
Macmillan summarised the aims of the Ministry of Information (MOI) to the Cabinet as 
demonstrating ‘what Britain was fighting for; how Britain was fighting; and the need for 
sacrifice if the war was to be won’.1 National identification is always central in wartime, 
and ‘the land’ (and what is built on it) is always central to such discourse. Initially 
triggered by the two very different sets of images produced within the ‘Your Britain’ 
campaign by Games and Newbould in 1942 (figures 14 to 20), this chapter will consider 
the posters produced by government that were believed to reflect the ‘Britain’ that people 
were being asked to fight for. The differences in appeal within one campaign are very 
startling, as both are presented as ‘Your Britain’, as something to be fought for. One 
appears to appeal to a modernistic, urban vision of the future, whilst the other appeals to a 
rural, pastoral past. In war, however, ‘or other periods of acute national danger, 
propaganda machinery is likely to simplify, to make black and white, issues which in fact 
may have been more complex’.2 Such symbols of ‘Britishness’ can be addressed for their 
greater significance, the modernistic vision tying in with the Beveridge Report which was 
being produced around the same time, the rural vision addressing the significance of the 
landscape as a part of English heritage.3 These seven posters, produced at the same time, 
                                                 
1
 Donnelly, M., Britain in the Second World War, 1999, p.70. Picture Post echoed this sentiment, 
demonstrating with extensive pictorial coverage the populist view of what the British were fighting for, 
particularly peaceful towns, villages and pubs, and what they were fighting against from the German people, 
namely dictatorship. Lloyd, A.L., ‘What we are Fighting For’, Picture Post, July 13 1940, pp.9-21; 24-39. 
2
 Miles, P., and Smith, M., Cinema, Literature & Society, 1987, p.233. Cull, N.J., Selling War: The British 
Propaganda Campaign Against American ‘Neutrality’ in World War II, 1995, p.138, demonstrates how a 
similar message was presented through film. Britain at Bay, (known overseas as Britain on Guard), (1940), 
for example, ‘provided a powerful vision of a war fought both to preserve old values and to build a better 
world’. 
3
 The terms ‘English’ and ‘British’ are often used interchangeably, as demonstrated by the following authors. 
Kertesz, M., ‘The Enemy – British Images of the German People during the Second World War’, 
Unpublished PhD, University of Sussex, 1992, p.12 uses the term ‘British’ so as not to exclude, and reflects 
governmental policy during the war to reinforce unity by using the term ‘British’. Many traditions appealed 
to the ‘English’ but the term was used unproblematically to mean British. As Kertesz notes, the debate is too 
large, and outside the scope of her thesis. The same is true of this thesis, where the term British is used where 
necessary ‘for expediency’, although English is used where relevant. Mikes, G., quoted in Waite, C., and 
Nicolson, A., Landscape in Britain, 1984, p.33 notes that ‘[w]hen people say England, they sometimes mean 
Great Britain, sometimes the United Kingdom, sometimes the British Isles – but never England.’ Matless, D., 
Landscape and Englishness, 1998, p.19: British is often used a surrogate term for English, there is a common 
conflation of the two identities. Viewed from abroad the terms are certainly used interchangeably, 
particularly from the Empire view when Englishness was viewed at the heart of Britishness. Raphael Samuel 
makes more of a distinction: Samuel, R. Island Stories: Unravelling Britain: Vol. 2: Theatres of Memory, 
1998, p.48: ‘English, in its twentieth-century usage, is an altogether more introverted term than “British” and 
largely associated with images of landscape, beauty and home rather than those of national greatness.’ 
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within the same campaign, by the same organisation,4 will be examined alongside other 
posters depicting rural or urban landscapes, and within the context of longer term debates 
defining British national identities and landscapes. The chapter will discuss a range of 
discourses which underlay the posters, including: national identity, citizenship, the rural, 
agriculture, land, heritage, tradition, home, suburbs, reconstruction, the urban, future, 
science, technology, medicine, health, education, and modernity. How differing poster 
styles were deployed to represent these discourses will also be considered.  
The Context and Planning of ‘British’ Posters 
National ‘[i]dentities are composed of a variety of ingredients, including a sense of 
community or place, loyalty to particular institutions or ideologies, shared aspects of 
common experience and culture.’5 They are generally regarded as relative concepts 
‘always constituted through definitions of Self and Other and always subject to internal 
differentiation’.6 Samuel defines the English nation as having self-consciously emerged in 
the nineteenth century, which ‘on the one hand summoned up the ghosts of the past to 
shore up threatened values, and on the other prepared a master race for its imperial 
vocation’.7 With wider enfranchisement introduced since the First World War, the Second 
World War was ‘The People’s War’, with a wider number and range of people included in 
formal citizenship. These citizens were being asked to be model citizens, and some in 
government thought people needed to know what they were fighting for. As in commercial 
advertising, people were incentivised to give in return for gains. 
 
This chapter will use Benedict Anderson’s idea of an ‘imagined community’. The British 
people were fighting together for the imagined community of their nation:  
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, of even hear of them, yet in the minds of 
each lives the image of their communion.8  
Anderson questions what ‘makes people love and die for nations, as well as hate and kill in 
their name’.9 He examines how tradition is constructed, invented and appropriated, often 
                                                 
4
 Darracott, J. and Loftus, B. Second World War Posters, 1972 (1981 edition), p.48, note that these posters 
were produced by the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA), ‘whose function was to interest servicemen 
in political and social questions’. 
5
 Powell, D., Nationhood & Identity: The British State Since 1800, 2002, p.174. 
6
 Matless, D., op.cit., 1998, p.17. 
7
 Samuel, R., op.cit., 1998, p.4. Others may refer further back to the Act of Union, 1707. See extracts from 
the original on Anonymous, ‘The Treaty (or Act) of Union, 1707’, 
http://personal.pitnet.net/primarysources/act.html, accessed March 25 2004. 
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through symbolism based on false tradition. Anderson’s frame will be used in this chapter 
to discuss both the ways in which utopian visions of the future were popular in wartime, 
and how tradition was also appropriated. For example, as the war removed accessibility to 
large swathes of the countryside, it was mythologised and became an emphasised part of 
‘Your Britain’.10 Both utopian and traditional visions drew on longer term discourses. 
Often the rural is associated with conservative pastoral idyll images, and the urban with 
socialistic futures.11 This chapter will consider whether there was a consistent contrast 
between the use of such images in posters, whether images of modernity appeared in rural 
images, and whether there was any harking back to the past in ‘modern’ images. 
 
The rural images tend to include aspects that are unchanging, quiet, idyllic, steadfast, 
tranquil, and spacious. Images of rural areas are generally of balmy spring or summer days, 
particularly landscapes, few of which, following art movements such as Romanticism, 
have human beings in them. As a more recent photographer explains, ‘[people’s] presence 
in a landscape seems to trivialise and distort it’, when looking for ‘a timelessness and a 
permanence which the human and the urban cannot convey’.12 The MOI had no need to 
invent the theme of ‘Deep England’, as it was ‘rooted in the national consciousness’.13 
Many in wartime would have been familiar with the work of John Constable, whose 
famous landscape paintings of the nineteenth century have come to define quintessential 
Englishness,14 with human figures deliberately kept distant or indistinct.15 Through his 
images, often recruited on the side of tradition, Constable was seeking to portray a solution 
to the struggle between progress and preservation.16 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
8
 Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 1991, p.6, 
(emphasis in the original). 
9
 Ibid., 1991, Back cover (This reference is used as it sums the ideas up most clearly, and there is no 
comparable reference within the text.). 
10
 Smith, M., Britain and 1940: History, Myth and Popular Memory, 2000, p.61. 
11
 Lloyd, D.W., The Making of English Towns: 2000 Years of Evolution, 1998, p.13 notes the intensification 
of academic studies over perceived rural and urban divides in the last thirty or so years, resulting in the 
Centre for Urban History and The Rural History Centre. See University of Leicester, ‘Centre for Urban 
History’,  http://www.le.ac.uk/urbanhist/, accessed May 3 2003 and University of Reading, ‘The Rural 
History Centre’, http://www.rdg.ac.uk/Instits/im/index.html, accessed May 3 2003. 
12
 Waite, C., and Nicolson, A., op.cit., 1984, p.8. 
13
 Hewison, R., Culture & Consensus: England, Art and Politics Since 1940, p.23. 
14
 Bishop, P., An Archetypal Constable: National Identity and the Geography of Nostalgia, 1995, p.1. 
15
 Ibid., p.60. 
16
 Ibid., p.115. 
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From the twelfth century when 97% of the United Kingdom population lived in rural 
areas,17 there had been many changes in population movements, with about 80% in urban 
areas by the 1880s.18 In the nineteenth century, many still felt that their roots were rural, 
and the countryside still remained physically close. Country Life noted that ours was ‘an 
island race whereof even the town dweller is a country man at heart.’19 Town dwellers 
viewed urban living as a ‘temporary necessity’ and dreamt of the day that he would find a 
cottage on the green, and ‘real’ values.20 The dominant image of late nineteenth century 
England was of an idealised and sentimentalised Arcadia,21 a term which referred to the 
unspoilt parts of England where there was a perceived unique, international beauty.22 The 
number visiting the countryside during the interwar years demonstrates that the ‘centrality 
of the countryside to national identity’ was still key.23 Originally the countryside was seen 
as a place of function, synonymous with agriculture.24 With the growth of outdoor pursuits 
such as hiking and camping in the early years of the twentieth century,25 particularly the 
1930s, it became a place of consumption and (aesthetic) pleasure rather than production.26 
Many would have seen H.V.Morton’s In Search of England, first published in 1927, still 
being republished in 1944, full of photographs that highlighted the old and quiet, lanes and 
cathedrals.27 The aspirant suburban middle classes in particular, would also have been 
brought up on images in magazines such as Country Life, which provided ‘assured and 
immutable’ establishment values,28 focusing on a celebration of nature through landscape, 
country houses and sporting pursuits.29  
 
With this growth of aesthetic appreciation of the countryside arose a number of 
preservationist groups, looking for a planned countryside. For example, the CPRE (Council 
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 Waite, C., and Nicolson, A., op.cit., 1984, p.53. 
18
 Strong, R., Country Life, 1897-1997: The English Arcadia, 1996, p.29. 
19
 Ibid., p.30. 
20
 Miles, P., and Smith, M., op.cit., 1987, p.42. 
21
 Ibid., p.43. 
22
 Matless, D., op.cit., 1998, p.42. 
23
 Burchart, J., Paradise Lost: Rural Idyll and Social Change Since 1800, 2002, p.99. 
24
 As noted by Ibid., p.1, and Stapledon, R.G., The Way of the Land, 1942, p.87.  
25
 Black, J.A., A History of the British Isles, 1997, p.251. For more, see Jones, S.G., Workers at Play: A 
Social and Economic History of Leisure 1918-39, 1986. 
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 Burchart, J., op.cit., 2002, p.2. 
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 Matless, D., op.cit., 1998, p.65. 
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 Strong, R., op.cit., 1996, p.12. 
29
 Ibid., p.20. Strong notes on p.36: The magazine provided many images which powerfully presented 
national identity: portraits of long-standing families, ‘ancient manor houses and gardens’, unspoiled 
landscapes throughout the seasons, ordinary countrymen ‘at their toil’, and ‘the gentry engaged in country 
pursuits’. 
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for the Preservation of Rural England), founded in 1926,30 was looking ‘for a tidy, ordered 
countryside, rather than preserving an unchanging, traditional countryside’.31 Commonly 
preservation is identified with ‘nostalgia and anti-modernity’,32 but many preservationist 
movements were radical, and against the private ownership of significant areas that could 
be of good to the community. Few leaders of preservationist movements would have 
regarded their work as a retreat to the past: rather, they were concerned with improving the 
future.33 They constructed ‘specific narratives of history’, which posited ‘a particular 
relationship between past, present and future’,34 using the past to criticise the present in the 
hope that the future would be better.35 Such rural planners wanted a countryside ‘fit for 
purpose’, not littered with billboards or mock-Tudor houses. Expressing ‘a particular 
modernism, committed to order and design’, they were not simply protecting the way 
things were for the sake of tradition,36 but was any of this reflected in the wartime posters? 
A variety of Acts were passed to protect the countryside, including the first Green Belt 
formed outside London in 1938,37 providing a physical barrier, preserving the distinction 
between urban and rural areas. There were increased restrictions on advertising and 
housing developments, and local authorities bought several areas of natural beauty. With 
the growth of hiking and other countryside pursuits the question of access to private areas 
of beauty was brought up, bringing town dwellers into conflict with those resident in the 
country, particularly farmers.38 During the interwar years there arose the idea of 
landscaped citizenship, those visiting needed to be aesthetically educated. The countryside 
was to be open to all, but those visiting needed to be educated in the body to the ‘correct’ 
conduct, such as picking up litter.39 
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 CRPE, ‘CPRE- About Us’, http://www.cpre.org.uk/about-us/index.htm, accessed December 23 2003. See 
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 Matless, D., op.cit., 1998, p.33. 
38
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In the Second World War, a machine war, ‘rural England became the touchstone of 
stability and tranquillity’.40 Country Life noted that Churchill recognised the value of 
presenting the war as a struggle between Britain, a humane, old-fashioned rural culture, 
against Germany, a heartless industrial society run amok.41 The myth of ‘Deep England’ 
was very important during the war, a ‘green and pleasant land with rolling hills, village 
greens and parish churches’, with an idyllic landscape symbolising ‘order, stability, and 
tradition, linking the past with the present’, which ‘no amount of German bombs could 
destroy’.42 The land did not simply have an aesthetic purpose during the war, regaining its 
functional element, with farmers ‘the fourth line of defence’.43 Unsurprisingly, it is quite 
difficult to track down posters addressed to the rural community, as the poster is really a 
tool of urban areas. One questionnaire respondent makes clear the dependence that farmers 
had on trade magazines: ‘“Make two blades of grass grow where one grew before”’. This 
slogan has been identified as a theme that appeared widely in farming circles and in the 
farming press, Farmers Weekly, Farmer and Stockbreeder.44 Such magazines could bring 
important issues to the attention of rurally-bound farmers faster than any poster, being 
brought to the farmer, rather than requiring the farmer to be where the message was.45 
 
Most posters were aimed at the urban population, with rural images used to get them to 
defend England’s mythical ‘green and pleasant land’, or attract them to work in rural areas. 
With the nation having to be less reliant on food imports, and with men called up into the 
armed forces, agriculture needed more workers.46 The Woman’s Land Army (WLA), 
formed in June 1939, looked to attract women to work on farms,47 for seasonal as well as 
permanent work, rather than other options such as factories.48 Within the WLA campaign, 
the MOI, working on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture, was keen to focus on the effort 
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that the women were making, and rejected a design from Laura Knight. The design was 
rejected on the basis that: ‘the emphasis in your design is so very strongly on the horses 
and so little on the girl that the message which we wish to convey would not really get to 
the public’.49 The new design was altered from an illustration of three girls working a 
plough, to one depicting just one, entirely replacing the man’s role.50 In March 1940, a new 
WLA recruitment campaign was planned, solely for seasonal work. The national campaign 
was to include posters, handbills, articles in the local press, cinema publicity, and local 
recruiting meetings and demonstrations, including the use of Employment Exchanges.51 In 
1942 a new campaign was planned, to be organised on the same lines as the 1941 
campaign. General recruiting appeals were to be avoided, but efforts were to be made to 
record spontaneous offers of help.52 
 
The ‘Lend a Hand on the Land’ campaign looked to attract urbanites to use their holidays 
to work in rural areas. It first went national in 1945,53 and ran into the post-war years, even 
running in conjunction with the ‘Holidays at Home’ campaign.54. People ‘discovered that 
farm work was a dignified, and notably cheap, way of taking a holiday in wartime’,55 
continuing a long-term trend, where the industrial workforce would help with the annual 
harvest. Hop picking in Kent was still an annual event for many East End Londoners until 
well after the Second World War.56 Within urban areas the ‘Dig For Victory’ campaign 
began in the early months of the war, initially as a ‘Grow More Food’ campaign. Extensive 
publicity, including ten million instructional leaflets in 1942 alone,57 was used by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in a campaign to provide an additional 500,000 
allotments in and around urban areas in England and Wales.58 With an emphasis on 
idealised rural self-sufficiency, and an increased knowledge of nutrition, the benefits of 
growing one’s own food were stressed, with fruit and vegetables, important for the health 
of the nation, only ‘absolutely fresh when grown in a man’s own garden’.59 
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The recurrent binary opposition in interwar British culture had been the belief that rural 
indicated life, and urban indicated death.60 Initially the Industrial Revolution appeared to 
reinvigorate towns and cities, offering ‘handsome public buildings and parks, gracious 
suburbs and vibrant shopping streets’.61 However, by the twentieth century the terms more 
associated with urban areas were crowded, cramped, polluted, poverty, dirty and disease-
ridden. Houses had been squeezed into the courtyards and gardens of existing houses, and 
dark and airless alleyways developed. Diseases, particularly waterborne, became a 
problem, and in the second half of the nineteenth century action was taken to improve 
matters, particularly as it started to impact on the rich.62 During the interwar years travel 
became cheaper and easier, aiding the growth of suburbia, where new, clean housing, and 
life outside the city were sold to the ‘respectable’ working classes (see figure 63).63 The 
government concentrated on slum clearance programmes,64 and vast amounts of housing 
were built on cheap land, developed into suburbs. Such housing was seen as the key to 
averting working class discontent,65 although many did not want to move as they feared the 
loss of warmth and friendliness of their current surroundings. There was also the problem 
of relatively high rents, as houses were built an average of twelve to an acre as opposed to 
forty plus per acre prior to the First World War, and the expense of commuting.66 For those 
who did move to suburbia, however, this idea of ‘the Englishman’s home is his castle’ was 
evident, with neo-Georgian and mock-Tudor ‘self-contained, owner-occupied, semi-
detached’ houses ‘signifying both the desire for privacy and the desire for status’.67 The 
suburbs, with their mock-style housing, attracted derogatory comment. Those moving to 
the suburbs were seen as attempting to get back to the country, to enjoy ‘rus in urbe’, the 
benefits of the country in the town. There was an element of fantasy, the suburban man 
‘being neither urbane nor exhibiting the qualities of the true-born English countryman’.68 
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The pastoral tradition was clear, but vulgarised, in suburbia, judging by the number of 
streets named, for example, Laburnum Avenue. Garden Cities, designed by Ebenezer 
Howard, also grew in this period.69 The countryside came to be regarded with nostalgia 
and had the allure of ‘paradise lost’.70 More urban solutions were also presented. The 
influence of Le Corbusier, for instance, although not fully implemented, could be seen in 
the concrete blocks of flats built, intended to provide communities surrounded by green 
space.71 
  
Miles and Smith note that many historical texts have concentrated on the perceived divide 
between the depressed industrial areas of the North, and the new consumer economy in the 
South.72 Donald Horne sees the South standing for ‘order and tradition’, defined as 
‘romantic, illogical, muddled, divinely lucky, Anglican, aristocratic, traditional, frivolous’; 
while the North was projected as ‘pragmatic, empirical, calculating, Puritan, bourgeois, 
enterprising, adventurous, scientific, serious’, believing in ‘struggle’,73 with similar 
descriptions from Orwell and Priestley.74 The landscape, however, needs to be seen as a 
whole, rather than in binary terms, for example, as highland and lowland, radical and 
conservative,75 and ‘to concentrate entirely on these disunities and paradoxes is to miss the 
significance of the unities’. During the interwar years, as the reality of pastoral England, 
particularly the South,76 was being swallowed by suburbia, the associated myth of pastoral 
England, articulated historically to the myth of the pre-industrial Golden Age, a time of 
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supposed harmony and progress, became stronger.77 Powell writes that the war prompted 
the halt in the divergence between north and south, as it was necessary for them to fight 
together,78 but in the media Coventry complained that London received more attention 
about the bombing. All industrial areas were under threat from bombs, but Southern 
factories, where consumer factories moved to production of wartime goods, were more 
within the range. 
 
After the Spanish Civil War bombing was expected to be catastrophic.79 In the summer of 
1939 over 80% of Londoners wanted to evacuate their children in the event of war, and 
evacuation was meticulously planned to meet these kind of numbers. In the event less than 
50% sent their children to safe rural areas, and the plans were thrown into chaos, resulting 
in a well-publicised disaster. Those in the reception areas were shocked by the state of poor 
urban children,80 and although there was increased social mixing, it merely confirmed the 
prejudices that the middle-classes had ‘about the dirty fecklessness of the working class’.81 
The initial stages of evacuation caused many problems, and the evacuees started to drift 
back to town. By January 1940, over half of those evacuated had returned home, despite 
efforts by the government to persuade parents to leave the children in the country.82 People 
were getting ‘impatient and irritated at being told to be patient’, at being told ‘that the 
difficulties are unavoidable, or that they will straighten themselves out in time’, and were 
looking for more concrete measures from government.83 There were doubts within 
Government as to the value of an extra evacuation campaign as it was unclear whether the 
Government had a settled policy on evacuation, and was sending mixed messages by re-
opening schools in dangerous areas.84 On November 20 1939, a small photographic poster, 
described as ‘effective, attractive and simple’: ‘Children are Safer in the Country, Leave 
them There’, was published. It was hoped that it ‘would serve a dual purpose of restraining 
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parents from bringing their children back at Christmas and of serving a long term policy’.85 
When the Blitz began in September 1940 a second wave of evacuation did occur.86 
 
Intellectuals such as Orwell viewed the ‘real’ England as ‘the willow tree by the stream’, 
but in the meantime campaigned for an ‘English’ revolution, espousing socialist principles 
but with English decency rather than in a Soviet style.87 As with most periods of English 
history, ‘the inter-war years revealed a series of tensions, paradoxes and echoes between 
utopian and arcadian fantasies’.88 The Second World War probably accelerated, rather than 
was the catalyst for, socialist change, as intervention, rather than laissez-faire had begun in 
earnest in the 1930s. Rising social and economic standards were accepted as necessary, 
and such rising demands were strongly influenced by the work of social reformers.89 This 
was the result of two nineteenth century trends, one a concern with the employment 
conditions of the working classes, and the other with health, housing and hygiene.90 
 
From about 1940 onwards there were many calls for a publication of peace aims, including 
large measures of social reconstruction after the war. Themes of ‘never before’ and ‘never 
again’ emerged well before 1945: ‘never again a return to the poverty and perceived chaos 
of the 1930s, never again such an opportunity to make a new country’.91 For example, 
Basil Wright wrote in the Documentary News Letter in June 1940, that ‘a nation fighting 
desperately to defend the present lacks the inspiration which springs from a vision of the 
future’. It was ‘necessary to repair past errors and fortify national morale with an 
articulation of democratic citizenship’, a ‘conservative force’ which could ‘mould the 
future’.92 This was necessarily a radicalisation of opinion, but the growth of information 
services in wartime brought many of the intelligentsia concerned with the issues into a 
position of power.93 The MOI, responding the Home Intelligence (HI) findings, argued for 
the government to publish peace aims,94 in order to strengthen public morale, and ‘heal the 
                                                 
85
 PRO MH 78/232, ‘Ministry of Information Liaison Committee of Imperial Defence’, November 20 1939. 
86
 May, T., op.cit., 1987, p.371. 
87
 Miles, P., and Smith, M., op.cit., 1987, p.226-229. Miles and Smith have taken the notion of willow trees 
by the stream from the novel, Orwell, G., Nineteen-Eighty-Four, 1949 (Chapter 2). 
88
 Bishop, P., op.cit., 1995, p.121. 
89
 Thorns, D.C., The Quest for Community: Social Aspects of Residential Growth, 1976, p.27. 
90
 Ibid., p.24. 
91
 Matless, D., op.cit., 1998, p.189. See Cull, N.J., op.cit., 1995, p.138, describes the film Dawn Guard 
(1941) with two Home Guard soldiers describing thoughts for peace, produced before the Prime Minister had 
made a formal declaration of British war aims.  
92
 Miles, P., and Smith, M., op.cit., 1987, p.238, quoting Basil Wright. 
93
 Ibid. 
94
 See PRO INF 292 for Home Intelligence Reports, for instance, No. 23, March 5-12 1941, p.141 and 
August 19 1943, monthly review, p.10. 
  119
rifts left by the interwar experience’.95 Churchill, however, wanted to postpone discussing 
future changes until the war was won, not wanting to ‘raise false hopes’.96Churchill was 
too concerned with fighting the war abroad and, after 1942, in co-ordinating with 
American and Soviet efforts. The Second World War did put the regenerative ideas of 
‘real’ British futuristic values in a powerful position. Churchill left the Home Front to 
Labour or Tory Reform ministers, many of whom believed that war was also being fought 
against the conditions of the 1930s, allowing ideas of the ‘New Jerusalem’ unaccustomed 
power and influence.97 
 
In December 1942, the Beveridge Report was published.98 The central recommendations 
‘comprised the creation of a unified and universal system of social insurance’, which 
would protect citizens ‘from the cradle to the grave’.99 It was perceived as a struggle 
against ‘five giants on the road of reconstruction’, defined as Want, Ignorance, Squalor, 
Idleness and Disease.100 Reactions to it varied from enthusiastic acceptance,101 disbelief 
that it would ever be implemented,102 as ‘Homes Fit for Heroes’ had never been after the 
First World War,103 and a disgust that such an expensive idea should have been mooted.104 
Many believed that it epitomised the more ‘classless’ society that people were fighting for, 
an idea that gained more prevalence with a large mass electorate.105 Implementation of the 
scheme met resistance with the Churchill Cabinet, largely as it would involve a threefold 
increase in costs over 1941 compared to relative schemes. Churchill wanted to delay 
questions of social reform until the end of the war, partly to avoid distractions, and partly 
to avoid expensive post-war commitments. Bracken, as Minister of Information, was 
                                                 
95
 Miles, P., and Smith, M., op.cit., 1987, p.235. 
96
 May, T., op.cit., 1987, p.373, quoting a note circulated by Churchill. 
97
 Miles, P., and Smith, M., op.cit., 1987, p.235, and Pelling, H., Modern Britain 1885-1955, 1960, p.151. 
98
 May, T., op.cit., 1987, p.301, notes that Beveridge had been influenced by the Toynbee Hall lectures in his 
younger life. 
99
 Land, A., Lowe, R., and Whiteside, N., The Development of the Welfare State 1939-1951: A Guide to 
Documents in the Public Record Office, 1992, p.18. 
100
 Timmins, N., The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State, 1995, p.24. 
101
 PRO INF 1 292C, ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Reports’, June 1942 to August 1943 and PRO INF 1 292D, 
‘Home Intelligence Weekly Reports’, August 1943 to December 1944, provide evidence that the Beveridge 
proposals were widely discussed. Enthusiasm, disbelief and disgust can be found, although not in equal 
measures, throughout the Home Intelligence reports. In PIN 8/162, ‘The Beveridge Report: Public Opinion’, 
December 1942 to February 1943, collected comments expressing (largely) enthusiasm are evident. 
102
 PRO INF 1 292/C, ‘Home Intelligence Weekly Reports’, 20-27 April 1943, p.145. 
103
 Healy, S., Town Life, 1968, p.70 noted that a survey in 1936 found that nearly 350,000 families in 
England and Wales were still living in overcrowded conditions. 
104
 M-O, FR 1634: ‘Fortnightly bulletin (4): Gandhi, the Beveridge Debate, Russia and morale, rumours and 
grumbles’, March 1943, p.9. See British Institute for Public Opinion, The Beveridge Report and the Public, 
1943. 
105
 McLaine, I., Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War Two, 
1979, pp.179-181; Marwick, A., op.cit., 1980, p.220. 
  120
particularly keen to prevent Beveridge from making public statements on the subject, 
expecting that it would attract ‘an immense amount of ballyhoo about the importance of 
implementing the recommendations without delay’.106 Public opinion was keenly 
interested in the proposals, and appeared to look for commitment from the government. 
Churchill was not keen to devote time to a matter of such importance when the war was 
still far from won, but in 1943 Lord Woolton was appointed as Minister for 
Reconstruction, and a year later a white paper was accepted which included many of 
Beveridge’s ideas.107 
 
Wars are expensive, particularly the Second World War, which spanned nearly six years 
and was highly mechanised. This needed to be paid for, and discourses of the ‘people’s 
war’ suggested that it was the people who should therefore be asked to pay for this. 
Although income tax rose and reached a wider net of people, further measures were also 
needed.108 As people were earning more, and had fewer consumer goods to spend their 
money on, saving became a ‘national obsession’. The National Savings campaign spent 
more on advertising than even the Ministry of Food, and many campaigns were targeted at 
the small saver. The main benefit for the government was to combat inflation.109 
 
The following section will focus on the ‘Your Britain’ poster series, which contained very 
different urban and rural representations in the same series. All posters were ultimately 
depicting either the world that was being fought for, against, or something that could be 
done to achieve it, some of which were clearly looking forward, others backwards. The 
section also considers other posters that represent or appeal to the British landscape. 
The Design of ‘British’ Posters 
Starting in November 1942, the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA) produced a 
series of seven pictorial posters on the theme of ‘Your Britain’.110 This showed the men of 
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the British Army some of the things they were fighting for.111 This was ABCA’s first 
enterprise of this type, as previous efforts had been confined to map reviews in poster 
form.112 Abram Games, a modernist artist, was the official War Office poster artist and 
Newbould, well known for his pre-war railway posters, his assistant.113 Commissioned to 
do these designs by the War Office, the posters were distributed by ABCA, three by 
Abram Games,114 four by Frank Newbould. Newbould chose ‘views of English country 
scenes and buildings’ as his subjects, in a style that closely followed ‘his pre-war 
technique’.115 Presenting a Southern England, Newbould’s designs focused on a typical 
English village (figure 14), Alfriston Fair (figure 15), Salisbury Catherdral (figure 16), and 
the South Downs (figure 16). The largely rural Southern counties, particularly Kent, 
Sussex, and Hampshire, were in the ‘front line’ in the ‘Battle of Britain’, so the ‘image of 
the English village could be related more directly, by juxtaposition and contrast, to German 
barbarism than could Yorkshire moors or Scottish coalfields’.116  
 
Villages were places with communal functions, small areas with ‘an ancient church with 
lofty tower’ at the centre,117 often mythically constructed tranquil ‘villages in the mind’.118 
This is the image Newbould presents in figure 14, even without the text, instantly 
recognisable as an ‘English’ image, in the style of Constable’s ‘quintessential 
Englishness’, described on page 110. Although most of the UK’s inhabitants had long 
lived in towns, ‘the idealised rustic village was a potent symbol of national identity, of 
“England’s Green and Pleasant Land”.’119 Miles and Smith explain how ‘[t]ime and again, 
the village community is represented as a microcosm of the national community.’120 
Several discourses are evident within the image: discourses of tradition, where something 
that appears to have existed in a stable and unchanging manner for a long time is to be 
defended. The viewer is told that this will not last unless ‘you’ fight for it. The discourses 
of religion and community are presented in the Saxon church (topped with St George’s 
flag) and the pub (probably traditionally named), central to the image, and thus to village 
life. Discourses of aesthetic beauty are also clear: a quiet, traditional village, beautiful 
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buildings, well planted, noticeably with an established English Oak. Bathed in sunlight, the 
image appears almost timeless, with indistinct signs of human activity. 
 
Figure 15 depicts Alfriston Fair, in Sussex, where there was a long tradition of village 
fairs. The image, with traditional pink-striped awnings, baloon-sellers, and swing-boats is 
the type of image that evokes nostalgia now. Discourses of family life are evident in this 
poster, as children enjoy a simple carefree time on the swings and roundabouts. The flag 
on top of the roundabout appears to be another St George’s Cross. Once again, the old 
English Oak and church appear at the centre of the image. The image appeals to what 
people ‘know’, and follows on from previous traditions, particularly well-known railway 
posters, where depictions of the English countryside were already popular before the 
war.121  
 
Religious discourse and the established church is evident in figure 16 which depicts the 
spired gothic Salisbury Cathedral, bathed in sunlight. This traditional image would have 
been familiar to many from guidebooks, particularly after the 1937 centenary of Constable, 
and his significant painting of Salisbury Cathedral.122 Once again, an established old 
English Oak is a key part of the image. The only person in the image is an indistinct figure 
with a horse and cart under the tree. 
 
In August 1943 figure 17 of the South Downs was the latest in the series prepared for 
ABCA,123 described by Darracott and Loftus as a ‘traditional vision of an idyllic, pastoral, 
almost historical Britain’.124 In 1938 it was believed that ‘[m]ore than any other race in the 
world are we influenced by the smooth gentle contours of the south-country wolds and 
downs.’125 Roads, and possibly electricity pylons, existed on the downs, but none of this is 
evident in this picture. Instead there is a timeless sweep of almost hedgeless landscape, and 
more established English oaks. An old manor or farmhouse nestles among the hills, but 
there is very little evidence of mechanisation. Tractors ‘were still far from universal, and 
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[were] outnumbered by farm horses through the interwar years’.126 An old shepherd in 
traditional garb is walks across the lush green land with an old English sheepdog, bathed in 
sunlight. This is reminiscent of a typical image, particularly from nineteenth century 
photographs, where ‘[s]hepherds and sheepdogs were often almost inseparable’.127 All four 
images follow the long tradition of typical horizontally painted ‘landscapes’.128 
Newbould’s posters are typical examples of how pre-war travel poster style was used 
almost unchanged during the war to arouse patriotic feelings for an idealised pastoral 
Britain.129 Such peaceful visions were a relief from the grim realities of war. Despite 
largely industrialised populations, rural images avoided confrontations with the ‘awkward 
realities’ of urban living.130 As Advertiser’s Weekly described it, ‘Newbould… looks back 
on the peaceful side of British life and presents those landmarks which are inseparably 
bound up with the spirit of England’. 
 
The same Advertiser’s Weekly article noted that Games had pushed ahead to the future. He 
produced three surrealist-inspired images for the ‘Your Britain’ campaign, covering three 
of the subjects dear to socialist hearts: modern variants of health, education and housing. 
Art and Industry noted that these posters would have been very different without the clear 
influence of Chirico and Dali, with the images dependent ‘on the extreme of photographic 
realism that results from the skilful use of perspective and shadows’.131 Although 
photographic techniques were available, and Games had been brought up in a photographic 
studio, Games ‘disliked photography’, finding ‘it too mechanical and neither creative nor 
personal enough’, finding the airbrush more flexible.132 All three images depict pioneering, 
futuristic buildings that already existed: Finsbury Health Centre (figure 18), school in 
Cambridgeshire (figure 19), and a block of workers’ flats in London (figure 20). These 
new, clean-lined and geometric, images are superimposed on the unromantic old, 
presenting ‘the bad old ways of poor living conditions’. They demonstrated ‘how slums 
can give way to bright, clean houses and how dark, stuffy schoolrooms can be redesigned 
to admit light and air’.133 These images demonstrate a belief that the future was to be 
planned, that collective suffering and heroism deserved a collective and planned future, 
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and a sense that if a country was worth dying for, it had to be worth living for. A planned 
society ‘was upheld as offering a new basis for social and political organisation at a time 
when laissez-faire capitalism was in crisis’.134 However, not all were in favour of 
reconstruction, as some saw planning as ‘non-English’, even Nazi.135 
 
Discourses of a healthy future are evident in figure 18, depicting Finsbury Health Centre. 
Possibly a community health centre, Finsbury, like Peckham, promoted health for families, 
and looked to re-enable the ‘village gaze’ within an urban setting.136 Death, disease and 
rickets are evident in the background – also the past, to be solved by modern healthcare 
regimes. Discourses of a modern urban future mask the dreary past, and discourses of 
cleanliness are evident, meshing with discourses of science and modernity. The large 
concrete structures depicted in the images were believed to offer cleanliness, lightness and 
freshness. The architecture appears to show the influence of modern architects such as Le 
Corbusier, with the health centre in an Art Deco style and the buildings alongside in a 
Bauhaus style. Figure 19 depicts a school in Cambridgeshire ‘where village children are 
learning to grow up in healthful surroundings’.137 In the past there is old style furniture, a 
lack of equipment, and what there is is tired and broken. Old styles of education with 
easels, chalk dusk, in small dilapidated village schools are to be replaced by bright, modern 
large schools. It is not clear what age or gender the schoolchildren are, but light, fresh, airy 
and modern facilities are to be provided. The ideal of universal education, with children 
‘our future’, was growing in the interwar years, culminating in the Education Act of 1944.  
 
Figure 20 depicts a block of workers’ flats built in London in 1936, probably a result of 
various interwar social housing experiments. Although the suburbs were the main areas of 
interwar development, these are not presented as the future. As with the other images, 
Games’ future is very much an urban, concrete one. The flats were to be part of the new, 
planned housing, carefully planned to use less ground space, and built of clean, hygienic 
fabrics, with balconies to access fresh air.138 Unlike the established Oak trees evident in all 
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of Newbould’s posters, this poster has the sole tree in Games’ designs, and this tree is still 
new, not yet established. The old tenement buildings in the background, part of the 
nineteenth century housing movements, had become overcrowded, uninhabitable and 
discredited. Such houses were dark and dingy, and generally housed one family per room, 
the water pump is evident outside. The scruffy poster on the wall claims ‘Carbol 
Disinfectant kills fleas, bugs, mice, rats’, real problems for urban areas. 
 
McLaine believes that Games was putting forward messages the Government was reluctant 
to make on its own behalf,139 but the War Office was behind the posters. The assumptions 
evident in these posters structured the thinking that made Beveridge acceptable. Although 
the less obviously ‘English’ view, Games’ was the style taken forward to the 1951 Festival 
of Britain. Games’ aim was ‘essentially about paring down the message to its simplest and 
most powerful form’,140 and every element of his design was a working part.141 The posters 
use ‘strongly symbolical colour’, with the past in dark and muted colours, but the future 
bright and sunny. Games’ designs show a familiarity with surrealism, which allowed poster 
designers to go beyond the physical, realistic depictions of a subject. Art and Industry 
noted in 1943 that Games’ posters ‘are interesting as an example of modern design 
harnessed to an educative and constructive theme.’142 Although the two sets of images by 
Newbould and Games are very different, there are similarities in discourse. For example, 
discourses of citizenship are evident within the poster series, as the slogan ‘Your Britain’ 
implies a sense of ownership, something to be defended and fought for, but presented in 
very different ways, reflecting very different contradictory but, nonetheless, meshing 
discourses. All posters ask the viewer to ‘Fight for it NOW’, aimed at (citizen) soldiers 
already fighting, this made the killing appear justified. The rural images suggest that they 
do their job as soldiers and they will maintain the rural idyll. The urban images provide 
both a fear, that unless you maintain your role we will be going back to cramped 
conditions, and they point to a hope that the future will be better. 
  
Rural images are often idealised, unrealistic, but in a style of heightened realism, as with 
the Women’s Land Army (WLA) posters. Smiling English roses are presented within the 
sunny rural pastoral idyll, in landscapes (figure 64), near picturesque old farmhouses 
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(figure 65), and amongst ‘cute’ animals (figure 66). The women are rarely shown doing the 
physical work that would have been necessary, and always remain recognisably 
feminine.143 More of a rarity appears to be ‘That Men May Fight’ (figure 67), which shows 
more of the real hard physical work the WLA did, with extra realism provided by using 
photographs and testimonials from actual farmers. The posters by Fougasse (figures 68 and 
69), although cartoons, present more realism, with the women doing backbreaking work in 
the rain. Utilising blank space, the image focuses the eye upon the simplified main 
character at the centre. These posters, however, were trying to produce sympathy and 
money for those who had done the work, rather than gain new recruits. Throughout all of 
these posters there is little sign of mechanisation, most are holding pitchforks or buckets, 
although Matless believed that machinery feminised farm work as it made labour easier.144 
Many of the images from the ‘Lend a Hand on the Land’ type campaigns were more of the 
same, for example figures 70 and 71, although now with a mixed gender audience. Again, 
the images were over-idealised, depicting smiling men or women, looking distinctly 
unflustered, set within a ‘traditional’ landscape, as in figure 72. Significantly, unlike in 
traditional landscapes, the figures of the people are central to the image, not indistinct. The 
message is that anyone can do this. There is little evidence of modernisation or 
mechanisation in agriculture, although the straight lines in figure 73 could indicate 
mechanised ploughing. The focus is on manual work, companionship, and holidays (figure 
74), when there would have been few other options for holidays. Those depicted within the 
posters are happy and healthy specimens, including those in the services (figures 75 and 
76), obviously keen for a change, although the clothing is not always the most practical. 
Particularly symbolic is the rolled up muscled arm (figures 77 and 78), ready for hard 
physical labour, first launched in July 1943 and expected to become a big feature. These 
‘holidays’ were presented as something even the children could manage (figure 79). We 
can see in this image a distinct contrast between the grey urban and colourful and sunny 
rural, lifestyles. 
 
The ‘Dig for Victory’ campaign was effectively a rural campaign played out in suburban or 
urban areas, as allotments were encouraged and schools turned their fields over to growing 
food. Dig for Victory was a huge campaign, running for much of the war, and thus presents 
a real choice of images. The phrase is first obvious in figure 80, an obviously local, text-
only poster from November 1939. The poster is quite solemn, promoting something that 
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will help the national effort, but not selling the benefits to the viewer. Also at the same 
time, figure 81 was produced, with more emphasis on ‘Grow More Food’, before the 
phrase ‘Dig for Victory’ took on a life of its own. Using natural green colours, the older 
man is dealing with hard physical labour: ‘the imagery of male and female domestic 
digging called up an amateur spirit of improvisation’, with ‘muddling agrarianism’ moving 
‘from the farm to the urban allotment’.145 Science if applied to this ‘muddling 
agrarianism’, with careful planning could get the best from the ground, all year round 
(figure 82). Such detailed text would probably have been more appropriate in a leaflet, but 
was possibly provided for reference on allotment sheds. The image uses the logo of the 
foot on the spade, which first appeared early in the war (figure 83), where the ‘Minister of 
Agriculture exhorted not only the big man with the plough, but the little man with the 
spade’.146 The spade is the tool of the individual, and within this image we have a manly 
work boot digging with a functional spade into soil that is to be tamed to become fertile in 
the war effort. The image was ‘cleverly used in all forms of the campaign’, which gave 
strength to the appeal.147 Using photography, this image purported to reproduce reality, 
although only the left leg is visible, the right leg must have been airbrushed from the image 
– why is unclear. 
 
The benefits of fresh food are sold in a new campaign in September 1941 when the 
‘familiar foot-on-spade illustration’ gave way to a traditional still-life full-colour design of 
a basket of vegetables, (figure 84), directed more noticeably at women (with most men in 
uniform). The appeal for allotment cultivation was to continue, but home gardens would 
‘receive new emphasis’.148 Such over-heightened colour visions of abundant vegetables, 
(rarely fruit or salad), good, nutritious food in a time of shortages, would have appealed 
(figures 85 to 87). There would be no need for coupons, although this is not sold as part of 
the campaign. Stapledon commented in 1942 that: 
The inter-dependability of food and ships can never be sufficiently stressed, and it 
is a fact that should always be held prominently before the peoples of our small and 
densely populated island, alike in times of peace and war.149 
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Games’ certainly demonstrated this within figure 88. Most of the previous images have 
been very naturalistic, but the benefits of growing ones own food to yourself (figure 89) 
and your nation (figure 88) were made clear through Games’ modern montaged images, 
the spade and the ship together presenting a new message, and Schleger’s clever use of 
vegetables as text (figure 90), natural forms represented in an unnatural manner. The 
slogan appears in various guises, which indicates the longevity and adaptable nature of the 
slogan, including ‘Dig on for Victory’ (figure 91), set within a traditional landscape, and 
‘Dig for Plenty’ (figure 92), which again emphasises the benefits. The campaign even 
gained commercial support, for example from Guinness (figure 93), which was believed to 
have iron-qualities, which gave the strength to ‘Dig for Victory’.150 Although people are 
rarely seen in the images, innocent, Aryan, beautiful children, in a style associated with 
children’s story books, do appear in figure 94, needing fresh food to keep them healthy. 
The guilt feeling is even stronger in figure 95 where (in the style of Hassall’s seaside 
posters) the child is trying to do their bit, when it should be the adults doing this particular 
job, although children were expected to do their bit elsewhere. 
 
With two different audiences for the evacuation campaign, the children remain the centre 
of attention. The mothers (the fathers are expected to be away at war) are to be persuaded 
to send the children away to safe areas; the reception areas are to be persuaded to accept 
the urban children. Urban areas are shown with all the trappings of war. A child is shown 
bravely trying to do a man’s work within blitzed areas (figure 96), whilst other clean, 
cherubic children cower in fear in urban shelters (figure 97). The reception areas are 
depicted in a similar style to Newbould’s ‘Your Britain’ images, traditional, but with and 
economy of line and detail, villages with a church at the centre (figure 98), populated by 
friendly, motherly women. Although the urban areas are shown as dangerous, with barrage 
balloons indicating the danger of further air raids (figure 99), icons such as the Union Jack 
(figure 96) and St Paul’s (figure 99) are evident as the nation is not to be cowed.  
 
London Transport noticeably supported wartime campaigns, and their campaigns, directed 
at urban commuters, depicted London standing up under the Blitz. ‘The Proud City’ was a 
series of six in traditional painted style, with the image surrounded by a frame. The series 
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focused on historic or significant buildings in the capital, surrounded by, or the victim of, 
bombing campaigns, but demonstrating resilience or new life coming through (figures 100 
to 102). The series was to emphasise that in spite of Hitler such ‘monuments of antiquity’ 
still stood, and the posters exemplified ‘in material form the proud spirit of the people of 
London - a spirit that remains as a symbol of Right over Might’.151 Walter Spradbery, a 
Royal Academy artist, was looking to ‘convey something intangible, something far beyond 
an actual pictorial record of the damaged historical buildings of London’. The muted 
colourings were chosen to demonstrate the ‘indestructible’ nature of light and beauty in the 
face of the Blitz.152 Interestingly, the series was also produced in Arabic (figure 103), 
although it is not clear where these were placed.  
 
The London Transport campaign demonstrated a hope in the future, and the savings 
campaigns largely push hope for the future as a message too. Essentially savings posters 
were persuading people to fund the war, but no posters were identified that depict what 
would actually have been bought with these funds. The emphasis with the slogans is on 
saving and lending, not on giving. Figure 104 demonstrates, through statistics, the return 
that will be achieved from investing. Much of the rest of the campaign focuses on what 
will be gained or protected with the money, particularly improvements to be made in the 
future. As the likelihood of winning the war increased, the emphasis on the future could 
become stronger. Eric Fraser’s modern image (figure 105), demonstrating cubist 
influences, emphasised the modern materials that would be used to construct the future, 
concrete and steel, with education at the centre of how this will be achieved. Education is 
also seen as an investment in the future in (figure 106), although in a style with more 
realism. This realism is also evident in figure 107, where a middle-class woman and child 
look to the horizon for a brighter future, presumably aimed at the men who had left them 
behind. In wartime, other than concentrating on the present, people could do little but 
dream of the future. This is evident in posters, where a glamorous woman dreams of 
holidays and fashion she can return to in the future (figure 108), and in figure 109 a worker 
dreams of a good family lifestyle in the suburbs. Despite the important growth of the 
suburbs in the interwar years, there is largely a silence surrounding them in posters, and 
this is one of the few images that depicts a suburb. The silence of the suburbs was possibly 
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because propaganda deals with othering, more difficult to depict in the case of the in-
between suburb. Figure 110 was part of a stop-gap campaign to keep people saving after 
the end of the European war,153 but was hurriedly withdrawn after the Japanese 
surrender.154 Reconstruction in a modern, planned world is evident in the blueprint, where 
central issues include housing, leisure, health, education, agriculture, roads and buildings.  
The Reception of ‘British’ Posters 
The popularity of posters depicting the English countryside had been demonstrated before 
the war by well-known railway posters displayed within homes and schoolrooms. During 
the war the War Office’s series of ‘Your Britain’ posters by Newbould and Games, 
‘impressed upon a vital section of the people what Britain is – the heritage of landscape 
and what men have built upon it’.155 Games’ posters intentionally had a ‘strong educative 
component’, and he deliberately did not design to the level of least intelligence. He relied 
on the more-informed soldiers to help the ‘more humble’ understand his messages. Games 
believed that the Army did not really understand the quality of the work that it was getting, 
otherwise they may have stopped his work, believing it to be too advanced for common 
soldiery.156 The images shown in Games’ posters were largely in line with the ideas of the 
Beveridge Report, with emphases on health, housing, education. As Bracken had feared, 
there was an enthusiastic reaction to the Beveridge report.157 Advertiser’s Weekly wrote 
that the all of the ‘Your Britain’ series had ‘proved popular; demand far outstrips 
supply’.158 
 
Although the posters may have been popular with the public, Churchill complained that if 
those fighting the war did not focus on winning the war, there would be no future to fight 
for as the country would be under the power of the Nazis. Churchill had a particular 
objection to figure 18, depicting Finsbury Health Centre, believing that it was an attack on 
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pre-war conservative policies.159 Bevin had drawn his attention to the poster, upon which 
Churchill had become ‘very angry’,160 claiming that: ‘The poster is a disgraceful libel on 
the conditions prevailing in Great Britain before the war.’ On the April 21 1943 Grigg 
agreed to stop the general issue of poster, which had only been seen by senior education 
officers so far, although he argued that ‘not intended to represent any of our soldiers’ 
homes’.161 Most copies of the poster were pulped, although a few copies survived, 
including one in the IWM.162 Although Newbould’s images may be seen as more 
‘English’, it was Games’ modern style that was used at the Festival of Britain in 1951.163 
 
It is less easy to find direct responses to WLA and ‘Lend A Hand’ poster campaigns, but 
the results of printing posters that were far more idealistic, glamorous and clean than the 
reality were clear. Problems were caused for some farmers when the images did not match 
the realities and, as a consequence, the ‘wrong’ type of person was recruited: ‘Girls turned 
up dressed as for a picnic and were incapacitated in a matter of hours.’164 As the ‘Lend a 
Hand’ national campaign was launched when the end of the European war was in sight, the 
public wished to ‘relax and take a normal holiday and the cessation of hostilities made it 
more difficult to attract volunteers’. In such circumstances, the publicity was believed to 
play a key role in helping the number of volunteers to reach 107,000, nearly the same as 
the previous year.165 The posters worked in conjunction with national press advertisements, 
the first batch of which produced ‘thousands of offers’. Holidaymakers ‘experiencing the 
difficulties of travel and seaside accommodation must have found the suggestion of an 
agricultural camp a promising prospect for the summer’.166 Stapledon noted that there was 
a ‘large reservoir of intelligent, willing and physically robust “casual” labour of both sexes 
that can be brought out on to the farms’. Farmers were willing to ‘exercise greater patience 
with “casual” help, and to take more trouble in training both part-time and whole-time 
recruits to the land’. He felt that the organisation needed to be strengthened, and the 
introduction of staggered holidays could help.167 
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In 1944, the Ministry of Agriculture considered all their long-running campaigns, ‘Lend a 
Hand on the Land’, ‘Grow More Food’ and ‘Dig for Victory’ as successful enough to 
continue throughout 1945.168 In 1941, when debating a new angle on the ‘Dig for Victory’ 
campaign (figure 84), an extra half-a-million allotments were credited to the ‘very 
successful 1940-1 publicity effort’.169 The 1942 campaign was specifically targeted at 
women, but women gardeners gained most of their information from friends. The 
conclusion was that the publicity aimed at them was not nearly as effective as it might have 
been.170 In 1943 ‘[p]ress and poster campaigns adjuring the people to “Dig for Victory” 
have played a vital part … in easing the shipping situation’. The urban dweller was 
believed to be ‘particularly impressed’ by the posters, with the ‘admirable selection of 
sites’ a key secret of the campaigns success.’171 However, in a letter to Advertiser’s Weekly 
in September 1941, Norman Taylor noted an ‘unfortunate association of ideas’ when a 
small poster bearing the slogan ‘Dig For Victory’ was exhibited next to an undertakers.172  
 
‘Digging for Victory’ was a voluntary campaign, and in January 1940 a psychology 
student wrote to Advertiser’s Weekly, contending that the slogan ‘Dig For Victory’ 
conveyed ‘the thought of hard work, sweating and thirst’. He suggested a slogan such as 
‘Plant for Victory’ would mean the same but remove the ‘psychological impression of hard 
work’, to a public who ‘will not go to any effort when they really do not have to’.173 This is 
borne out by a comment in 1943 to HI, from the Midland Region: ‘It’s all very fine for the 
Government to tell us to grow out own vegetables – we haven’t time to do more’.174 Mass-
Observation (M-O) investigated the 1943 ‘Dig for Victory’ campaign where many claimed 
that they would willingly dig, but were unable to access any land to dig on, and called for 
areas such as Hyde Park to be used. Those who had dug up half their lawn for vegetables, 
had done it partly in response to the government campaign, but also due to fears of price 
rises in food and as a leisure interest.175 Despite these complaints, in 1943, allotment 
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‘numbers had almost doubled to 1,400,000’.176 The general background and sheer scale of 
the campaign was more significant than any one part of the campaign. Statistics provided 
by the Wartime Social Survey in 1942 demonstrate the largest percentages had taken 
wartime allotments because of ‘Dig for Victory’ publicity (14.9%), the desire for fresh 
vegetables (14.1%), and as a hobby (23.9%). The Survey claimed ‘that the desire for fresh 
vegetables and the wish to help in the national food situation – “are in themselves a 
reflection of the message conveyed in the ‘Dig for Victory’ publicity and should, therefore 
be attributed directly to the campaign”.177 The campaign continued into 1944, and although 
the peak year for allotments was 1942, ‘interest in the campaign generally appeared to be 
undiminished’. The campaign no longer called for extra allotments, and was ‘directed 
almost entirely to greater efficiency in vegetable production’.178 The slogan had caught on, 
and aside from the ‘immediate purpose of helping out the supplies of green vegetables’ it 
gave ‘many a new feeling (or revived an old one) about the soil and working outdoors’. 
Both the Dig for Victory and evacuation campaigns effected a mixing of town and 
country.179 
 
Despite widespread evacuation campaigns in many different media, by June 1940 ‘only 
about a quarter of mothers in danger areas have registered their children for evacuation’.180 
In 1944 the evacuation campaign still continued, although such publicity was not expected 
to ‘have any substantial effect on registrations under present conditions’, as not only were 
people unlikely to go, they started to drift back as they become more optimistic about the 
progress of the war. People would not evacuate without good reason, and posters and press 
campaigns were not getting the support of ‘authoritative statement from the 
Government’.181 In a democratic society, if the leaders had decided that it was in the best 
interest of the state, and the people, that children should be evacuated, a failure to persuade 
them to do was, was ‘a definite failure on the part of leadership’. It meant that ‘either the 
people do not believe in their leaders, or … the leaders have not spoken in a language 
which the people can understand and respond to’.182 London Transport had a lot of 
experience in publicity, and certainly spoke in a language people could understand and 
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respond to. Posters they produce are often popular for reproduction, and despite 
Spradbery’s fears that ‘The Proud City’ series would be one of the grimmest ever 
produced, his posters attracted considerable attention and thousands of copies were 
distributed throughout the world, including in Arabic.183 
 
In October 1939, the National Savings Committee (NSC) proposed to put St George and 
the Dragon on their forthcoming posters. M-O were asked to do an advance test on this and 
found that many ‘condemned this symbol as too old-fashioned or remote’, as were the 
‘whole tone of the red Government posters’.184 ‘Candidus’ of the Daily Sketch enquired in 
March 1942 as to why one of the slogans used as ‘lend to defend’, reminiscent of the 
‘Maginot mentality’ and suggested that ‘give to attack’ would be a more appropriate 
message. A series under the slogan ‘hit the enemy with your savings’ had disappeared, and 
Candidus was glad to see the back of it as  
‘[h]e felt that forgoing the use of one’s money could not be compared with the 
fighting man’s sacrifices, and that the stress on the merits of war savings as an 
investment contrasted badly with self-denial in other countries.185  
Throughout December 1942, praise for advertising was reported, though the ‘ghastly 
picture of the Savings family’ was criticised: ‘The posters are regarded, on the whole, as 
“the best advertisements issued by any Government Department.”’186 At the same time, the 
editor of War Savings, the NSC journal, discovered that there was a clear desire for 
horrific, meaning realistic, posters.187 
 
Whatever image or slogan was used on the posters, if the government was not producing a 
consistent message, it was not going to be a success, as with one hand it promoted a NSC 
campaign, and with the other made ‘arrangements for the resumption of football pools. On 
Monday we are urged to keep trade alive. On Tuesday we are told to reduce expenditure 
even upon necessities’.188 Savings increased following good war news but there was a 
reluctance, particularly in rural areas, as people did not believe that government would be 
able to meet its debts after the war. Workers also disliked tying up their money, believing 
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that if a slump set in after war they would be required to use their savings. They 
particularly disliked paying up at work, as employers would say that there was no need for 
pay rises if they could afford certificates.189 During February 1943 people were holding 
back from buying Savings Certificates because of ‘lack of faith in the Government’s post-
war standing’. Builders were not joining saving groups as they were observing a ‘wastage 
of material’ on aerodrome sites.’190 In August 1943, savings campaigns were still attracting 
a great deal of response, much of it negative, including the belief that the more they paid 
into savings the longer the war would last.191 In November, there was still a lot of comment 
and opinion was ‘divided as to their effectiveness. Some appreciate the publicity; others 
“deplore its fatuous tone”.’ Some felt that campaigns increased interest in savings; others 
that ‘the expense is not justified because much of the money “saved”’ was really only 
transferred, and therefore did not represent an extra saving.192 
 
Poster sites in London were carefully chosen so that the message could be absorbed easily, 
‘without shocking the viewer’. In March 1944, however, there were calls for War Savings 
posters to be removed from Nelson’s Column as foreign visitors might ‘think it strange that 
a national monument be used in this way’.193 The type of images presented in figures 108 
and 109 caused ‘a strong divergence of opinion’ in Lambeth for several months. Mr T. 
Hobson, of the NSC headquarters, was worried that a poster with the slogan ‘Save for a 
Sunny Day’ was illustrated with ‘fur coats, silk stockings, boxes of chocolates and all the 
other things which are in short supply’. Hobson contended that the poster would ‘induce 
the public to rush out and buy these luxurious goods’. The posters were turned down by the 
NSC headquarters because ‘advertising experts said they would encourage the public to 
believe that luxuries would be available as soon as the war was over’.194 In August 1945 a 
thanksgiving campaign was planned, to be the biggest ever campaign. In order to be 
topical, there had to be some hurried changes, figure 110, urging the public to ‘finish the 
Japs’ had to be hurriedly withdrawn. The theme for an incentive to save was now to ‘be 
focussed entirely upon reconstruction’. A lot of debate occurred over the slogan, with 
Advertiser’s Weekly’s prediction that it would be ‘Great Things To Do…’, a slogan 
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formerly used, but adapted for the new campaign.195 In September 1945 the NSC released 
figures which showed that for ‘every £1 spent on advertising, £10,000 came back from the 
British public’. Commercially speaking, this was ‘a microscopic cost’.196 
 
Propaganda, making the issue more black and white, presented two Englands throughout 
the war, of which the rural, pastoral England197 was ‘often deemed more English’ than the 
urban.198 The divisions are often not clear cut: 
Defining England, or at least isolating any single version of ‘Englishness’, 
remained problematic. This was partly because of the size and diversity of England 
itself, and the number of its internal regional and social divisions.199  
In a democracy, propaganda could not ‘short-circuit reason, as the dictator propaganda 
does’. As an educative process, it ‘knows that the stability of a social order does not 
depend upon everybody’s saying the same things, holding the same opinions, feeling the 
same feelings, but upon a freely achieved unity’ which recognises and accepts 
differences.200 Both traditional and utopian visions drew on longer term discourses, 
stylistically, as well as in subject matter, whilst also looking forward to a more promising 
future. The rural in particular drew on the landscape tradition, with realistic drawings 
which appear to have forgotten all the lessons of modern design, although the designs were 
focused upon the functional message, with highly readable typography. The modern 
socialistic message was more tied with the abstract, graphical messages. This was not cut 
and dried: the London Transport series, for example, depicted urban images in a very 
traditional style. Various IPA techniques were drawn on, the ‘glittering generalities’ of 
democracy, and the transfer of authority from both conservative and socialist movements 
ensured that the war was deemed a good fight. Card stacking was used, to ensure that only 
selected facts were presented, appropriate to the message, and the bandwagon effect, where 
everyone should contribute to the fight, as everybody else is. Having examined what 
people were fighting for, identifying their ‘imagined community’, we move onto the 
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second case study which emphasises the idea of the island nation, and identifies those 
involved in the industrial effort. 
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Chapter 5: Industrial Posters 
The Second World War was fought in a more businesslike way than the First World War, 
although there ‘was no longer the feeling that production came first, and people a long way 
second’.1 In the early years of the war, those in the UK’s factories were encouraged to 
believe that they were playing a major part in aiding the nation’s survival.2 This chapter 
explores the posters used to maximise the industrial effort, identifying the longer-term 
discourses that they drew on. It discerns a range of discourses that were important to 
industry in the Second World War, including discourses of industrialisation; 
mechanisation; science and technology; health; protection; cleanliness; femininity and 
masculinity; and scientific management and psychology, with moral discourses largely 
absent. A varied range of posters styles, as with most poster campaigns, was used to get the 
message across, including technical diagrams, Soviet-influenced designs and homegrown 
designs.  
The Context and Planning of Industrial Posters 
In the First World War, men had been presented with white feathers if not seen in uniform. 
In the Second World War, behind the obvious military fronts was the ‘Battle for 
Production’, working continuously.3 Workers, particularly men, needed convincing of the 
importance of their work: ‘Churchill told war workers that “the Front Line runs through the 
factories”’, where ‘they were “soldiers with different weapons but with the same 
courage”’.4 Civilian contributions to the war effort were of ‘decisive military importance’, 
with Britain’s armed forces dependant on ‘the industrial and organisational skills of the 
home population’.5 Much equipment produced in factories, particularly for the Royal Air 
Force (RAF), was complicated. A strict control of manpower was needed, as a high 
proportion of skilled labour needed to be retained in the factories.6 A profit motive for 
industrial effort was rarely seen, as the British workforce worked for victory for the nation. 
Industry was central to the war effort, as it recovered from the poor reputation it had 
gained through the interwar years, with poor industrial relations and strikes. As seen in the 
previous chapter, much propaganda focus was on a sentimentalised, rural England. The 
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urban and industrial England, providing the manpower and materials for the conflict, was 
often ignored,7 partly due to the desire of the British to be seen as different from the 
‘machine-worshipping’, inhuman Nazis.8 
 
In the UK, the technical and manufacturing changes of the mid-eighteenth century created 
an industrial economy which provided a ‘dominant collective self-image’ of the country as 
‘the world’s workshop’.9 As work and the home became distanced from each other, both 
mentally and physically, the idea of ‘the worker’ became more prominent.10 The industrial 
elite sought to appear gentrified and ‘clean’, to distance themselves from the grimness and 
ugliness of real industry,11 of the ‘“satanic mills”’, a problem that discouraged 
wholehearted commitment to industry.12 In the popular imagination factories were such as 
Priestley described, in his seminal 1934 account of the composition and appearance of 
England: Northern, dirty, and ‘a grim blackened rectangle with a tall chimney at one 
corner’. As the new consumer industries were created in the South in the 1930s, new 
‘decorative little buildings, all glass and concrete’, which seemed merely to be ‘playing at 
being factories’ were built.13 As the coal, steel, textile and shipping areas of the North 
declined, the consumer growth industries of the South, including electrical appliances, 
synthetic fibres, chemicals, and car manufacture, grew.14 New (electrical) technological 
‘magic’ was ‘clean and bare and glittering’, unlike the old industries.15 By the Second 
World War industry was largely associated with the machine, which Priestley described as 
enslaving some in a monotonous routine, particularly women, although liberating others 
who enjoyed the possibilities of machine technology, principally men.16 By the Second 
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World War discourses of clean industry, achieved through science and technology, are 
evident, although mass factories still only employed a minority.17 
 
British industrial working practices were influenced by those from abroad, including 
Taylorism from America, which applied scientific method to the details of work processes. 
It broke tasks down into the smallest possible units, introduced wage-incentive schemes, 
and rigidly separated jobs that required thinking from those that only required manual 
operation.18 Joad’s popular text of 1926, The Babbitt Warren, depicted America as a 
‘machine-ridden, work-and-money-mad land’, with a worship of ‘size, speed, 
mechanisation and money’.19 There was no longer time for apprenticeships, and mass 
production intensified the stress on good time keeping, discipline and regularity.20 Lenin 
was impressed by the methods of Taylorism, feeling that they fitted the Soviet industrial 
model.21 Essentially an ‘urban creed’, Socialism was bound up with the idea of machine-
production.22 Visits to the USSR were quite common in the interwar years, with cultural 
achievements, such as the works of Eisenstein, celebrated.23 Walter Citrine24 and the 
Webbs25 wrote influentially on the state of Soviet Russia, with the Webbs praising the 
factories, education system and the classlessness.26 Associated particularly with the 
working classes, the Soviet system took on a symbolic character for the workers, for whom 
it ‘represented the achievement – real or imagined – of their aspirations’, whilst for the 
middle classes ‘it stood for all they feared’.27 The dominant attitude of the state until 1939 
was anti-communism, rather than anti-fascism.28 
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The British Communist Party, formed in July 1920,29 had grown in number and influence 
in the interwar years. Initially it enthusiastically supported the war, but reversed the policy 
within a few days.30 By January 1941 their party paper, the Daily Worker, had been 
suppressed.31 With the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939, few outside the Communist Party had a 
good word to say for the USSR. After July 12 1941, when Germany invaded the USSR, 
few had a bad word to say.32 The Anglo-Soviet alliance was enthusiastically received as 
Britain was no longer alone. Pictures of Stalin began to be displayed alongside those of 
Roosevelt and Churchill in factories and ‘other public places’,33 whilst munitions factories 
held ‘tanks for Russia’ weeks, where the entire weeks output was dedicated to the Soviet 
effort. There were Anglo-Soviet committees everywhere, and Clementine Churchill’s ‘Aid 
to Russia’ fund raised £8,000,000 of aid.34 The aims of British propaganda about the USSR 
were to combat ‘anti-Soviet feeling’ which might ‘jeopardise execution of policy’, and to 
‘counteract enemy attempts to split national unity’ regarding the Anglo-Soviet Alliance. 
Those working in industry needed little convincing, but the government needed to 
anticipate and ‘curb exuberant pro-Soviet propaganda from the Left’.35 Appearing to offer 
a viable alternative to Fascism, there was considerable grass roots support for the Soviet 
effort. Fearing that this would translate into support for Communism, the government 
decided to pursue a secret, long-term policy to ‘steal the thunder’ of the left.36 Churchill 
vetoed the playing of the Internationale for six months. Stress was laid on cultural 
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similarities with the ‘Russians’, rather than on the political system of Communism.37 The 
BBC believed that the British people recognised the oppressive nature of Communism but 
were prepared to put up with it:  
If the devil out of hell came to fight the Nazis just now, we would cheer him and all 
his fallen angels, and you needn’t worry that our cheers would mean that we were 
turning devil worshippers.38  
Sir Walter Monckton, in 1941, whilst Director General of the MOI, made a special visit to 
the USSR to ‘exchange information on policy and technique in propaganda with the Soviet 
Propaganda Ministry and to establish co-ordination’ between the UK and the USSR. 
Arrangements were made for close co-operation through the exchange of information and 
material.39 In 1942, newspaper magnate Lord Beaverbrook also visited, returning with a 
collection of original posters, published, with English translations, in factories two days 
after his return (figures 111 to 114),40 with the British also providing posters in return 
(figures 115 to 118). Admiration for the Soviet Union arose largely from a ‘conviction of 
our inefficiency, resulting in an increasing degree of admiration for efficiency wherever it 
is found’.41 
 
With rising numbers of strikes in the interwar years,42 including the General Strike, 1926, 
presented by the government as being political in intent,43 the government began to fear 
that British workers would look to the USSR example, and seize ‘power in a revolution’.44 
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Men had returned from the First World War psychologically changed, ‘convinced that they 
were entitled to fair treatment and were prepared to act to get it’. The pre-war ‘tendency 
towards deference and humility’ was gone, and the demands for changes set in.45 Whilst 
there was a surplus of work, the trade union movement expanded.46 The 1927 Trade 
Disputes and Trade Union Act made ‘sympathetic strikes directly and indirectly against the 
government illegal’,47 and from July 1940 all strikes became illegal.48 On October 3 1940, 
under Churchill, Ernest Bevin was asked to take office as the Minister of Labour and 
National Service.49 Bevin, a moderate who believed in achieving agreement through 
‘reasoned argument’ rather than confrontation,50 even referring to workers he met in 
factories as ‘mates’,51 was readily accepted. As leader of the Transport and General 
Workers’ Union at the time of the General Strike, he was trusted more than Churchill, 
whose reputation with the miners was poor after the 1910 Tonypandy massacre.52 The key 
figure from the labour movement in the government, Bevin’s responsibility was to achieve 
the highest possible level of war production, determining the allocation of labour, contain 
inflationary wage pressures, and avoid industrial trouble.53 Bevin believed that ‘more hours 
of work did not necessarily mean more work’, and that to get the best from war workers, 
fair treatment and relaxation needed to be provided.54 
 
Bevin ‘allowed several highly damaging and irresponsible [strikes] to go unpunished, 
rather than endanger his good relations with the unions’. Building up such trust allowed 
him to ask for, and get them to accept, the loss of various cherished privileges.55 Able to 
legislate on behalf of workers, strike levels were initially the lowest they had been since 
records began, although some legitimate members grievances were ignored. Towards the 
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end of the war the number of unofficial strikes rose, particularly in the coal industry,56 
losing control of their members to extremists. There was a lot of criticism for the strikers, 
and comparison with what soldiers had to put up with,57 with calls from the public for 
strikers to be tried for treason. Farmers were angry: ‘If we stopped work England would 
starve’.58 Towards the end of the war, factory workers felt the need to hold out for better 
post-war conditions, as advancing mechanisation made their position increasingly unclear. 
The sense of urgency for industrial war effort had gone, victory appeared certain, and 
workers felt that if they did not make a stand now, they would never get anything. Workers 
outside government industries often felt that they were not really doing anything towards 
the war effort, but simply giving the management profits.59 Stories of ‘wartime strikes by 
dockers and miners find little space in the picture of a nation united in a common cause’,60 
but significant numbers of working days were lost to strikes (see appendix 8).61 
 
There is no question that the miners were symbolically at the centre of the key inter-war 
strikes.62 The heroic narrative, in which the miner appeared both as the symbolic victim of 
capitalism and as the indomitable survivor, was not peculiar to the UK, but held special 
resonance. The manufacturing greatness of the country was owed to steam power and 
machinery, and at its peak the coal industry employed one tenth of the male work-force.63 
Mining was a geographically differentiated industry,64 but across the board the industry 
was clearly dangerous and lowly paid.65 Orwell and Priestley’s important texts provide 
evocative images of the hardships of the miner’s life, bent double in small spaces, covered 
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in dirt, breathing foul air, in return for a small wage.66 The miner in employment was still 
considered ‘one of the lucky ones’,67 as the increased application of science and 
technology to coal mining techniques increased coal production, whilst less coal was 
required.68 Inefficient mines were shut down,69 and many miners were unemployed or on 
short hours. The Victorian work ethic was still evident,70 and most were ashamed of being 
unemployed, opinions that had percolated down to the working classes from the middle 
classes, talking about ‘lazy idle loafers on the dole’, who could ‘find work if they wanted 
to’.71 The middle classes had their own visions of the life of the worker, believing that they 
were accustomed to the hardships and ugliness of their surroundings.72 Walter 
Greenwood’s 1933 novel Love on the Dole tackled issues of unemployment, but a film 
version was not produced until 1941, and withheld until 1943. Orwell viewed the lot of the 
working classes as a dismal one, with the best they could hope for that industry would be 
stimulated by, for instance, rearmament, providing more work.73 May Day procession 
floats of the 1920s, however, were decorated by socialists with slogans such as ‘The 
Burden of Armaments Crushes Social Progress’.74 
 
With the outbreak of the Second World War, having contracted so much, the mining 
industry had difficulty in ‘recruiting and retaining’ labour in order to fulfil wartime 
requirements. As with other strategically important industries, plans for state involvement 
in a time of war had been drawn up as early as 1936, although the government was wary 
about potential unrest in the industry. During the war, local campaigns were significant. 
For instance, figure 119 appealed to Derbyshire’s miners, one-third of whom had been out 
of work in 1931-3.75 Many of the unemployed would have joined the forces, and 
announcements were made at the pits when the local regiment distinguished itself. The 
Derbyshire Yeomanry were the first to enter Tunis, and this poster was rushed out for the 
local mines.76 Figure 120, similarly, was rushed out for the Durham area, immediately after 
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the Durham Light Brigade captured the Primo Sold bridgehead south of Catania.77 In May 
1941, it became obvious that there would be a severe shortage of coal if the current rate of 
production continued, and the state had to get more involved. Mining work required 
training, but miners were free to choose to join the forces, and unemployed miners had 
even been directed to the armed forces and munitions factories, rather than back into the 
mines. Being a miner was not an attractive career at the outbreak of war, with an 
‘unenviable record of unemployment, poor labour relations and relatively low pay’.78 With 
an ageing coalmining population, 79 (40% aged forty or over by 1941),80 young men, 
known as ‘Bevin Boys’ were directed into the coalmines after 1943.81 Absenteeism was a 
problem, particularly by the younger miners, and with the increasing technical nature of 
mining, the loss of a few key workers had a serious impact.82 
 
Orwell complained that capitalism had slowed down mechanised progress as the profit 
principle, the driving force for capitalist industry, ensured that inventions which threatened 
to reduce profits were suppressed.83 During the war British capitalism was enlisted ‘for the 
duration’ only, the profit principle abandoned,84 and most, if not all, factories turned over 
to war work. Mass-production methods ensured that workers were ‘completely divorced 
from the product and the means of production’.85 In April 1941, it was suggested that 
factory workers did not ‘thoroughly’ understand the importance of their role, and that this 
should be addressed.86 Workers in the factories needed to be kept involved as ‘fighters’, as, 
‘except in the assembling works, few workers appreciate the full significance of the parts’ 
on which they worked.87 Those manufacturing small parts for which the purpose was not 
obvious, or non-military equipment, needed convincing of the importance of what they 
were producing. Time induced war-weariness and frayed nerves, particularly when 
workers were doing unspectacular work, ‘out of the limelight and monotonous’, was 
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exacerbated by uncertainties about the future. Such uncertainties increased as victory 
became more certain.88  
 
Blatchford, in 1894, had described the factory system as ‘evil’, and declared that England 
needed to choose between the ‘quality of men and the quality of production’.89 Welfare 
took on an increasing concern in factories, and certain early philanthropic employers 
provided medical and leisure schemes for their workers.90 Finding Taylorism inhuman, 
some maintained that English business was founded on values of ‘humanity’, ‘honour’ and 
‘craftsmanship’. In the 1930s, with more focus on social obligations to its workers, 
working conditions improved.91 Between 1914 and 1950 the chances of a worker 
sustaining a fatal injury at work more than halved. New technology improved the risk from 
some hazards, although it introduced new ones,92 with machine work more monotonous, 
inculcating a belief that such work was safer, thus less attention was paid to the task in 
hand.93 Increased discourses of protection (physical, rather than moral as had been the 
concern in the past),94 led to the formation of the ‘National Safety First Association’ in 
1918. This aimed to tackle workplace safety on a national scale,95 becoming The Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Accidents (ROSPA) in 1941.96 ROSPA produced many 
accident prevention posters throughout the war, initially with little support from industry or 
the government, despite the economic benefits of less accidents. In summer 1940, 
however, the government took ROSPA over ‘lock, stock and barrel for the duration’.97 
ROSPA and the MOLNS combined to produce a bigger variety of posters than any other 
Ministry, with posters displayed for a week, fortnight or month, then turned over with new 
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designs printed on the reverse to economise on paper.98 The Factories Act 1937 provided 
the first safety legislation, requiring, for example, safety guards on dangerous machines,99 
evidence of the growth of state concern with, and intervention in, working conditions. With 
more recognition of the ‘interconnections between general standards of health and 
occupational problems’, there were improvements in real wages and living standards, and 
the Holidays with Pay Act was passed in 1937, although not enforced until after the war.100 
The Emergency Works Order (EWO), March 1941, laid an obligation on employers to 
provide for the welfare of their workers, with canteens, crèches, and ‘music while you 
work’.101 An increased number of nurses, doctors and welfare officers on the shop floor, 
and more works canteens, were the result.102  
 
The EWO was indicative of the extent to which the imperatives of total war legitimised 
state power, in a way which would have been inconceivable in the 1930s.103 The state had 
avoided intervention in industry where possible, with Baldwin ‘believing that management 
was the task of the employer, not the state’,104 although in 1935 he declared that laissez-
faire was dead.105 In the initial stages of the war unemployment rose as industries laid off 
their workforces,106 but the importance of manpower to the war production effort was soon 
recognised, with the Ministry of Labour and National Service (MOLNS) formed, and a 
series of Acts passed.107 Under the EWO, men and women were forced to register for 
possible industrial service,108 and employers required to obtain workers through 
employment exchanges or approved trade unions.109 The EWO was initially unpopular for 
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some workers. Unable to leave work for more lucrative industries, the EWO lowered 
worker morale and impacted negatively on production.110 The EWO caused problems for 
employers as, with a combination of higher wages and fears of dismissal removed, 
absenteeism increased.111 In 1942, the EWO was amended so that habitual absentees could 
be prosecuted but these powers were rarely used, with a steady rate of about 6-8% for men 
and 12-15% for women from 1943 to the end of the war.112 The government attempted to 
assess the factors causing absenteeism in industry, particularly those which might be 
remedied by propaganda. Absenteeism was particularly notable amongst married women, 
who would not otherwise be working in factories. Some absenteeism was accepted as a 
natural safety-value, avoiding longer-term involuntary sickness created by stress, with few 
holidays and increased overtime.113 Working hours inevitably had to increase in a time of 
war, from the pre-war average of a 48 hour week.114 Unpunctuality and slowness in 
starting work were considered almost as important as absenteeism in causing loss of 
production.115 
 
Outside of wartime, industry is ‘built around a wide margin of inefficiency’. With a surplus 
labour force there was ‘no serious occasion to consider the best possible use of every 
worker every working hour’.116 In wartime, production crises made headline news, and the 
question of productivity was key, particularly in 1941 and 1942. As it became obvious that 
the economy was fully mobilised for war production, ‘further growth in outputs would be 
possible only by the rationalisation and streamlining of manufacturing processes’.117 Key 
in improving the situation was the creation of a new Ministry of Production in February 
1942, designed to mobilise resources for war production as ‘fully and efficiently as 
possible’. Production needed to be increased without extra support from abroad, and 
without asking for longer hours and more sacrifices from already over stretched 
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civilians.118 Calls for increased effort had to compete against hostility from the public, who 
believed that workers in industry were slacking and time wasting, and bitterness within 
industry at time spent stood down. One report speaks of ‘deep resentment’ among many 
war workers at repeated appeals to ‘increase output and stay at their jobs’. There was no 
question of workers ‘wanting to slack, but shortage of material and bad internal 
organisation make it impossible for them to do otherwise’.119 The importance of the 
industrial effort was stressed through the campaign ‘It all depends on me’ (figures 121 and 
122). The slogan, originating in the Hoover factory, was intended to develop a ‘spirit of 
personal responsibility’ in ‘every worker in industry’,120 symbolising the ‘importance of 
the individual in the national effort’. The Production Executive for Industrial Propaganda 
examined the best methods of ‘educative propaganda’ for arms workers, where interest 
needed to be stimulated in munitions production in general, and in the product of that 
factory in particular.121 A variety of posters were produced to demonstrate to the worker 
where their part was used, and how it contributed to the war effort. 
 
After the First World War, when women had taken war work, particularly in the factories, 
a ‘barrage of propaganda’ had been aimed at women to ‘remind them of their primary 
responsibilities as mothers and homemakers’, provided for by her husband.122 
Advertisements in women’s journals continued to present the nineteenth century ideal of 
the ‘lady of leisure’, with women a living testimony to her husband’s wealth, managing 
both appearance and the housework.123 Women were forced to resign from white-collar 
collar occupations on marriage,124 although the legal bars had been removed by the Sex 
Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919.125 Single girls who took jobs not really required 
were regarded as selfish, having done so at the expense of someone else.126 Work roles 
were assigned in a gendered manner, based on assumptions that such inequality was ‘a 
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dispensation of providence’, that by working a woman was somehow being ‘untrue to the 
higher functions of wife and mother’.127 Working class women could not afford to absorb 
such middle class views in full, needing to work, with housework a secondary 
consideration.128 Women had previously done economically productive work at home, 
fusing it with their roles of raising a family. The need to go to work changed this.129 The 
numbers of working women grew in the interwar years, particularly in the civil service. In 
1939, outside of government service, women’s employment was still concentrated in 
‘specific trades such as hosiery, laundering and dressmaking’, although ‘new engineering, 
light metal and electrical industries’ provided semi-skilled employment, concurrent with 
the decline in domestic service work.130 The war accelerated this trend, with 7,000 women 
employed in government ordnance factories in 1939, 260,000 by October 1944,131 although 
in the early months of the war, unemployment rose.132 
 
As men ‘served their nation in arms’, women were encouraged to take on extra work in the 
factories, the fields, and the armed forces support services.133 Alongside the patriotic 
impulse134 there was also an economic incentive for paid work.135 Wartime work 
constructed as ‘feminine’ was ‘routine and repetitive’, ‘portrayed as clean and light’, 
requiring no formal training, but dependant on ‘dexterity, concentration and the ability to 
tolerate monotony’.136 The ‘male/female, public/private dichotomy’ needed to be 
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preserved, with men in the armed forces doing their duty, rather ‘than simply giving free 
rein to supposedly masculine impulses of aggression’.137 The government went some way 
towards trying to accommodate women in their joint roles, pioneering the use of nurseries, 
and using ‘schemes whereby two married women could ‘share’ the same job, each putting 
in a half shift’.138 Women who had been out of work, those who had been divorced or 
widowed, and particularly those over 40, also felt that ‘they ought to place their past 
experience at the service of their country’, whether that had professional training or not.139 
Women often worked long hours, with those employed in munitions factories commonly 
working thirty-six hour shifts to complete rush jobs. This was bad both for the health of the 
people concerned, and for production, as following each spurt of effort, production would 
lapse, with increased absenteeism and spoilt work.140 
 
Initially, Bevin had hoped that enough women would be persuaded to come forward 
voluntarily for work, with no need for compulsion.141 In February 1941, a meeting was 
held to discuss publicity for the Ministry of Labour, which was looking to recruit half a 
million women to essential war industries, replacing men in non-essential jobs. Employers 
needed to be convinced that they should employ women, as they disliked spending time 
and money training women when they were then unable to compel them to stay at work.142. 
The campaign was to start with a national ‘background’ campaign, consisting of an 
‘indirect appeal’. This was to be followed soon after by ‘publicity of a similar style applied 
regionally, allied with a direct appeal to certain classes for specific jobs’.143 In March 1941 
vacancies for women existed only in a few districts and welfare arrangements such as 
nurseries, to enable married women to take on work ‘were still more of an aspiration than a 
fact’. Consequently plans for a nation-wide appeal on recruitment were considered 
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dangerous, and the appeal to women workers was de-emphasised,144 with confusion caused 
when Bevin stressed the call for women in a broadcast on March 16.145 All the problems 
envisaged by the General Division resulted,146 with women turned away after answering 
appeals, ‘because there was nothing for them to do’. The results were still evident later in 
the year, with women happy to wait for conscription, rather than volunteering.147 
Conscription for all single women between twenty and thirty was introduced in the form of 
the National Service (No 2) Act in December 1941.148 The UK went further than any other 
nation, further than Stalin’s USSR and far further than Hitler’s Germany, where women’s 
roles were to ‘breed and succour the master race’, which restricted the use that could be 
made of them.149  
 
The projection of the UK as a shipping nation, an island people, who ‘owe nearly 
everything to the sea’, was belied by the condition of the docks visited by Priestley in the 
1930s, full of ‘gloom, emptiness and decay’.150 Although geographically false, the image 
of Britain as an island has powerful roots in the national imagination, suggesting a ‘small, 
clearly bounded and defined place, which is separate but not disconnected from the world, 
restful yet dynamic when the need arises’.151 Increased production resulted when this 
image was threatened by fears of invasion. As the fear of invasion was removed, discipline 
was gradually relaxed and the production rate declined.152 In December 1943 final victory 
over Germany was anticipated for 1944, although much of this depended on other events in 
the war, and the supply of equipment. There was a need for full industrial output but rather 
than ‘going to it’, the public was conscious only of delays, and industrial absenteeism and 
unrest reached new levels. The government responded with reallocation, and by mid-1944 
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43% of the working population was engaged in the war industry.153 Initially the industrial 
war effort limited by the need to still produce goods for export, so as to pay for at least 
some of raw materials and equipment bought from America and elsewhere.154 The export 
market, for coal at least, collapsed with the fall of France in mid-1940.155 From March, 
1941, the ‘cash and carry’ system was replaced with ‘lend-lease’, to be repaid after the 
war. If Lend-Lease from the USA and Mutual Aid from Canada had not been received, the 
UK could not have devoted its resources to war as fully as it did.156 Industry did not really 
have to cater for consumer needs, as demand was cut by purchase taxes, quota schemes 
allocated materials to manufacturers, ‘utility’ standards were established in 1941, and 
points rationing on food and clothing was introduced.157 With this context in place, the 
following section will focus on the posters produced, both within and external to the 
government, to maximise industrial production in the Second World War. 
The Design of Industrial Posters 
Shaw, an industrial propaganda critic, described figures 111 to 114 as ‘grim’ cartoons, of a 
type not yet exploited in industrial work in the UK. These posters were original Soviet 
posters brought back by Lord Beaverbrook. With a ‘fundamental difference’ in 
temperament, he felt it doubtful that the British race would ‘ever be attracted towards the 
“horrific” cartoon’.158 Figures 123 and 124, in a ‘horrific cartoon’ series, however, were 
distributed to every Royal Ordnance Factory and over 10,000 Ministry of Supply 
contractors. British poster artists were not slow to ‘copy the Russian style’, with a ‘gory 
Hitler… scurrying away from a concentration of Waltzing Matilda’s tanks with blazing 
guns’,159  where the images exalt in speed and the machine. The Soviets, originally the 
subject of ‘name-calling’, were now being called on to name-call Hitler. Admired by the 
workers, the prestige of Soviet style was transferred to the British poster. Soviet-style 
posters are defined by strong graphics, colours and message, a focus on the worker, 
whether manual (figure 116), or technical (figures 117 and 118). 
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The British supported the Soviet effort with their own more refined designs, for example, 
figure 125. Very much in the British tradition, it plays on the heritage of the UK as a 
shipbuilding and seafaring nation, working with the modern industrial Soviet nation. As 
with figure 126, the emphasis was constantly on the association with Russia, with rare 
references to the Soviets. The British also produced posters for the Soviets in return, 
including the series designed by Reginald Mount (see example in figure 115). This 
presumably was only for export as there is no English translation, unlike figures 116 to 
118, designed by the very proletarian sounding ‘British Artists’, which indicates they were 
also used for display in British factories.160 Figures 117 and 118 used photographic images, 
a technical medium, appropriate for messages regarding technical equipment. British 
workers were encouraged to look to their Russian counterparts as an example, (see figure 
127), but the stress was laid on cultural similarities and the shared danger from the Nazis 
(figure 128), rather than on ideological similarities. The Communist Party, as feared by the 
government, did (initially) try to turn the issue into an ideological one. It called for the ban 
on the Daily Worker to be lifted (figure 129), and for British workers to ally themselves 
with the Russian effort (figures 130 and 131), with an end to ‘corporate mismanagement 
and waste’. 
 
Even more important than stressing solidarity with the Russians, was the need to stress a 
shared bond with the soldiers, and to emphasise that the ‘industrial front’ was as important 
as any other front in the war. An extensive series utilising three different slogans was 
regularly produced throughout the war, demonstrating the machinery and goods produced 
in the factories in use at points of victory. Illustrated in figures 132 to 134, this series used 
a detailed, British nationalistic style, depicting detailed heroic battle scenes without death, 
little more than pictures in a frame, unlike figure 129, a design where the text and image 
were integrated. Figure 133, produced in 1944, was described as continuing ‘the appeal to 
workers to back up the offensive now being intensified in the heart of Germany’.161 
Comparisons and interactions with members of the armed forces were used to illustrate the 
unity of the war effort (figures 135 and 136). In figure 135, the image is slightly surreal, 
with a loss of detail, and the juxtaposition of the worker in industry, and the fighter on the 
front, impossible without acceptance of techniques of montage, is key to the message. 
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Figure 136, part of a series of three,162 one from each of the Services, appealed to ‘the men 
who will give them the armaments and material of war’,163 using photographs of real 
service personnel.164 As evident in figure 137, the message sometimes went the other way. 
 
The importance of individual effort, and the sense of being a link in a large chain is 
explicitly demonstrated in several posters in the ‘It all depends on me’ campaign (figures 
121 and 122), with the ‘ME’ in figure 121 deliberately vaguely illustrated. In heavy 
industry, so reliant on technology, workers had to take care of themselves or they would 
weaken the whole chain (figure 138). Technology made industry reliant on a single worker 
more than before, if one was missing, work further along the line could be held up (figure 
139). Both artists, within these images, were unafraid to use modern non-realistic graphic 
techniques, including abstraction, geometric shapes (both angles and pure circles), 
demonstrated a clear economy of line, combining the text with the image. Other posters 
made the individual ‘a cog in the great machine that grinds forward to victory’,165 evident 
in figure 140. This, and figure 141, highlight problems of absenteeism, figure 141 in more 
of a cartoon manner, demonstrating the concrete loss made. Figure 49 illustrates the ‘Go to 
it’ campaign produced by the MOI in June 1940, the first major campaign to use 
commercial sites after the ‘Your Courage…’ campaign. Handled by S.H.Benson,166 the 
campaign was based on a speech made by Herbert Morrison to factory workers calling for 
increased production.167 Over 200,000 posters were released,168 many in a large billboard 
size, although the blackout had reduced their effective viewing time.169 With the idea of the 
‘nation’ explicit within the words, the red lettering and bold, inventive typography gave a 
sense of urgency and an indication of speed. 
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Those in the hand tool industry, like many who produced non-military equipment, found it 
difficult to maintain ‘the enthusiasm of their workers’, with the work not felt to be ‘of 
sufficient importance to the war effort’. The MOI therefore produced a poster for the 
Ministry of Supply to issue to the workers, to ‘tell them how important to the nation is their 
work’ under the slogan ‘Let’s stick to our jobs and deliver the hand tools’. A photograph 
showing the wide range of hand tools produced, ‘from spanners to hack-saws’, was 
illustrated above sketches ‘of the tanks, ships, planes and guns which hand tools are needed 
to build, maintain and repair’.170 Figure 142 used a ‘skilful photomontage’ which linked 
the worker directly with the final product. Figures 143 and 144 used adaptations of nursery 
rhymes to show how important a small part could be in the final issue. Many parts were 
quite dull in themselves, and it was a challenge to poster artists to produce interesting 
designs. Shaw feels that this was successfully done in figures 145 and 146, where artists 
opted to show the final product in use, with figure 146 opting for photography to represent 
this as reality.171 Able to appeal to a specialised audience, detailed technical diagrams were 
suitable for use in factories,172 with figures 147 and 148 prepared by the works relationship 
office of a manufacturing office. Shaw was keen to point out how easy it was for all 
factories to produced similar drawings ‘for the general interest and enlightenment of the 
workers’.173 Some companies were content to do no more than display posters received 
from elsewhere, and the Ministries of Supply and Production had to cater for this. Figure 
149 is one of a series of posters ‘intended for smaller firms and sub-contractors’, with 
space provided for the factory to ‘illustrate the particular element the factory is making’.174 
Outside the factory the object of propaganda was ‘to create and foster the belief that it is a 
privilege to be engaged on war work’, thus stimulating recruitment.175 In a recruitment 
campaign aimed at suburban women, posters entitled ‘Vacancies’ contained lists of 
occupations vacant in local factories, placed near roadways to allow for detailed study.176 
Recruitment of women was a particular issue, to which this chapter makes reference (see 
figures 150 and 151). The applicability of domestic skills to factory life (figure 152) was 
emphasised, and women in industry became an accepted feature of wartime life, depicted 
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in other wartime propaganda campaigns (figure 153), but this chapter is more concerned 
with increasing production for those already in industry. The war ended with large 
numbers of women in employment; in the Forces, in industry, in the public service and in 
all sorts of other occupations. In 1942, it was believed that most women would wish to 
return to home life, although177 a significant proportion did want to continue working after 
the war.178 
 
Most industrial propaganda was aimed at the entire work force, both men and women, with 
evidence that women were less interested in production figures.179 Campaigns directed 
specifically at women appear to be largely concerned with appearance, particularly the 
conflict between appearing fashionable and glamorous and being dressed correctly for the 
job. Though uniforms still had an ‘undeniable femininity’, ‘traditional notions of what it 
was proper for women to wear inevitably retreated in the face of the requirements of their 
new jobs’. Trousers and shorts, worn pre-war only for holiday or sports, were suitable for 
industrial work, and regularly worn,180 as illustrated in figure 154, designed in the style of 
a pattern book or women’s magazine article. Posters in figures 155 and 156 illustrate 
clothes that were perfectly acceptable to wear outside the factory, at least until the 
introduction of utility clothing, but totally unsuitable in factories, near running 
machinery.181 
 
Many health and safety posters were produced by the government aimed at factory 
workers, a campaign to which there appeared to be an infinite number of angles,182 with 
few ‘cross references to morale or to the war effort’.183 Many ROSPA posters were in a 
modern graphic style, including figures 138, and 157 to 159. When the causes of factory 
accidents were analysed, it was deemed that untidiness was the main cause, but telling 
workers to be more tidy was believed to be ‘about as helpful as telling a worrying woman 
not to worry’. The artist could, however, depict various aspects of untidiness, and explain 
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how tidiness improved ‘general efficiency’, for example humorously in figures 160 to 162, 
depicting the ‘British buffoon’.184 Shaw believed that general exhortations to avoid 
accidents were pointless, as it was ‘doubtful if an accident poster’ could achieve much 
unless it was ‘specific and confined to a definite aspect or example of accident prevention’. 
Being wise before the event was more important than admonitions after the event,185 as in 
the following specific examples, which all focused on ensuring guards were kept on eyes 
(figure 163), hands (figure 157), and machines in general (figures 158 and 159). In 
factories where there had been no recent accidents, there was no need for such propaganda, 
but familiarity with machinery rapidly bred contempt, and posters needed to get across to 
workers the risks they were running by being careless.186 There was debate as to whether 
humour, as in figure 158, was appropriate for such a serious subject. Shaw felt that it was 
‘a useful approach to an unpleasant subject’, but that ‘grim and gruesome’ subjects, such as 
figure 157, ‘arrests the attention while the frivolous cartoon dispels it’.187 Keely (figure 
157) and Rapier’s (figure 159) designs were modern, graphic and abstract, and may not 
have been appreciated by those who looked for realistic images. Any controversy, 
however, ensured that such images would be noticed, important to achieve the function of 
the message. 
 
ROSPA was particularly concerned about accidents caused by women who failed to cover 
their hair. Sir Wilfred Garrett, Chief Inspector of Factories, reported in 1941 that 179 
accidents had been caused by women’s hair getting entangled in moving machinery. He 
noted that: ‘the modern style of hairdressing does not lend itself to the hair being carefully 
covered, and the fluffy curl still protrudes’, as evident in figure 164, which deliberately 
echoed the style of Fougasse. Even after a minor ‘scalping’ accident, the same girl would 
be found again without a cap as she ‘preferred to have an accident rather than look a 
fright’. Many were putting ‘pride before safety’, and thus stressing a fashionable angle for 
wearing a cap, rather than how many accidents it would prevent, as attempted in figure 
165, seemed key.188 Publicity was therefore ‘directed especially to this aspect of industrial 
safety’.189 The only solution to the problem appeared to lie in ‘persuading the fair sex that 
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they are in the fashion if they cover their hair’, as evident in figures 166 to 169, using a 
combination of stylistic techniques including photomontage, depicting ordinary, but 
glamourous, women.190 As with other aspects of industry, Russian women were 
‘continually held up as examples for their British sisters to emulate’, as in figure 170,191 
which ‘Russian visitors to the “Britain at War” exhibition at the House of Scientists in 
Moscow were greatly pleased’ to see on display.192 Figure 171 was a locally produced 
design in the series, using photographs of the ‘girls in our own works wearing the caps as 
they should be worn’, accompanied by the music from an old nursery rhyme. The designer 
wanted to satisfy the ‘girls’ at the works that the caps could still look ‘quite attractive’ 
when worn by ‘some of their own number’.193  
 
In the early years of the war ‘Britain relied, as usual, upon the protection of the seas and 
her naval power’, with early losses a shock to public opinion.194 Heavy industry had been 
hit badly by the Depression years. For example, the Tyne launched 238,000 tons of 
shipping in 1913, but less than 7,000 in 1933.195 Output from shipbuilding yards needed to 
be increased, and modern montage posters such as figure 172 were produced in 
response.196 In May 1941, the Production Executive of the Industrial Committee was 
shown designs of posters under consideration by the Admiralty to stimulate shipyard 
workers. Commander Cross suggested that ‘the earliest posters should stress the Sailor’s 
appreciation of the high quality of British shipbuilding’. Discussing figure 173, the 
Chairman and Mr Henderson  
were of the opinion that Shipyard workers already possessed sufficient confidence 
in their own skilled craftsmanship, and ought rather to be reminded of the urgency 
of the present situation in any poster that might be issued.197 
The Committee also considered designs by the Mines Department, to stimulate coal 
production. Campaigns, such as figure 174, stressed the importance of careful use of fuel, 
using statements of facts, fuel was equated with wartime products. Production, however, 
was the key, and a similar comparison was made in figure 175, aimed at coal-miners. 
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National campaigns for coal production were impossible, as the psychology of the men in 
different pits and areas varied so widely.198 The government appeared to try, with a variety 
of styles in figures 176 to 178, including a cartoon illustrating the miners digging coal so 
frantically it hits Hitler as a bomb, with local campaigns also significant. The 
unsophisticated style of figures 119 and 120 was appropriate for local mining area 
campaigns. Although largely realistic, the posters incorporated modern techniques, 
including simplified images, the use of central figures, and montage. As with industrial 
campaigns, in a combination of the style in figures 135 and 172, figure 179 was produced 
by the Communist Party, showing a clear link between the miners and the soldiers. Despite 
complaints that the mining population was ageing, a cross-section of ages is shown in the 
mining posters, although this was potentially to tempt younger men to be recruited, rather 
than being representative. 
 
Local campaigns were important, as those in industry did not want to be ‘preached’ to by 
those who did not understand their situation. The use of individually designed posters 
promoted awareness, and a feeling of pride in involvement. Figure 180 was produced by 
full time poster artist employed by a firm of scientific instrument manufacturers.199 The 
symbolic figure ‘ME’, ‘represents a typical worker’, consistently used in the ‘It all depends 
on ME’ campaign. All posters utilising the symbol attracted particular attention in the 
factory ‘because every worker knows that the figure is personal to his own factory; the 
poster therefore embodies a more personal message’.200 Some factories could not afford a 
full-time poster designer, but poster competitions were an effective means of producing 
potent messages, even if the design quality was not there.201 One Midlands firm had 
operated a ‘suggestion scheme’ for over forty years, using approximately 30% of the 
suggestions. They found that in a time of war the quality of suggestions improved and in 
1941 they used over 50% of suggestions made.202 Figure 181 is a poster demonstrating 
such ‘hidden talent’, ‘drawn by a worker on his own initiative and afterwards shown to the 
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management’, using a cartoon style typical of Punch.203 In a competition run by the 
Standard Telephone Company, figure 182 illustrates the winning entry, using a gothic 
Germanic typeface, with figure 183, with the characters depicted reminiscent of British 
political cartoons, the second prize design. Stylistically, the range of posters produced both 
by the government, and within factories, was widely varied. Traditional paintings, 
cartoons, and Soviet-inspired designs, mostly espousing modern, scientific discourses, and 
unafraid to use political comment, were all used, although the British concentrated more on 
pragmatic, instructional messages. Soviet posters were issued directly by the government, 
unthinkable even a year before the war. 
The Reception of Industrial Posters 
On August 11 1941, there were still 22,234 vacancies for men, and 26,405 for women in 
the munitions industry.204 There were complaints that propaganda campaigns, including 
figures 150 to 152, had failed to recruit women. Advertiser’s Weekly took issue with this 
and claimed that the campaigns had achieved what they were meant to do, get women to 
attend Labour Exchanges. The failure lay with the labour exchanges which did not 
capitalise on this, and ‘sell the final product’.205 The demand for unskilled labour was still 
increasing, although a Treasury Sanction for a joint campaign to obtain workers had 
expired. The MOLNS wished the campaign to continue, although short term results were 
only ‘modest’, as such propaganda could not ‘be judged purely on short term results’. The 
MOLNS looked to increase the effectiveness of local drives, to be launched with maximum 
‘punch’, containing as much ‘concrete’ and ‘informative matter’ as possible.206 The first 
job of any recruiting drive in 1942 was to clear up some of the psychological muddle 
engendered by the ‘contradictory propaganda with which Government and commercial 
advertisements between them’ had bombarded the public for the previous two years.207 
Pelling noted that by 1942 the country’s economy was fully mobilised, with little slack that 
could be taken up.208 In June 1944, out of every nine members of the potential labour 
force, two were in the armed forces, three in war production, maintained for three years, 
more than any other country.209 Women were heavily influenced by feminine concerns, 
such as fashion. When asked why women did not respond more readily to appeals to join 
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the A.T.S. appeal, one was: “It’s the horrible skirts!”. ‘Contact’ was horrified, with 
Russian women fighting on the front line, and the enemy approaching fast, that a skirt was 
preventing women from taking their part in the war effort: ‘Fashion at the front and 
glamour in the glory’.210  
 
The USSR was a ‘powerful stimulus’ to industry in 1942,211 and ‘Aid to Russia’ weeks 
were carried out in various regions in 1943, supported by posters, photographs and flags.212 
Exhibitions such as ‘The USSR at War’ were popular, with visitors commenting how the 
images brought home to them how much the ‘Russians’ were enduring. Women were most 
interested in pictures of hospitals. Cartoons attracted the most attention, but were studied 
seriously – they did not seem to be causing any sudden grins.213 There was intense interest 
in the USSR involvement in the war, a ‘desire to assist’, and more demand for information 
about the ‘Russians’ than all the other Allies together. Copies of posters were demanded,214 
with ‘Russian’ cartoons much admired in the UK and America ‘for their drive and 
appeal’.215 Posters were one of the brightest features in the streets of the Russian capital, 
and were deemed the most effective method of bringing the issues of war home to the 
people. USSR posters were more brutal than the British, depicting the Germans as ‘thick’ 
Nazi thugs, as they did not have any illusions about treatment they would receive in 
German hands. The British featured in only one poster, shaking hands over Berlin with 
USSR pilots as bombs rain down, translated for use in the UK (figure 184).216 
 
A positive reaction was given to USSR posters reproduced for display in the UK. Soviet 
style posters appeared to be popular and to ‘achieve the best results’. Advertiser’s Weekly 
was amazed that ‘the forceful and elemental proletarian technique of the Soviet should 
bring such an astonishing response from factory workers’, and found it ‘an interesting 
guide to the wage-earners’ psychology.217 Milner described them as ‘brilliantly clever’, 
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and called for them to be widely circulated in the country. He believed that British artists 
could learn from them, and it was not too late to ‘start training our puerile propagandists in 
the real art of poster propaganda’.218 The British efforts in industry contrasted 
unfavourably with the Soviet 100% effort, and the American organisational drives. 
American examples of propaganda do not appear to have made the impact that Soviet 
propaganda did, and a ‘considerable body of the public’ regarded ‘Russian propaganda as a 
model which this country should follow more closely’. Managers and men alike were said 
to emphasise that appeals to workers for greater productivity were frequently ineffectual 
because of perceived ‘all round mismanagement’. It was suggested that a more positive 
kind of propaganda might counter stories of muddle and inefficiency. As the USSR did, the 
British planned to give wide publicity to particularly good pieces of work, as much as 
security would allow.219 Figures 127 and 170 illustrate how ‘Russian soldiers and citizens 
were constantly held up as embodiments of various wartime virtues’. Even ‘in posters in 
which no reference was made to the Soviet Union there was injected more than a dash of 
heroic soviet realism’.220 This is evident in figures 123, 124 and 151, which all show signs 
of the Soviet influence. Shaw spoke positively of figure 124, where ‘the impressive 
absence of wording’ and lack of ‘verbose exhortations’, combined with a sky full for 
aeroplanes, gave the poster most of its appeal. The poster stood out from other cluttered 
designs, and was ‘widely circulated in the early stages of the war, when it was realised that 
the end of the war would depend ultimately upon air power’.221 Figure 170 was regarded as 
a ‘masterpiece of achievement’, as it ‘was brought out at a time when it was fashionable to 
do everything that they did in Russia’. Once it was ‘realised that the Russian girl in the 
factory tied up her hair, there was then no need for any further argument, or for stricter 
factory rules bearing on the matter’.222 
 
Both figures 129 and 131, produced by the Communist Party, called for the lifting of the 
ban on the Daily Worker, suppressed, along with other communist publications, between 
January 1941 and August 1943.223 The MOI protested, as it deemed that communist 
publications were ‘entitled to as much freedom as other sections of the press’ with regard 
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to expressed opinion.224 The government recognised that in appealing to a diverse 
audience, there was a need to use propaganda that supported the Soviets. They believed 
that the ‘Russians are realists and they know that any assistance they get from Great 
Britain is due to the existence of the Capitalistic system’.225 The MOI refused to issue 
posters to Communist Party influenced groups, for fear that they would be seen to have 
government sanction. By 1944, the anonymous author of this memorandum is calling 
against such discrimination as he believed that however government propaganda was 
disseminated, it was achieving the government purpose, and the government could 
otherwise justly be accused of unfair discrimination.226 
 
Despite posters aimed at the miners, production of coal declined from 231 million tons in 
1939 to 183 million tons in 1945, and absenteeism showed a ‘marked increase’, with 
average output per manshift falling by about 10%.227 Fuel was never rationed in the 
Second World War, but propaganda was successful in reducing consumption by voluntary 
economy,228 although miners’ strikes had an adverse effect on fuel economy campaigns, 
with a peak of 2.5 million working days lost in 1944.229 The public wanted to know why 
they should bother conserving fuel, when miners were continually on strike. They believed 
that if the ‘fuel economy really mattered, something would be done about the stoppage at 
the mines’.230 Complaints came not only from those affected by fuel shortages, but 
especially from those with relatives in the forces. There was a feeling that whilst their 
grievances might be genuine, timing was not good with the second front imminent.231 The 
Times criticised excessive concerns about the future in industrial concerns, they felt that 
‘the war and production for the war are surely all that matters for the present’.232 The miner 
may have been isolated by the circumstances of his industry, but there was no reason to 
think that he was any less patriotic than the rest of the nation,233 and production increased 
considerably in the two weeks following the production of figure 119.234 
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When it was recognised that difficulties in production could be resolved by propaganda the 
Production Executive of the Industrial Publicity Committee swung into action. Published 
figures of production were believed to have led to complacency in the factories, leading to 
apathy with no fear of crisis. There was recognised to be a need for a ‘consistent set of 
statistics which both congratulates people and makes them realise the need for continued 
work’.235 The chief function of the MOI was expected to be information, not exhortations, 
which were ‘generally resented’, although a back-patting campaign, ‘free from patronage’ 
was desirable. Exhortations to hard work and sacrifice, such as the ‘Go to It’ campaign 
(figure 49) had produced as much as they could, and needed to be relaxed, so that if needed 
later in the war, they would still be effective.236 ‘Skilful advertising’ had made the ‘Go to 
it’ phrase famous, and impressed it ‘upon the nation’s consciousness’ through such large 
posters.237 Advertisers showed their approval by parodying the phrase within commercial 
advertisements.238 Surrey Brook, however, questioned what the ‘cryptic words’ ‘Go to it’ 
meant, deeming them ‘futile, meaningless, and costly’, a ‘mystery’, and uninformative,239 
whilst ‘What is it?’ was scrawled on posters.240 Prior to the campaign being released, John 
Rodgers, a propagandist, complained that the campaign would be futile, a waste of 
taxpayers money, as taken from the original context of the speech, the slogan would be 
meaningless.241 Other advertising men criticised the slogan as ‘weak’, ‘uninspiring and 
uninspired’, ‘lacking in force and salesmanship’, but the Americans, considered the 
masters in the art of the slogan, approved, as they believed that if the British put their 
minds to something they really go for it.242 The Ministry of Supply, releasing a similar 
poster ‘Keep At It’ (figure 185), praised ‘managements and workers alike’ for having 
‘Gone to it’ without sparing themselves. Workers had shown themselves ‘fully worthy of 
our armed forces and of the cause for which we fight’, with ‘resolution and staying power’ 
which had ‘daunted our enemies and encouraged our friends’.243 Mass-Observation (M-O) 
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were worried that continual calls for effort were problematic in the long run, as the normal 
human mind was not ‘attuned to peak-to-peak effort’. A ‘steady optimum’ was preferable, 
as otherwise each ‘peak of furious endeavour’ was followed by a ‘plateau’,244 leading to 
increased absenteeism.245 Repeated propaganda campaigns stressing the importance of 
time-keeping and individual effort, such as figure 186, which focused ‘attention 
immediately upon the ten black minutes that are sometimes wasted every day in factories 
of every denomination and size’.246 Figure 121 became one of the most famous posters of 
the war, earning ‘widespread application as the symbol of the importance of the individual 
unit to the combined effort of the whole’. Writing in 1944, Shaw felt that the importance 
and function of each individual work in relation to the whole, ‘could not be better 
expressed than by the now familiar link in the chain analogy which applies without 
exception to every form of industrial activity’. The concept expressed in the poster was so 
successful, that it was applied to other posters, replacing the female with a male worker, 
illustrating John Bull linking up the USA and the USSR, and equating management with 
male and female workers and a symbolic ‘ME’.247 
 
The technical diagram in figure 149 was held to be an ‘excellent example of the type of 
poster which gives technical information in a simple and direct manner’. Aimed 
specifically at the worker who ‘may be engaged upon a comparatively small part of the 
engine or air frame’, but is anxious to know more about the completed aircraft. Shaw noted 
that such posters were a ‘delight to anyone who ha[d] a thirst for knowledge’, giving 
concise details of a modern aeroplane. Such drawings could only ‘be prepared only by 
experts of the highest skill, and the most profitable method of producing such a poster is to 
get permission to use one of the many drawings available through the technical press’.248 
After seeing the collection of images in figure 146 Shaw felt there could be ‘no doubt in 
any worker’s mind about the importance of his own job’.249 In figure 145, widely used in 
factories making ropes and cables, Shaw shows that there was still room for the ‘beautiful’ 
and ‘aesthetic’ in industrial posters, despite the ‘apparently lifeless and uninteresting 
article’ that was featured in the poster. Hempen rope needed to be ‘charged with romantic 
vigour in the minds of the workers’, which Shaw believed had been achieved. In such 
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trades, where the atmosphere allows little space for beauty or refinement, beautiful posters 
would be particularly successful, by virtue of the contrast to their surroundings.250  
 
The use of ROSPA by the government ensured that leaflets and other publicity material 
about accidents were no longer out of date, but M-O considered that ‘the actual 
propaganda material is still largely amateur and old-fashioned’.251 On the general question 
of effective publicity the Production Committee was unanimous in believing that publicity 
should be conducted as far as possible on a local basis.252 Some local posters were so 
successful that they became national. The factory employing the worker who designed the 
safety poster in figure 181 were so pleased with the design that they not only printed the 
poster, they issued copies to other firms and government departments for wider 
distribution.253 The Minister of Labour was asked in the House of Commons whether 
industrial propaganda was being checked for effectiveness, whether it was stimulating 
production, or checking absenteeism. Bevin responded that he was aware of the ‘regard’ 
paid to such propaganda, and that the effectiveness of such methods, and the possibility of 
further extension throughout the war industries, was ‘under constant review by a 
committee set up for that purpose’.254 M-O considered that whatever was being done with 
propaganda inside industry, it had to be set against the ‘total propaganda of events’, which 
would ‘relate each and every individual to the total effort’.255 
 
Industrial relations in wartime were heavily influenced by the interwar years. Bevin’s 
position of power was significant, his interwar experiences allowed him to claim to be ‘one 
of the people’, and thus more in tune with industrial workers than others may have been. 
The miners were key figures in interwar industrial discourses, but within the Second World 
War, the propaganda focus was largely on the factory effort, clean, modern factories, rather 
than dirty smokestacks. Within a campaign dealing with the industrial effort, the 
propagandists were unafraid to use modern stylistic techniques, including photography, 
appropriate for a modern campaign, although other styles, including cartoons and realistic 
drawings, were also used. Several propaganda techniques were clearly at play: testimonials 
were provided by those who would benefit from the parts provided; ‘card-stacking’ was 
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evident as the worst case-scenario for lack of parts was presented (figure 144); ‘name-
calling’ was applied to poor effort; and all were called to jump on the ‘band-wagon’, as 
everyone else was doing their bit, and so should they. Most evident was the transfer of 
authority from the Soviet effort to the British effort, as the British were called to emulate 
their Soviet comrades. Anglo-Soviet relations were key, played on in style and subject, 
often to great effect, although the emphasis was always on ‘Russians’ rather than on 
Soviets or Communism. The Soviet style is evident is figure 187, for a nation that needed a 
fit, productive workforce, working to full capacity, whatever the gender. Throughout this 
chapter we have seen the significance of the civilian effort, within the ‘People’s War’, both 
the individual and the team effort were key, specifically within the mechanised mass 
industry. In the next chapter this theme continues, with every individual needing to ensure 
the future of the nation by being aware of the ‘enemy within’. 
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Chapter 6: The ‘Enemy Within’ 
The dangers of carelessness were a constant theme throughout wartime posters: the 
dangers of throwing away unlit cigarettes (figure 188); thoughtless fuel consumption 
(figure 189); and wastage of scarce goods (figure 190). The biggest campaign, however, 
addressed in many different ways and styles throughout the war by the government, was 
the campaign against rumour and ‘careless talk’. Although a phrase largely associated with 
the Cold War1 and thereafter applied to more recent events, particularly terrorist 
campaigns,2 this chapter focuses on the idea of the ‘enemy within’. The concept is clearly 
evident in government careless talk and anti-rumour campaigns which ran throughout the 
war, with strong fears of a ‘Fifth Column’ to be fought by a ‘Silent Column’. This chapter 
discusses a range of discourses which underlay the ‘careless talk’ posters, including: 
carelessness, ‘the other’, ‘the enemy’, visibility, psychology, education, citizenship, 
family, nation, protectionism, friendship, personal responsibility, and death and humour. 
As we have seen with the previous two case studies, a wide range of stylistic techniques 
was used in the ‘careless talk’ campaigns. 
The Context and Planning of ‘Enemy Within’ Poster Campaign 
Duff Cooper of the Ministry of Information (MOI) defined three types of ‘careless talk’ 
that were of danger. Each had different consequences, although all could damage the war 
effort. He considered the most dangerous ‘the talk that is depressing’. Cooper believed 
that: 
Those who spread gloom and despondency do definite harm; they are hurting the 
cause; they are delaying the victory. They are enemies; unintentional enemies 
probably – but enemies of our side. 
Other problems were the spreading of rumours: ‘false information which may hinder 
ourselves’, and, more obviously, the danger of passing on ‘true information’ that was of 
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value to the enemy, which could prolong the war, whether intentionally as a spy, or 
unintentionally in the course of conversation.3 Whether directly visible or not, the 
existence of ‘the other’ was assumed to be a fact, something that needed to be fought.  
 
Fears of the enemy drew on longstanding discourses about spies -  ‘person sent secretly’ 
into enemy territory, ‘to inspect his works, ascertain his strength, movements, or designs, 
and to communicate such intelligence’.4 Boyle (and Knightley) describe espionage as ‘the 
second-oldest and arguably the least honourable of the professions’, with a long history.5 
Spies can variously be described as eavesdroppers, peepers, inside man, shadows, 
observers, and go-betweens.6 Spies were defined as a threat to the nation, but the 
government needed to make it appear that espionage was under control.7 Surrounded in 
mystique, the secret world of intelligence, and the very nature of espionage make it a 
difficult subject to research at the best of times, with a further layer of secrecy added in 
wartime.8 It arguably would have been useless to address spies or their go-betweens 
through posters. Therefore posters needed to focus on those who could aid spies in their 
information gathering campaigns by talking ‘carelessly’. 
 
Many spy stereotypes were based upon spy fiction, popular from the 1880s onwards, 
several of which were transferred to film in the 1930s, to popular acclaim.9 Reflecting the 
time in which it was written, between 1880 and 1920, the ‘enemy outside’ theme in spy 
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thrillers concurrently served to facilitate the transition from the assertive, confident, and 
expansionist themes of adventure fiction to the increasingly insular, even paranoid, 
espionage genre that stressed vigilance and protection against invasion.10 From the 
Edwardian era spy thrillers focused on a battle between good and evil, with an emphasis on 
action and adventure, in British schoolboy adventure style. In the spy thriller the hero is a 
competitive individual, fighting against a conspiracy which threatens both the hero and the 
values he (sic) stands for. Usually set against an international political context, plots focus 
on betrayal, disguise and double-cross.11 William Le Queux, amateur spy and popular 
novelist, was popular either side of the First World War. His spies were obsessed with fast 
automobiles, gave themselves away by swearing in German, worked in 
telecommunications or the barbers shop, and were heavy drinkers.12 
 
Le Queux’s spies were always German, following earlier traditions, including The Spies of 
Wight (1899) by Headon Hill, which revolved ‘around the sinister machinations of German 
spies against Britain’, the first of a spate of fictional anticipations of a future Anglo-
German war. Erskine Childers ‘famous yarn’ The Riddle of the Sands (1903) soon 
followed, where heroes Carruthers and Davies expose German plans.13 The German nation 
was constructed as one of Prussian militarism,14 and by the mid-1900s, Germany was the 
principle threat to the British, involved in a race for naval supremacy.15 The enmity 
engendered by this ship-building race was exacerbated by the Northcliffe press, stirring up 
anti-German feeling among their readers, which warned that there was a ‘secret army’ of 
trained German soldiers in the UK. Employed as waiters, tailors, etc., this ‘army’ would be 
‘ready to act when the German army, guarded by its fleet, fell on British shores’.16 Anti-
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German feeling was evidenced in several clear ways. Daschunds were mistreated,17 and the 
German Shepherd Dog was renamed the Alsatian, because of their German connections.18 
In 1915 The Royal Family replaced the German-sounding title Saxe-Coburg-Gotha with 
that of Anglo-Saxon Windsor.19  
 
Intelligence collecting activities were common for all nations by the outbreak of the 
Second World War.20 Le Queux is credited with helping to create the ‘spy fever’ that led to 
the formation of the British intelligence service.21 In March 1906 the London Daily Mail 
began serialising Le Queux’s The Invasion of 1910, a plot with a successful German 
invasion of Britain, then converted into a play that ran for eighteen months.22 In 1909, Le 
Queux published Spies of the Kaiser: Plotting the Downfall of England. Despite a lack of 
real evidence, an enthusiastic public responded with their own stories of spies and 
Germans misbehaving in the UK, information which was passed onto the government.23 In 
Februrary 1915, Le Queux’s German Spies in England: An Exposure was published, which 
fabricated a system of German espionage that ranged from German prostitutes around 
Piccadilly Circus to ‘naturalised’ businessmen of the highest social standing.24 This could 
all have been dismissed as ‘harmless nonsense’, but it influenced Haldane’s subcommittee 
planning the UK’s secret service. Haldane recommended defence plans to protect vital 
installations against sabotage,25 the tightening of the Official Secrets Act,26 and the 
establishment of a regular secret service bureau.27 When war broke out in 1914, only 
twenty-one German spies were arrested, rather than the thousands of Le Queux’s 
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imagination.28 Intelligence operations continued in the interwar years, but a spy’s chance 
of surviving was higher if they were at the ‘upper end of the political and social 
spectrum’.29 English spies were deemed men of honour, but heavy sentences imposed by 
the British were a deterrent to other spies, who were characterised as ‘social misfits, 
criminals, adventurers, vagabonds, romantics’.30 
 
Until the Second World War, due to a long tradition of civil liberties, British citizens 
carried no official means of identification, unlike most countries in Europe.31 Character 
references from a self-nominated person are usually considered adequate for a job, and ‘too 
close an inquiry into anyone’s personal affairs… is resented’. Much of the Civil Service 
was like a club: ‘entry to it automatically meant that you were assumed to be totally loyal 
and the most important virtue was keeping the club together’. In October 1939 John King, 
a cypher clerk in the Foreign Office, was arrested and convicted of passing information to 
the Soviet government. Knightley commented that the notion that ‘the threat might come 
from within never occurred to anyone until the King case’, although it was believed to be 
so out of the ordinary that attitudes still did not change. There was shock that the upper 
middle class could betray their country. King was believed to have given into financial 
temptation: it was not believed that he could be ‘ideologically inspired’.32 Churchill, 
however, is described by Stafford as having an ‘exaggerated obsession with German spies 
before the First World War, fed by a xenophobic MI5’. His ‘widely shared obsession with 
an internal Fifth Column’ saw him ‘opt for a drastic curtailment of civil liberties 
unwarranted by the evidence.’33 The British certainly put out their own spies and 
saboteurs,34 both men and women, and would expect the Germans to do the same in case of 
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war.35 Part of the challenge was to present the German spies as ‘evil’, whilst presenting 
British espionage activities, when acknowledged, as positive.  
 
The Spanish Civil War had given rise to the expression ‘fifth column’: ‘a subversive group 
that supports the enemy and engages in espionage or sabotage; an enemy in your midst’.36 
Nationalist General Emilio Mola, explaining to the Press in October 1936 how he was 
going to take Madrid, said that ‘he would attack with four columns stationed outside the 
capital, and a fifth stationed within, by which he meant the sympathisers trapped behind 
enemy lines.’37 Since then the term ‘fifth column’, ‘torn from its forgotten context’,38 has 
described the activities of various spies, saboteurs and terrorists, who support aggressors in 
attacked countries. A characteristic of the ‘fifth column’ is ‘to apply falsehood and 
provocation, and to recruit traitors and renegades among the military and civilians of 
attacked countries’.39 The idea was not entirely new, in Homer’s Iliad, the Greeks gave a 
giant wooden horse to their foes, the Trojans, ostensibly as a peace offering’. However, 
once the horse was inside the city walls, ‘soldiers sneaked out of the horse’s hollow belly 
and open the city gates, allowing their compatriots to pour in and capture Troy’.40 The 
Trojan Horse hid spies in preparation for attack, a fifth column was largely reliant on 
friendly natives.  
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Many of those in the highest circles took it for granted that a fifth column existed. 
Churchill spoke of ‘this malignancy in our midst’ in his Dunkirk speech ‘as though it were 
a well known fact of important dimensions’.41 Scare stories in the press appeared. The 
Sunday Express claimed in January 1940 that Germans living in the UK were blackmailed 
into spying, with their families threatened.42 The British were told that their job was to be 
actively looking for and reporting fifth columnists.43 The collapse of Britain’s allies in 
1940 was believed to be partly the result to infiltration by fifth column, with enemy agents 
penetrating the system, and traitors sympathetic to Germany involved. There were fears 
that the same would happen in the UK, fears fuelled by the press.44 Knightley described the 
‘Fifth Column’ as a myth created by British ‘spy masters’ to explain its own intelligence 
failures.45 McLaine claimed that the MOI blamed the collapse of many European nations 
on a fifth column as it ‘shielded the believer from the unpalatable fact that the Germans 
had won because of superior tactics and greater strength’.46  
 
In the summer of 1940 there was widespread internment. Churchill had urged his Cabinet 
that British Communists, fascists and aliens ‘should be put in protective or preventative 
internment, including the leaders’.47 Internment was not new in the Second World War. In 
the nineteenth century, there were larger movements of populations, immigration rose, and 
along with that rose a fear of aliens. Refugees from Czarist persecution, Russian and Polish 
Jews, trickled into England after 1875. There was an illusory fear that they were in 
competition with British workmen for jobs, and legislation followed: the Aliens Act of 
1905, which set the precedent for future immigration laws in the UK.48 Although this was 
unique legislation, the Jews were not the first to attract hostility from the British. 
Thousands of Irish arrived in the UK, particularly in the early nineteenth century, and 
became associated with poverty, squalor and ignorance. Discrimination was caused by 
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fears of pressure on work, housing, and social status, and was applied to the Irish in their 
time, and the Jews in their time.49 In wartime, others became the targets for discrimination, 
not because of social conditions, but for fears of the ‘enemy within’. In the First World 
War, 30,000 foreigners were interned, but chaos and suffering ensued. In 1939, the 
government announced that the action would not be repeated.50 
 
In September 1939 there were approximately 60,000 German and Austrian refugees in the 
UK, as well as 15-20,000 nationals living in UK before the war. Those who were pro-Nazi 
were quickly interned, with the rest classified by special tribunals: ‘Category A were 
deemed the most suspect and also interned, B were restricted in their movements, and C 
were left alone’.51 As the government ‘lacked both the time and the machinery for 
effectively discriminating’, a policy of ‘intern the lot’ soon followed.52 On 10 May 1940, 
after German attacks on the Low Countries and France, all male aliens living in coastal 
areas liable to invasion were immediately interned. Within the next week all B class aliens, 
many refugees from the Nazis, were rounded up and taken to the Isle of Man.53 On May 22 
1940, Defence Regulation 18B was passed, giving the Home Secretary ‘the right to 
imprison anybody he believed likely to endanger the safety of the realm’. A ‘good number’ 
were imprisoned under this Act.54 In June 1940, Italy entered the war, so all Italians were 
rounded up. By late June 1940, C class alien males under 70 were also interned, and all 
others had heavily restricted movements.55 The conditions of internment varied from 
‘inconvenient’ to ‘atrocious’,56 and when the Arandora Star carrying deportees was 
torpedoed on 2 July 1940 by a German submarine, public outcry was caused, and the 
policy was changed.57 
 
Before the war, many thousands of refugees from Nazi oppression had been given asylum 
in England, and it was believed that this ‘influx might, in part, have been used by the 
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Germans as a sort of Trojan Horse’.58 In the Second World War the Nazis expected the 
British to follow similar, successful, counter-intelligence tactics as they had in the First 
World War. The Nazis planned a scheme to succeed despite such measures, with two spy 
layers, one ‘not too well hidden’, to be deliberately sacrificed to London counter-
intelligence, whilst the second ‘deeply buried, would lie concealed until the authorities 
were relaxed, and then go quietly into operation’. Initially they believed that all had gone 
as anticipated, but the second layer was swiftly swept up, and some 35 key agents and 400 
sub-agents were apprehended within the first forty-eight hours of war.59 Fleming, 
Longmate and Orwell give examples of how German spies were discovered, mostly 
through elementary errors: lack of the English language; lack of knowledge of pub laws; 
strong foreign accents; writing 7 with a stroke through it, and carrying German sausages.60 
Knightley disagrees that all were found, and claimed that there was evidence for at least 
one who survived.61 
 
Traditionally the British feared seaborne invasion, but technology had improved and the 
‘airborne bogey’ became feared.62 By July 1940, unproven parachutist landings were so 
widely reported that an official denial was deemed necessary.63 Technology had changed 
the way wars were fought, with the wireless transmitter, the aeroplane and the ‘trained 
parachutist’, greatly reinforcing the potential for a traitor, and allowing more opportunities 
for sabotage.64 The importance of communications was more evident in the Second World 
War than in any previous war. Rather than risk stealing documents, it was often safer and 
more profitable for the spy to keep his ears and eyes open. Fragments of information could 
be collated quickly into a meaningful whole (figure 191):  
Troop and ship movements, the position of power stations and munition plants, the 
state of public morale … plenty of data useful to the enemy can be pieced together 
from a few scraps of gossip, innocent in themselves but fatal in bulk.65 
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By 1939 71% of the population held radio licences,66 and various underground radio 
stations existed to undermine the war effort.67 The most famous ‘Fifth Columnist’ was 
probably William Joyce who appropriated the title ‘Lord Haw Haw’.68 He caused anxieties 
for British officials who worried how many were listening to him, particularly with stories 
of his accuracy regarding, for example, stopped clocks.69 
 
When not all the facts can be published, it is natural that people will try and guess. During 
the first few months of war, particularly the first-few days, rumours were rife. Rumours 
included exaggerated numbers who died in bombings, the lack of wood resultant from the 
number of coffins made in preparation, and on bombings that were believed to have been 
hushed-up. Urging others not to spread rumours became a popular occupation as 
‘[n]ewspapers harangued their readers, clergy their congregations, headmasters their 
pupils’.70 The public was told not to believe or spread rumours, to double check orders, to 
keep watch and report suspicious activity to the Police. They were, however, also warned 
not to be over-suspicious, wasting Police time, as many foreigners hated Hitler.71 Spies 
were a popular topic for discussion and rumour. With the era of ‘false whiskers and secret 
rays’ over, the successful spy could be ‘masquerading as a pedlar, a domestic servant, a 
journalist, or a commercial traveller’.72 Balfour describes the difference between careless 
talk and rumour mongering, with the latter implying an element of falsity, the first only 
dangerous if true. The speaker either does not realise that the matter talked about could 
help the enemy, or wishes to appear ‘better informed and thus more important than the next 
man’. Anyone with a more sinister motive was ‘unlikely to be checked by official 
publicity’.73  
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In the winter of 1941, the Cabinet raised subject of the dangers of rumour. Home 
Intelligence (HI) felt that rumour and gossip were to some extent a healthy system of 
society, aiding the relief of anxiety. Rumours were useful pointers as to what was worrying 
people, and the best way to deal with them was to find publishable information which 
would make the rumours less convincing and sinister.74 A careful watch was kept on 
rumours and steps were taken to make sure that explanations or denials were either put out 
through newspapers, or counter-rumours were circulated.75 The MOI recognised the need 
to give the public more facts and news to stop them fabricating their own news, but were 
frustrated that the government would not act.76 Mass-Observation (M-O) investigated this 
later in the war, in 1944, and found that a lack of information was not a major gripe any 
more as people did not feel that any major issues were being concealed except those 
necessary for security measures.77  
 
A problem arose when rumour or gossip became, or appeared to become, defeatism: 
it is a British habit to make jocular remarks and facetious remarks which, if 
reported secondhand or taken at their face value without an exact record of the 
actual tone in which they were made, might often seem subversive or defeatist.78 
Following Regulation 18B, some were prosecuted for defeatist talk, although it was agreed 
that ‘prosecutions should only be made in a few glaring cases, to which as much publicity 
as possible should be given so that they could act as a warning’.79 In a war fought to 
protect freedom democracy against a totalitarian state, care needed to be taken with 
prosecutions. Prosecution could arouse hostile feelings, although: 
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People do not resent restriction in wartime, so long as they know where they are 
and what it all means, and so long as the basic elements of freedom do not appear 
to be overwhelmingly involved.80  
The prosecutions for defeatist talk were themselves a topic of conversation, as many had 
been affected by rumours, fears and criticisms. There was ‘a growing feeling’ that too 
many campaigns took ‘the form of unconstructive prohibitions’, too many do nots: don’t 
talk; don’t listen.81 The poster ‘If you must talk, talk victory’ (figure 192), using dynamic 
typography, tried to be more positive, and, at the same time, people were told that they 
could grumble.82 
 
The ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’ campaign that started in early 1940 was ‘aimed at 
preventing the exchange of information of possible value to the enemy rather than 
preventing the spreading of supposedly depressing stories’.83 The campaign was focused 
on ‘the gossip who likes to talk big and air his knowledge’. According to the authorities, 
women were not the worst offenders in this respect.84 The talker who ‘deliberately shows 
off is perhaps the less dangerous of the two types’ as they ‘talk a lot of nonsense to which 
the enemy is more than welcome’. The modest man was more dangerous as:  
he may find it hard to believe that such as he can know anything about matters; or 
he may give truthful answers to indiscreet questions merely because he is anxious 
not to show off with any claim to specialist knowledge.85  
Valuable information could be given away by ‘casually mentioning that John Smith rejoins 
his regiment on Saturday afternoon or that Mary Jones can’t get home for lunch because 
the shadow factory where she works has recently moved to ---’.86 The government believed 
people needed to be made to realise that they did have information of value to the enemy. 
A 55-year old female questioned by M-O claimed: ‘I think it’s ridiculous what does 
anyone know that they have to keep secret? It’s only Government officials that can give 
anything away.’87 Some of those questioned felt that the examples of bad talk given were 
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so vague that they might have said such things at any time, and thus it would be 
‘exceedingly difficult to avoid saying such things’.88  
 
In 1942, a new campaign was issued by the MOI, for the attention of all ranks. Having 
covered public house talk, wayside conversations with strangers, and ‘harmless chat’ with 
friends when on leave, the government believed they had identified ‘the major problem’ at 
last. The campaign was to make a direct appeal along the lines of ‘Cherchez la femme’, as 
a reminder that ‘when in the company of a beautiful woman, remember that beauty may 
conceal brains’. Service personnel seemed particularly ready to disclose their station and 
line of work.89  People did not regard comments made about local military events to people 
they trust, for example down the pub, as ‘careless talk’,90 although people did not appear to 
need to know the person. Writing to Advertiser’s Weekly, a reader claimed that in a pub 
where he was a ‘complete stranger’ he had: 
been informed by a garrulous Home Guard N.C.O. of the training, numbers and 
armament of the local Home Guard and of the exact location of the important and 
secret military headquarters in the district.91  
Police stations and military headquarters were inundated with reports of suspicious 
activities,92 although this was not proof that there was a problem, just evidence that ‘spy 
fever’ had gripped the country. M-O collected a number of ‘overheards’ during the week of 
March 15 1943, of which several referred to careless talk. There were examples of people 
volunteering information, enough to establish where a large camp was stationed. A young 
female noted that she had heard workers on the bus talking about the output of their 
factories. The bus conductress had said ‘Hush, careless talk’, but one of them replied 
‘What does it matter? The Germans can find out if they want to’.93 Attempts to find 
examples of where careless talk had actually cost lives proved in vain. Having embarked 
on publicity against rumour and careless talk, the MOI could not stop it without creating 
impression that it did not matter.94 In June 1941 ‘it had been agreed that there was little 
evidence of careless talk and less evidence that it was being put to good use by the enemy’. 
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It was suggested, however, ‘that it would be as well to continue for the present the 
inexpensive propaganda on specialised lines that was already being done’.95 
 
At the end of July 1940, the Planning Committee agreed that ‘the Anti-Rumour campaign 
should not be abandoned’, although all reference to the ‘silent column’ was to be 
abandoned. The campaign was also to ‘revert to its original form in concentrating on 
gossip rather than rumour’.96 From early July 1940, the ‘Silent Column’ campaign, devised 
by Crawfords, had run, largely in the Press,97 supported by a poster campaign, the result of 
a direct order from Churchill.98 The idea was that keeping silent was the best way of 
countering the ‘Fifth Column’.99 The Silent Campaign showed ‘photographs of typical but 
dangerous British citizens’, (figure 193) who were to be rebuked and told to: ‘Join 
Britain’s Silent Column – the great body of sensible men and women who have pledged 
themselves not to talk rumour and gossip and to stop others doing it.’100 The Silent Column 
had been the latest in a series of campaigns ‘based on the assumption that the best way of 
controlling rumour, etc. is by urging people not to talk about things’. No attempt had been 
‘made to deal with the subject constructively or positively’.101 Sir Kenneth Clark wanted 
people to be given more information, and propaganda campaigns to concentrate on the 
‘positive contribution’ citizens were making ‘to the defence of the country’ rather than 
‘passively refraining from something which would hinder it’.102 
 
Public Record Office INF files are crammed with planning meetings for ‘careless talk’ 
campaigns throughout the war years. The location of posters was given a lot of attention, 
and was largely focused on social meeting places and areas of travel. Designs were planned 
to be ‘especially suitable’ for public houses,103 railway carriages,104 transport cafes,105 lorry 
snack-bars,106 and factories, docks and munition works.107 After complaints about the cost 
of the first government poster campaign, voluntary sites only were used for the anti-gossip 
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campaign. Posters were deliberately designed to appeal in order to be voluntarily 
displayed, and were kept to small sizes so as to be suitable for factories and pubs.108 
Including Fougasse’s posters, the series distributed in February 1940 consisted of 
2,500,000 posters, ‘for exhibition by local authorities, Government offices, banks, docks, 
barber’s shops, hotels and public-houses’.109 In the next section, we consider the varied 
designs produced by the government in their attempts to deal with careless talk, rumours 
and the ‘enemy within’. 
The Design of ‘Enemy Within’ Posters 
The Prime Minister had ‘stressed the importance of putting out a lot of anti-gossip 
material, and had recommended variety and the use of pictures’.110 Variety was important 
to ensure a lack of boredom,111 and many different poster designers and graphic techniques 
were used in the campaign against careless talk. Both Scotland and Wales were to have 
distinctive posters, including posters in the Welsh language.112 Soon after war commenced, 
a small poster, ‘Don’t help the Enemy, Careless talk may give away vital secrets’ (figure 
62) was approved by the War Office, ready to be put into production immediately.113 The 
first full anti-gossip poster drive was prepared by the MOI in December 1939. A wide 
variety of posters, in a variety of sizes, pictorial as well as letter designs, were prepared on 
the theme. The first was ‘Warning’ (figure 194), which looked rather like a death notice, 
with other posters following shortly afterwards. Unlike the MOI’s first big poster 
campaign, as discussed in chapter three, the new scheme was prepared and distributed by 
the Ministry’s own production department.114 
 
Talking about the posters chronologically is difficult due to problems dating the posters, 
and thus it is difficult to follow how they changed, or assess whether they ‘improved’. To 
deal with this difficulty, we shall discuss the posters thematically. The term ‘fifth column’ 
may never have appeared officially in British posters, although the term ‘Silent Column’ is 
used, but the posters are clearly part of a campaign to warn the population against fifth 
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columnists.115 Very few make specific reference to countering rumours, excepting figure 
195, one of many cartoon posters in the anti-rumour campaigns, as the concentration in 
posters was more on careless and thoughtless talk. The slogan was key to the message, and 
as we see on page 195, the slogan ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’ outlived any other.116 A 
reader of Advertiser’s Weekly suggested in February 1940 that airmen (who appeared to 
have spare time to fill) should be consulted regarding slogans. Some had invented ‘security 
slogans’ such as ‘Tittle-tattle lost the battle’; ‘Why not be as dumb as you look?’ ; and 
‘They met, he told, she sold’, suggestive of the female spy of fiction.117 The phrase ‘the 
Fifth Column’ had directed vigilance ‘not to suspicious characters but to those not 
outwardly suspicious’.118 Suspicion switched from strangers or those on the fringes of 
society, to those at the backbone. Ironside, Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces noted in 
1940: ‘My experience is that the gentlemen who are the best behaved and the most sleek 
are those who are doing the mischief. We cannot be too sure of anybody.’119 Unlike in the 
spy novels, most of the ‘spies’ or ‘enemies within’ illustrated in home front posters are 
invisible. We would almost expect to see someone hovering in the background, or having 
furtive meetings in dark shadowy places such as alleyways, similar to places that the 
‘oldest profession’, prostitution, took place. Alternatively we may expect to see ‘intrigue in 
high places’. These do have their place, for example in figure 196, but more commonly 
‘the enemy’ is not visible, or if it is, it is frequently Hitler, an ‘identifiable individual who 
personified, and could be blamed for, all that the Nazis stood for’.120 This is most clearly 
shown in figures 197 and 198 where Hitler and the Swastika are presented as one and the 
same, the ‘Furtive Fritz’. Other recognisable Nazis, such as Goering (figures 5 and 10) 
Goebbels (figure 199, which used a Kitchener style appeal, and a disembodied head), more 
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rarely make an appearance, whilst other enemies such as the Japanese or Italian are rarely, 
if ever, visible.121 
 
As a MOI pamphlet in 1940 noted, the job of the Fifth Column was to make people think 
that it did not exist, so that people would stop looking for it. It did not only consist of 
foreigners.122 Probably the closest to a stereotypical spy is evident in figure 200 where the 
man is faceless, and in disguise. In most cases the spy is represented as indistinguishable, 
as is evident when The Star announced on February 10 1940, when the Fougasse campaign 
(figures 3 to 10) was launched: ‘Watch Your Step for SPIES! AND THEY WILL NOT BE 
WEARING FALSE WIGS OR USING SECRET RAYS.’123 The very ordinariness of the 
people in the images was designed to show how careful people needed to be in every 
circumstance. No clear ‘other’ is depicted or recognisable in posters but the assumption 
that they exist is there. In the ‘This Happened’ series (figures 201 to 205), we see, ‘in each 
case a “spy” listening to indiscreet talk, and in each case the ‘spy’ is an entirely normal 
looking British citizen’. In most of this series one character does look fairly ‘shifty’, but in 
figure 202 it ‘is impossible to be certain which person is the ‘spy’ in the picture’. The 
‘campaign represents the ‘spy’ as a normal looking citizen.’124 The campaign was unafraid 
to use photographs, juxtapositioning the original careless situation against the possible, but 
imprecise, consequences, lit by surreal, muted lighting. 
 
Fougasse, already an established cartoonist, offered his services free to the government. He 
suggested that humour was an ‘ideal vehicle’ for propaganda,125 offering a ‘unifying 
quality, where the common understanding of a joke creates a bond, and persuades without 
causing resentment. He believed that humour can spotlight the ridiculousness or 
foolishness of actions and irresponsible behaviour without offence. Isolating his posters 
from surrounding images by the use of white space, he engages the viewer by deliberate 
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intrigue. Each cartoon is drawn in characteristic style, depicting an everyday situation with 
which everyone could identify.126 Shapes, colours and the main slogan could be seen from 
a distance, but in order to enjoy the joke, the viewer was forced to come near enough to 
read the small caption and then make his/her own conclusions about the situation. This 
personal involvement was the key to remembering and ‘actioning’ the message.127 Bartlett 
was wary about the use of humour, which he labelled a ‘dangerous tool’, only really 
effective within the artist’s own population. The sense of humour needed to be known 
‘intimately’ and ‘sympathetically’.128 Fougasse, a British artist appealing to a British 
audience, fitted this criteria, and his cartoons marked ‘a fundamental change from the 
earlier sober government posters against careless talk’. Depicting scenes from everyday 
life, Fougasses accurately illustrated ‘human nature’, enabling ‘every viewer to identify 
with the characters’.129 Fougasse ‘tried to convey the concept that no place was safe, and 
that information, once divulged, was beyond control in a compelling spiral of risk to the 
national security’.130 For Fougasse, Hitler stands for the enemy, he is ‘ever-present’.131 
Other artists appeared to agree with Fougasse’s notion that Hitler was ever-present, 
presenting the message both with humour (figure 206), and in a more serious manner. 
Lacoste’s ‘Beware’ (figures 207 and 208), depicting Hitler ‘with an ear stretched out to 
hear careless talk’, already used with success with the Army in France, was re-printed for 
the Home Front.132 Despite the extreme simplification, economy of line and lack of detail 
used in figures 206 to 208, it is clear with those few pencil marks on paper that Hitler is 
represented.  
 
In the early days of the war, the Government was told the only real way to bring home to 
the public the real danger of careless talk was by ‘pictures which hurt’, but the scheme was 
turned down as ‘too tough and too realistic for the British public’.133 Norman Wilkinson’s 
realistic design (figure 209), showing the end result of careless talk, was produced at the 
same time as the Fougasse campaign, and the Press picked up on the contrasting use of 
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realism and humour.134 Figures 209 to 211 in some ways play upon the familiarity with 
marine landscapes, subverting the tradition, depicting destruction, rather than the 
magnificance of shipping. It was often difficult to be too realistic, as graphic images of 
death would not necessarily have been well received. The victim is rarely visible in 
posters, or if he is, it is the risk of death that is posed (figure 211), rather than the reality. 
Where the reality is shown, the human cost is rarely visible, rather a ship is seen sinking 
(figures 209 and 210), or a plane is crashed (figure 202). The only exceptions found were 
army posters: ‘A Maiden Loved’ (figure 212) shows the ‘grave’ consequences, and Abram 
Games’ modern designs. Games, as usual, was unafraid to subvert the realism of the 
image, and use abstract graphic techniques to provide visual links between ‘careless talk’ 
and the victim (figure 213 and 214). Drawing on psychological discourses, this was aimed 
directly at the soldiers, who were presumed to live with death on a far closer basis than 
civilians, and images could therefore be much harsher and more direct. In 1945, however, a 
campaign aimed at soldiers returning from the fighting fronts was deliberately designed to 
be humorous (figure 215), with the figure depicted in the bed deliberately drawn in a non-
realistic manner, symbolic of the men who ‘shoot their mouth off’. It ‘was not policy to 
produce starkly realistic posters for men who already knew so much of reality’.135 
 
The same places as the posters were to be located were often visibly depicted in the 
posters. Care was required with conversations, represented as dangerous when located in a 
social arena such as the pub (figures 216 and 217), particularly associated with the working 
classes, or the hairdressers (figure 218), particularly associated with women. Both staged 
photographs and traditional pen and ink drawings were used within these campaigns, with 
the location depicted in detail, whilst other campaigns, particularly those by Fougasse, 
used cartoons, with minimal detail. Figure 219, in some ways reminiscent of the French 
style of figure 44, as does figure 5, depicts places of travel, such as the train, both inside 
and outside, which offered risk. On trains, with a clever play on words, and use of extreme 
abstract techniques, passengers were warned to ‘guard’ their conversation (figures 220 and 
221). A similar concept was used by Games in figure 222. As with the industrial 
production posters, one weak link in the chain, in this case one thoughtless comment, could 
endanger the nation. Figure 191 clearly demonstrated how many innocuous conversations 
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could aid the German intelligence effort, although this would have been suitable for 
viewing only in locations where there was an opportunity to study the detail. The dangers 
of modern communication devices were made clear, through evidence of use of equipment 
such as the wireless (figure 223136) and the telephone (figures 224 and 225), particularly 
significant as they ran through manual exchanges. Hitler is often visible in these situations, 
overhearing scraps of information that may be of use (figure 4). People in certain 
occupations, including in telephone exchanges (figure 226), on the docks (figure 227), in 
the services (figure 228137) or in the factories (figure 229) needed to take particular care, 
and needed convincing that their knowledge, of location and production, was of value to 
the enemy.  
 
The campaigns appear to be cross-class and cross-gender, both in audience appeal and 
representations, with a wide-range of everyday locations evident. The campaign needed to 
make everyone realise that ‘You’ meant them. Everyone had the potential to know 
information of importance, and thus the capacity to be dangerous to the nation. It was 
likely that the upper classes would have access to more knowledge, although the working 
classes were deemed more likely to give away scraps of information without realising the 
significance. Personified by the cloth cap, the working classes are visible in various 
posters, chatting away in the pub (figure 216), stoically keeping silent (figure 230), with a 
head full of technical knowledge (figure 231), depicted in many styles from extreme 
realism, to extreme modernism. The middle classes do not escape, they are clearly visible 
in other posters, businessmen commuting (figure 232), the woman in pearls passing on 
information (figure 233). The ‘They Talked’ and Fougasse series cover a wide range of 
locations, from the pub (figure 3), the third-class train carriage (figure 5), to the 
gentleman’s club (figure 8), via a variety of cross-class locations such as a restaurant 
(figure 205). The ‘Keep it under your hat’ series (figures 234 to 237), as with many 
careless talk posters, focused on the head areas, indicating whatever knowledge was in 
your head, it needed to be kept to yourself. The campaign covered a wide cross-section of 
society: a warden’s helmet, a safari hat (adventurer types), the civilian business man, and 
the woman’s hat, feminine but not too frivolous. The message was more explicitly, but less 
succinctly spelt out in figure 238. 
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Other than when stoically keeping information to his or herself, both men and women 
could be represented as gossips or spies. Several earlier campaigns were aimed at men, 
requesting them to careful what information they imparted to women. In 1941 it was 
agreed that a new appeal ‘should be to women not to tell things to men instead of always 
being the other way round’.138 Denault claims that the government treated women as 
children in propaganda campaigns, and ‘[j]ust as women’s work was seen as 
fundamentally less valuable in the public sphere, women were judged incapable of 
controlling themselves on a personal level’. She deems that women ‘in particular were 
constructed as potentially dangerous to the safety of the state through posters identifying 
gossip and female spies’ (figure 10).139 Author A.A.Milne’s speech for Queen Elizabeth, 
which would no doubt have been reflected in posters, was never made public. Echoing 
early poster campaigns calling on discourses of the monarchy, the speech would have  
had the Queen ordering the women of Britain “to remember, when you are tempted 
to spread these rumours, or these ugly thoughts of hatred, just to say to yourself, 
‘The Queen asked me herself not to. She asked me”.140  
Families, particularly women, were reminded of their responsibility to their family, calling 
on discourses of protection for their men overseas, with a need to avoid discussing 
information that could be of use to the enemy, including sailing dates (figures 239 and 
240). 
 
The ‘Cherchez la femme’ campaign referred to on page 182, issued in 1942, was designed 
by Harold Forster. Forster was truly a ‘chocolate box’ artist, having previously created 
‘Black Magic’s alluring ladies’, produced figure 241, which Advertiser’s Weekly described 
as ‘the most striking of the series’. The image features officers from each of the three 
services, surrounding ‘their glamorous but dangerous guest’, which the journal christened 
Olga.141 The Star noted the Mata Hari, the conventional glamour spy, was as ‘out of date as 
the aspidastra’, but ‘Olga’ is presented as the seductive spy, or intermediary, a role unique 
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to women.142 ‘Olga’ makes eye contact directly with the viewer, which, in a ‘western 
culture where women rarely stare at men… can be perceived as having “bedroom 
eyes”’.143 The idea of the prostitute as spy was common, and there was also a need for 
‘expendable intermediaries’ to disguise dealings between spies and the secret service.144 
The prostitute, drawing on Victorian imagery, was represented as elusive, merging with the 
surrounding communities, an invisible danger, transgressing the established social and 
class boundaries, carrying disease, dirt and death, and undermining the health of the social 
body.145 ‘Olga’ was reserved for display in places where commissioned ranks met, such as 
officers’ messes, where men with significant operational knowledge met. Other realistic, 
fashionable designs were also produced (figures 242 to 244) for other ranks. Each service 
man is ‘in the company of a beautiful girl, but (such is the wisdom that comes with non-
commissioned status) each is looking determined to keep mum’.146 Having seen the variety 
of posters used in the ‘careless talk’ campaign, we consider how the message was received. 
The Reception of ‘Enemy Within’ Posters 
The Silent Column campaign (figure 193), as we saw on page 183, was not a success. The 
relationship between the campaign and prosecutions for defeatist talk was considered 
‘sinister’.147 It had created the impression that the authorities ‘regarded almost any 
exchange of information or opinion on the war as unpatriotic and dangerous’.148 The 
timing of the campaign was not good, as, around the same time, Cooper mentioned that 
press censorship might become compulsory, and thus the press, nervous, kicked up a 
fuss.149 The Silent Talk campaign was launched without a clear outline of ‘how and why 
defeatist talk did harm, nor exactly what was defeatist talk’, and M-O felt that ‘campaigns 
launched without a background are much more easily opened to misrepresentation and 
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misunderstanding’.150 The campaign was quickly curtailed and then dropped altogether as 
‘the public was, if anything, too well aware of the need for security and that people were 
being encouraged to distrust one another at a time when it was important for them to pull 
together’.151 The government noted that the campaign should not necessarily be considered 
unsuccessful: 
People had reacted strongly and had been encouraged to think about the subject. 
The fact that they criticised the methods adopted did not necessarily mean that they 
would not take the lesson to heart.152  
M-O, however, noted that ‘the virulent press campaign against the Silent Column, which 
worked on already existing private opinion in favour of further talking, has had an effect 
antagonistic to any new discretion campaign’.153 At about the same time, figure 202 was 
produced. M-O noted that in this poster ‘the point is not at all clear’, ‘for the dangerous 
remark quoted’ spoken by what appears to be the father with his pilot son, is: ‘Cheerio, old 
lad, good luck tomorrow’. M-O could not see ‘anything sufficiently specific’ in this remark 
‘to lead to a shot down plane pictured on the lower half of the poster’.154 
 
Balfour, comparing British and German efforts used the example of Fougasse (figures 3 to 
10) to ‘suggest that the subject [of careless talk] was not to be taken seriously’. He 
described German posters as more serious, and some more sinister.155 In the UK, however, 
there was not a stark differentiation between the use of humour and of reality. Neither was 
used in isolation, they were used alongside each other. Princess Elizabeth claimed: ‘How 
carelessly we should have talked during the war but for Fougasse’,156 and his posters were 
generally enthusiastically received, even though some people disapproved of the official 
use of humour for such a serious subject.157 Others believed that a sense of humour was the 
British ‘secret weapon’.158 Fougasse himself, in a talk on the BBC a few days after the 
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publication of the posters, justified his use of humour for such a serious subject. He placed 
humour within a British cultural context and:  
explained his emotional function of enabling people to deal with the difficult truths 
they do not wish to confront. It is precisely their lack of realism than enables 
cartoons to communicate powerful ideas in a non-threatening manner.159 
Fougasse exploited humour as a ‘corrective’ device, but his light touch and aesthetic 
sophistication concealed a tendency to reinforce the belief that fifth columnists were 
everywhere.160 When planning another anti-gossip campaign, the Fougasse posters were 
described as ‘partly Haw Haw propaganda’, he said ‘I know everything, see everything, 
hear everything’, and this played ‘up the worst Hitler fantasy for the nervous’.161 
 
The Times approved of Fougasse’s campaign, noting that although the target may be made 
to look a fool, ‘Fougasse’s touch is as delicate as it is deadly, and his victims laugh even 
while they see themselves as Fougasse sees them’. Whether a civilian or in uniform, 
Fougasse’s message was for everyone, as the anti-gossip campaign would only become 
effective as everyone realised that it was not necessary ‘to be an out-and-out “long-tongued 
babbling gossip” to be, potentially, one of the silly asses in the cartoons, jabbering away in 
public places’. Although Hitler and Goering may not actually be on the bus, the viewer 
was never to know who was listening, and overhearing information of use to Hitler: 
Let Fougasse teach us that there is a Hitler in every hedge, behind every bar, under 
every table, and lurking, all ears, by every telephone, ready to snap up any 
unconsidered trifles of information which the latent spot of indiscretion in the most 
cautious of us may innocently let fall.162 
A twenty-five year old female noted that she thought the ‘careless talk pictures – with 
Hitler peeping over telephone booths and out of luggage racks at people’ were 
‘excellent’.163 
 
Ricardo Brook, a ‘well-known humorous artist’,164 wrote that he was all for ‘humour in 
advertising’, when the subject was not serious. The Prime Minister, however, had said that 
for certain ‘gossip’ the death penalty could be invoked, and then a ‘series of anti-gossip 
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joke comic posters’ were issued. He felt that ‘pictorial jokes are not likely to stop the 
menace’.165 Victor Morris agreed, and criticised government ‘comic posters’ as ‘popular 
vote never yet decided the merit of an advertisement’. The fact that ‘characteristic British 
comment has shown approval and even enthusiasm for these posters’ was irrelevant. 
Comic advertising had rarely produced ‘useful results’, and in this case had merely brought 
‘the whole object of the campaign into contempt’.166 Advertiser’s Weekly disputed whether 
humour was out of place in the anti-gossip campaign, regarding Fougasse as ‘one of the 
most subtle interpreters of the British idiom that it has ever known’. ‘[C]haracteristic 
British comment’ on the series, almost without exception ‘amounted to approval; indeed, 
even to enthusiasm’. Advertiser’s Weekly believed ‘that the humorous Fougasse series has 
already drawn more attention to, and observance of, the need to hold one’s tongue than all 
the previous printed sermons put together’. A British characteristic was ‘to treat serious 
things lightly’, where it is the joke, not the ‘oratorical flourish’, which sees men through to 
the end.167 
 
Gibbons agreed with Morris that the war was a serious subject, and could not be dealt with 
as thought it was a comic subject: 
There is nothing very comic, however, in a ship being sunk by enemy action as the 
result of confidential information being spread about by those who imagine that 
they gain some social prestige by so doing. The loss of human life and vital 
supplies in wartime can best be illustrated by war pictures showing the devastating 
results of careless talk.168  
With stocks of poster designs exhausted, a steady demand for supplies, and a delay before 
new designs could be put into production, Wilkinson’s realistic design (figure 209), along 
with two others, was considered successful enough by the government to reprint.169 
Talmadge’s poster design (figure 210) could have be viewed as ‘horrific’, but Art and 
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Industry felt that it imparted ‘its message simply and adequately, the test of any good 
poster’.170 The Times noted that anti-gossip campaigns could not ‘insist too strongly that 
the possible connection between a quiet little talk and a horrible catastrophe is not a fond 
invention of a heated imagination, but a genuine and pressing danger’. They went on to say 
that at some point, everyone would have information of value to the enemy, and thus ‘no 
one is too unimportant to keep a watch on his tongue and remember that careless talk costs 
lives.’171 
 
The slogan ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’, initially not thought to be sufficiently closely 
connected with the war effort, likely to be revised or superseded, it outlived any other.172 
The phrase was a regular slogan in anti gossip posters and other publicity from early 1940, 
and ‘was taken up generally by speakers and the press’.173 It was such a successful slogan, 
it was parodied in another poster: ‘careless ropemaking’ (figure 245). Shaw, however, 
complained that this allowed the critic to ask: ‘Does not careless talk any longer costs 
lives?’.174 It was also taken over by humorists: ‘What did Father say when Mother told him 
she was expecting?’ ‘Oh, that careless stork’.175  
  
HI requested a report into the slogan ‘Be Like Dad, Keep Mum’ (figures 246 and 247). The 
general reaction that they found was ‘unenthusiastic approval’, whilst a large number, 
particularly women, puzzled over the meaning. Previous reports into slogans had 
demonstrated that ‘people were definitely irritated after a time by the official use of 
slogans’. Many spontaneously compared the slogan to other government slogans: ‘People 
are now definitely conscious of the Government’s use of slogans to influence them, and 
some seem to resent it’. This slogan was seen as ‘easy to memorise, with a humorous 
element’. The investigators got the impression that although many found it humorous, they 
did not take the message itself seriously. The upper and middle classes were more cynical 
and critical about the message. Punning was seen as cheap undignified: ‘More educated 
people are often consciously critical of punning (a thing you have to apologise for doing in 
middle strata of society).’ They were also more self-conscious than the working classes 
about addressing their parents publicly as ‘Mum’ and ‘Dad’. Furthermore, they were more 
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likely to refer to their parents as ‘Mummie’ and ‘Daddie’ or ‘Mother’ and ‘Father’. M-O 
noted that the message may not have been intended for middle-class people, but ‘its 
presence conspicuously displayed under official auspices may well lead to adverse 
comment’ from critical and vocal middle-class citizens.176 
 
M-O observed that the slogan did not necessarily work for the working classes either, as 
‘keep’ was an ambiguous term. It appeared that the working classes read ‘no subtle 
meaning into the word “keep”, that is, they do not have any association in their minds with 
“kept woman”’. The working classes tended to use ‘elaborate circumlocutions’, rather than 
particular phrases to describe ‘kept women’, where it did not appear to imply the legal 
relationship that it did for the upper classes. They certainly did not appear to see the pun in 
the words straight away, but it appeared that it was the word ‘Mum’ that was obscure, 
rather than ‘keep’. When the pun was pointed out to them by the investigator, ‘the usual 
reaction was to brighten up and laugh, fully appreciating the joke’.177 M-O found the 
message to be ‘essentially masculine’, as in general, ‘women showed less association and 
less interest than men, though usually they are particularly stimulated both by slogan and 
by joke appeals’. Many women deemed the message ‘obscure’ as ‘[t]hey are quite unable 
to think of themselves in the situation when they would “Be Like Dad”’, whilst many 
housewives did not consciously feel that they were kept by their husbands. The message 
was considered particularly inappropriate for spinsters and widows. The message may have 
been difficult to understand initially, but M-O concluded that this may actually have 
worked in its favour ‘so long as the message is not adversely criticised or does not set up 
hostile reactions among those who do not understand it in the early stages’.178 This pre-
testing thus gave general approval to the campaign, and it appeared on the hoardings. 
 
Dr Edith Summerskill criticised the ‘Be like Dad, Keep Mum’ poster campaign, and called 
for it to be withdrawn from the hoardings. She felt that it was ‘offensive to women’, and ‘a 
source of irritation to housewives, whose work in the home if paid for at current rates 
would make a substantial addition to the family income’. Summerskill described the 
posters as being in the ‘worst Victorian music-hall taste’, and thus out of touch with a 
modern audience. Cooper responded that he liked Victorian music halls, and apologised 
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that words ‘intended to amuse should have succeeded in irritating’, although he could not 
believe that the irritation was ‘very profound or widely spread’.179 Described in 1996 as 
having been ‘a seriously formidable lady’,180 Summerskill was an English Labour 
politician, physician, boxing abolitionist, author and, as a member of the House of 
Commons (1938-61), an advocate of women’s rights.181 Considering Summerskill’s 
involvement with the Married Women’s Association, which she initiated her in 1938, her 
objections are unsurprising. The primary objectives of the Association were to promoted 
legislation that would provide equal rights within the marriage relationship, particularly 
with regard to parenting rights and financial security.182 O’Connor felt that the poster that 
Summerskill had condemned, and others had said ‘tickles the fancy of the public’ was part 
of a whole campaign that had ‘failed in its purpose’. He listed various conversations he had 
overhead which were against the war effort, and noted:  
Let anyone try, as I have done, to call these offenders to order. He will only meet 
with unpleasant rebuffs. He will be told, as I have been told, that this is a free 
country, and that they (the offenders) were jolly well going to say what they 
pleased.  
O’Connor claimed that such conversations were occurring every day, and that if there was 
a real desire to put a stop to it, ‘jokes, cartoons and comic pictures will never succeed’. 
There was a need for more serious warnings, and offenders to be punished.183  
 
Opinion was divided as to whether it was worth spending money on careless talk posters, 
and whether they would help the problem. In 1943, a forty-year old male barber based in 
Oxford Street noted that he would be pleased to display a new careless talk posters, as it 
was awkward when a regular client said things when ‘he had much better keep his mouth 
shut about’. Another forty-year old male, having said that he did not think careless talk 
existed, and thus posters were not ‘worth the cost in paper’, wanted police to check up on 
foreign refugees who could get work in hairdressers and pass on some ‘fine reports’. He 
did not see any inconsistency in his comments. A young female noted that ‘posters and 
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talks won’t have any effect on such people’.184 Negative comments on posters are 
numerous. Longmate describes figure 194 as a ‘pompous pronouncement’, typical of MOI 
at the time.185 Figure 215 infuriated some British soldiers, who went so far as to tear the 
posters down. Sending comments to William Hickey of the Daily Express, one soldier 
objected to the way soldiers are ‘depicted in their beds as screaming and gesticulating 
lunatics’. Service men and women felt that a ‘dignified and effective request’ could easily 
have been designed ‘instead of this insulting production which would be hard to beat for 
lack of psychological insight’. Exception was taken to the message, as ‘men returning from 
the front wanted to get their experiences “off their chest”,’ which may have had medical 
benefits but was not good ‘from the military point of view’. Advertiser’s Weekly noted that 
not many posters were being torn down, but the negative publicity would at least indicate 
that people had taken notice: ‘Whatever was thought about it, the message had gone 
home’.186  
 
Positive comment is also evident. One of the earliest careless talk campaigns, Keep it dark 
(figures 248) was described by a M-O interviewee, as a ‘nice little rhyme – something 
anyone could learn’,187 although several commented to M-O that it would have been nice 
for the colouring to be patriotically red, white and blue.188 Images depicting young, 
glamourous women, evidently intent on gaining information, such as figures 212 and 249 
were popular in many countries, although Lant claims that such images were really only 
used in the UK before it was realised what a shortage of “manpower” there was going to 
be.189 Figure 212 was praised for presenting a ‘complete story in twelve words, full of pep 
and punch and straight to the point’.190 McLaine described the campaigns in figures 234 to 
237 as clever, as they ‘avoided browbeating the public’,191 and described figure 191 as 
‘heavily didactic’.192 
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As with the Blitz and the British bombing offensive in Germany, two similar activities had 
to be presented in different lights.193 British spying activities were heroic, whilst the enemy 
doing the same job needed to be presented as underhand, sly and evil. ‘Careless talk’ 
campaigns particularly used the IPA technique of ‘name-calling’, with members of enemy 
nations as ‘bad’, as threats. Every member of the nation needed to jump on the 
‘bandwagon’, called to join everyone else in protecting the nation, taking personal 
responsibility for the effect that they could have on the war effort. The wide range of styles 
from didactic detailed diagrams, through modern and typographic designs, and a large 
number of cartoons, ensured that all classes, occupations, and genders, were addressed. All 
campaigns were noticeably aimed at adults, with children conspicuous by their absence 
from campaign images. Propaganda campaigns stressed the omnipresence of danger from 
the ‘enemy within’, despite the lack of evidence as to the existence of any real threat, using 
‘card-stacking’ to present facts to the contrary. Cartoons proliferated throughout the 
campaign, in the hope of disarming the audience, but realistic designs fought possible 
complacency. Those in the services had access to information that could help the enemy to 
invade, but as we saw in the previous chapter, the industrial effort was key, and thus 
locations and production schedules needed to be protected from bombing raids. As the 
following chapter demonstrates, the VD campaign also depicts the ‘enemy within’, which 
could harm the British war effort. The health of the nation depended on healthy bodies, 
needed to fight, to man the war effort on the home front, and to produce a future generation 
to populate the New Jerusalem. 
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Chapter 7: The ‘Problem’ of Venereal Disease in Wartime  
Statistics on those attending venereal disease (VD) civilian treatment centres during the 
Second World War initially reveal a drop in figures. After 1941, however, as in the First 
World War, there was a rapid rise in cases (see appendix 9).1 In this chapter we discuss 
how VD was characterised as a ‘problem’ within scientific and religious discourse. We 
look at how medical, legal, political and religious institutions influenced, and gained the 
power to deal with, the ‘problem’ within discourses of citizenship. The poster designs are 
considered, and the truths they produced (and reflected) through their form and function 
are described. A respondent to the project questionnaire claimed that ‘VD posters were 
unheard of prior to the war’,2 but this is clearly not correct. What was significant about the 
Second World War is that VD posters were placed in open public spaces for the first time, 
causing great controversy.3 As we reflect on reactions to the posters, we see how far people 
recognised the need to fulfil their duties of citizenship through altering their sexual 
behaviour in order to remain ‘undiseased’, maintaining a healthy body that would fight the 
war and have the potential to build a new future. Several competing discourses were 
involved in the construction of VD as a problem in the Second World War. These included 
discourses based on government, religion, scientific medicine, the law, and education, 
which collectively addressed questions of gender, nation and citizenship. VD has a long 
identifiable history,4 in which Second World War thinking was grounded, particularly 
drawing on Victorian values.  
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The Context and Planning of VD Posters 
In 1889 the ‘Independent Advertisements Act’ was passed ‘against persons who advertise 
their specifics against a certain class of disease of a nameless character’.5 The issue of VD 
did not suddenly surface in the UK in the mid-nineteenth century, although the key 
legislative action of the Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864, 1866 and 1869 has focused 
much attention on this era.6 As chemical treatments were developed, Hall maintains that 
their availability led to the abolition of regulatory approaches, and the adoption of a strictly 
voluntary approach to treatment.7 Chemical treatments were available to cure VD at the 
outbreak of the Second World War, however, it was still illegal to promote them as cures 
for such a disease, or give instructions for use.8 This was partly because it was felt that 
those men who ‘behaved irresponsibly’ could not be trusted to treat themselves, and there 
were also worries that it would lead to a false sense of security, promiscuity, and even a 
rise in VD.9 
 
The Royal Commission on Venereal Diseases reported in 1916, having been established in 
1913 in response to calls from prominent medics attacking the ‘conspiracy of silence’, and 
feminist and social purity groups.10 It recommended educating the public on the ‘grave 
evils which exist among us, and their effect on the national life, present and future’, 
concluding that a consistent effort would need to be made to keep the issue before the 
public mind.11 In 1916, The Public Health (Venereal Diseases) Regulations of 1916 
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required local councils to provide treatment facilities, but allowed them to decide what 
education and publicity was felt to be desirable,12 and the National Council for Combatting  
Venereal Diseases (NCCVD) was established. With an interest in education, publicity and 
the treatment of VD, this became the British Social Hygiene Council (BSHC) in 1925, 
when it took on wider issues of health education.13 There were criticisms, particularly from 
ex-Army doctors, of the focus on moral prophylaxis by the NCCVD,14 and in 1919 The 
National Society for the Prevention of Venereal Diseases (NSPVD) was founded. Largely 
concerned with encouraging the use of preventative medical prophylactic measures to halt 
the spread of VD,15 although the Ministry of Health (MOH) refused to entertain the notion 
of prophylaxis.16 The NSPVD dismissed the argument that calling for chastity of all would 
solve the VD problem, as there would always be ‘rebels’, and that it was usually the 
‘absolutely innocent’ who bore ‘the cross of suffering and degradation’.17 
 
Initially in the early twentieth century, ‘many men considered their first dose of clap a rite 
de passage into manhood’. By the Second World War a ‘“manly man” appears to have 
become one who had the sense and control to take precautions against infection’.18 The 
First World War had changed attitudes to VD, challenging the clear demarcation between 
military and civil spheres established by the Victorians.19 With increased infections, or 
possibly just more cases brought to attention as men entered the armed forces, VD was a 
cause for concern. Officers provided lectures on sexual continence, with the stress on 
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medical rather than moral messages.20 Thinking was influenced by the eugenics and social 
purity movements that had become significant in both the UK and the USA prior to the 
First World War. Eugenics, the ‘science of improving the human race by better breeding’, 
promoted evolutionary ideas.21 Eugenicists studied ‘the problems of venereal infection for 
information, not sensation’. Describing VD as a ‘menace to civilisation’, they regarded the 
problem as a sanitary and economic one, rather than a ‘God-given plague to keep people 
from sin’. Eugenicists believed that education about the causes and means of treatment was 
the key means of dealing with the problem, although prophylactic measures (including 
treatment) would help halt the spread of the disease.22 Eugenicists regarded the man as the 
main source of infection, and called for VD to be made legally notifiable.23 
 
Health propaganda or publicity in general became more acceptable in the interwar years, 
although it was often perceived as education,24 and many films had been produced on 
public health subjects, including VD.25 By 1935, health weeks had become a normal part 
of life, and the Central Council for Health Education (CCHE), BSHC, and the NSPVD all 
dealt with the issue of VD.26 By 1938, there were calls for a central body ‘capable of 
giving expert advice appropriate to local circumstances’, for the ‘difficult subject’ of VD 
propaganda.27 Despite the centrality of the VD issue to health education, and MOH claims 
that it was ‘fully aware of the importance of education’, there was no compulsion for local 
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authorities to undertake such propaganda,28 and many failed to.29 VD was deemed to be a 
problem intensified by war, exacerbated by the disruption to normal life and by the 
movement of peoples and the armed forces.30 In 1939, the NSPVD tried to place adverts in 
magazines, but the funds were largely returned, as, for example, Odhams Press had a 
policy to have no adverts relating to sex in their magazines.31 At the same time, the BSHC 
called for funding to be enforced, arguing that the costs would be offset against the savings 
in medical costs, time off work, and would be of ‘great and lasting benefit to our young 
men and women, both morally and physically’.32 The Exchequer did not wish to expend 
extra funds and hoped that the publicity that had been devoted to the subject in the interwar 
period ‘would have had the effect of minimising the danger of any widespread trouble 
during this war’.33 In 1941, the NSPVD complained that the government was still not 
dealing with the problem of VD. Despite dealing with many requests from Service 
personnel, both men and women, for information on the issue, funding was not available 
for NSPVD either.34 
 
In October, 1942 Sir Wilson Jameson, Chief Medical Officer of the MOH gave a press 
conference in London regarding VD. In his view, the incidence of disease was increasing 
due to wartime conditions, particularly those that encouraged ‘loose living’. Facilities for 
diagnosis and treatment were freely available throughout the land, but due to the ‘old 
tradition of hush-hush’, this knowledge was not being transferred to the general public. 
Jameson recognised that they were moral aspects of the problem, but they were not for him 
to deal with. He regarded the problem as ‘just another medical and public health problem’, 
like diphtheria. He called for a change in attitude, such as had already occurred in the 
Dominions and the United States, for people to face up to the facts.35 The British Medical 
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Journal (BMJ) approved of this speech, which gave official backing to a medical approach. 
The BMJ felt that VD would now simply be regarded as an infectious disease, voluntary 
methods of control would be rejected, allowing VD to be dealt with properly.36 
 
In 1942, the CCHE took over the educational role of the BSHC, and undertook an 
intensive and extensive campaign in order to ‘create an informed opinion and to encourage 
early and continued treatment’.37 The MOH believed that that campaign would be much 
more effective if the national campaign was supported by local publicity.38 Central action 
gave incentive to local action and ‘responsible Authorities’ were urged to take fullest 
advantage of the facilities the CCHE could offer,39 with a leaflet issued, detailing material 
available for local use. Publicity materials needed to be ordered, but were free of charge,40 
distributed through the Ministry of Information (MOI). Posters were particularly targeted 
at indoor and outdoor areas of travel such as railway stations, linked with the intensified 
movements of people during wartime. With families split up, there was seen to be more 
danger of immoral behaviour. Despite media reluctance to devote much space to the 
subject, the campaign was supported by press advertising.41 At the end of 1942, Regulation 
33B was brought into force, providing for the notification of carriers of VD. In an 
atmosphere of all-pervasive total war, identifying bodies who were clearly harbourers of 
the disease, such as prostitutes, helped limit the perceived dangers of VD.42 ‘Immoral’ 
behaviour was defined within the narrow sense of implying sexual misbehaviour.43 Foreign 
bodies were also stigmatised, with the government needing to deal with a perceived 
‘problem’ posed by American soldiers.44 Women were making it clear that they would 
welcome advances from the soldiers, but could not be described as ‘common prostitutes’ as 
they did not accost them.45 
 
In 1943, following nationwide approval of the first wartime VD campaign, the MOH 
‘decided that it would be wise to increase the publicity given to the subject’ amongst the 
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civilian population. The MOI Campaigns Division ‘stepped up the circulation and display 
of VD posters’, along with wider publication through newspapers, magazines, radio shows, 
on screen, as well as through lectures and plays. A widespread educational campaign 
covered the nature of the diseases, the need for treatment, where to seek treatment, the 
repression of prostitution, the provision of adequate treatment facilities and the 
development of methods of case tracing.46 The campaign was to break ‘down the secrecy 
which covers the subject’, demonstrate ‘the need for early treatment’, and ‘the need for 
continuance of treatment until a cure has been effected’. The campaign also aimed to 
‘explain the dangers of quack medicines or self-treatment’, and encouraged people to visit 
a clinic for proper treatment. Posters had two distinct functions for the campaign. They 
were to reinforce the press advertising message and emphasise where to go for treatment.47 
As far as possible, plans were made to work within the existing legal framework, although 
if ‘desirable and practicable’, it was recognised that changes to the law were possibly 
needed.48  
 
In February 1943, the Medical Advisory Committee for Scotland (MACS) was asked by 
the Secretary of State for Scotland to advise on how far propaganda would be helpful in 
halting the rise in incidence of VD. Statistics were collected on the rise of VD in Scotland, 
particularly the number of new cases. The Committee called for information to be better 
collated, and for routine tests ‘on a large scale’ in order to identify many who they believed 
had VD without being aware of it. MACS called for a ‘concerted and persistent effort’ to 
eradicate the ‘scourge’ of VD from ‘civilised communities’. As the ‘precise aetiology and 
methods of spread’ of VD was known, with ‘a high standard of enlightened citizenship’, 
and the ‘moral sanction and active co-operation of the general public’, there was no reason 
why this should not be achieved. Within the past year attitudes were believed to have 
changed, with more acceptance of the need for information on VD and its control, and 
there was a call for ‘courageous leadership’ to deal with ‘almost universal’ bans on even 
the most elementary publicity.49 Figures are given for a campaign for the first six months 
of 1943, showing that an increased number had come forward for treatment, and an 
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increased number were found to not be infected. This was taken as a sign of success for the 
poster and advertising campaign. MACS did question, however, whether those who were 
‘not socially conscious’ would have been affected by the campaign. In the report they 
wrote that it was ‘clearly in the national interest that the family and the home be protected 
against the ravages of these infections’. Education and propaganda therefore needed to be 
‘addressed to the individual as well as to the community as a whole’.50 
 
MACS felt that propaganda was best when presented factually, in an educational manner, 
and ‘prepared by competent people’ (presumably medical). Propaganda should stress that 
VD was best avoided, and dealt with quickly through treated if contracted, and commented 
that official propaganda had slowly moved in that direction in recent months. MACS noted 
that the overwhelming majority of cases were a result of ‘illicit sexual contact’ with an 
already infected person. The best method of prevention was ‘personal chastity’, and that 
this should be taught to ‘young people’ as a part of ‘clean living’. For those who had 
already ‘run the risk’, it should be made what should be done; that it could be done in 
confidence; the dangers of delay through ‘self-treatment’; and the effect on a wife and 
unborn children. Those who gained VD through ‘no fault or responsibility of their own’ 
were in the minority. MACS considered the possible offence to social and moral codes 
through the provision of information on prophylaxis. There was a fear that this might 
engender a false sense of security, although on medical grounds such information should 
not be withheld. MACS recommended that posters be displayed prominently by local 
authorities, supported by leaflets. Fear and alarm might be raised but a certain amount of 
‘fear’ was healthy. They hoped that the public would come to adopt a similar attitude to 
venereal infection as to ‘ordinary’ infectious diseases, and hoped that ‘the morbid interest 
and prejudice’ towards VD would disappear. Education of the young was important, but 
‘fraught’ with ‘dangers’, with ‘health education’, rather than sex education, to be taught by 
both male and female medical practitioners (rather than regular teachers). With the 
confidence of parents obtained, this was to cover the rules for ‘clean living’, including the 
‘moral and physical dangers of promiscuity’. The responsibility for such a campaign was 
to fall on government departments, and whilst support from voluntary societies was 
deemed useful, responsibility was not to be delegated.51 
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With religious views still commonly held during the war, and the problem ‘as much moral 
as medical’ MACS commented that ‘the Church should be pressed to attack the moral side 
of the question fearlessly in straightforward, outspoken teaching’.52 Despite the ‘wages of 
sin’ being VD, pre-war the Church refused to preach ‘the truth about the evils and dangers 
to be avoided’. Religious discourses emphasised the moral aspect of the problem, 
emphasising that ‘fornication’ and ‘illicit’ sex were the main problem, although as others 
pointed out, pre-marital sex was not illegal.53 At the other extreme scientific discourse 
propagated an approach of chemical and mechanical prophylaxis. Between those two 
views there was a wide difference of opinion, and a wide field of controversy, visible at a 
conference held in February 1943, attended by representatives of the MOH, the CCHE and 
the Church. The Archbishop of Canterbury complained that ‘what is primarily a moral 
problem with a medical aspect is being treated as if it were primarily a medical problem 
with a moral aspect’, and that ‘there is a great evil and a grave menace to be met’.54 The 
most favourably received opinion at the conference was that ‘the prevention of the causes 
of VD was a moral problem’, whilst ‘the cure… was definitely a medical one’, and that 
people should not be prevented from coming forward for treatment through shame55 
 
From October 1943 to March 1944 an experimental contact-tracing scheme was carried out 
in Tyneside, persuading those who were known to be at risk of infection to attend a VD 
clinic, and establishing patterns in the social background. The idea was to treat both sexes 
equally, although, due to inexperience health workers, for the first three months, it was 
limited to tracing women. The categorisation is interesting. They interviewed married 
women, some of whom admitted to extramarital relations. They defined the group of 
women who ‘indulged in sexual relations with a chance acquaintance and on the first 
occasion’ as ‘promiscuous women’. In contrast, they found it difficult to define 
‘promiscuous men’ possibly because they did not contact as many, but identified that men 
‘indulged’ in sex relations outside marriage after quarrels, through boredom, or through 
‘necessity’.56 Suggestions for further measures included more control over the activities of 
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females, particularly in public houses, with excessive drinking a key cause.57 The 
distribution of prophylactic packets, considered useful for the Services, was deemed not 
appropriate for the civilian population, where it would be difficult to give mass instruction, 
and would be ‘undesirable’, encouraging ‘a false sense of security’.58 
 
Sir Wilson Jameson, Chief Medical Officer, made a speech in October 1944, which 
indicated that the health of the nation was good after five years of war. Although people 
were tired, mortality rates from infectious diseases were lower than in the pre-war years. 
Influenza was at lower rate than 1937, typhoid fever at all time low, and diphtheria slowly 
coming under control; the two black spots were tuberculosis and VD. The rates for syphilis 
could be measured most readily, with an increase in 1943 of 139% over 1939, although 
only 7% more than 1942. This was partly deemed to be the result of a change of attitude, 
as:  
[n]o longer are we shutting our eyes to this social plague, no longer do we refuse to 
discuss it, no longer are we withholding from young people information about its 
dangers.59 
The ‘problem’ of VD had largely been recognised as an urban problem, within a long 
‘tradition’ of urban prostitution. With the war-time movement of populations, the Scottish 
Council for Health Education believed that it brought the problem into rural areas for the 
first time.60 By 1944 the previous attitude of secrecy had been overcome sufficiently to 
launch a programme of public education through the BBC, the press, films, posters and 
leaflets. Believing that such a programme was largely welcome, the government was 
encouraged to continue it, with posters displayed nation-wide to draw attention to ‘some of 
the features of this social problem’. With government plans for a better post-war world 
evident, in return, people needed to take an interest in their own welfare,61 with citizenship 
rights and duties in respect of healthcare.62 
 
In March 1945, the MOH sent out details of new material available for local use in support 
of the national educational campaign against VD. The MOH worked in conjunction with 
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the MOI, the CCHE, and the Department of Health for Scotland, to produce centrally 
organised publicity. Largely in the form of detailed publicity such as press advertisements, 
films, lectures, leaflets, it had been supported by large posters displayed on hoardings 
nation-wide.63 In May 1945, a photographic display, designed to be frank and informative, 
was offered by the MOI to factories. With no compulsory attendance at the display, 
different (and separate) displays were organised for male and female viewers. For males, 
the possible reasons for VD were given as boredom, too many drinks, and the ‘easy’ girl-
friend; women were given other reasons, but these are not specified in the archival 
material.64 
 
Discussion of the matter of VD reached both Houses of Parliament on several occasions, 
including in January 1943. Viscountess Astor raised questions in the House of Commons 
regarding the timing and nature of propaganda campaigns designed to combat the spread of 
VD. By this point the distribution of the first poster had begun, whilst others were in the 
process of being printed.65 The discourses involved in constructing VD as a problem in the 
Second World War were: government, religion, scientific medicine, legal, education, and 
questions of gender, nation and citizenship. The following section will examine whether, 
if, and how these discourses were articulated in the posters through their content and style. 
The Design of VD Posters 
Although the general chronology for VD campaigns is fairly clear, the same cannot always 
be said for the posters themselves. Advertiser’s Weekly, for example, obviously did not feel 
it appropriate to illustrate their discussion of VD campaigns, and in some cases we are 
reliant on the IWM categorisation system to ‘know’ that posters are British Second World 
War posters. Some posters are mentioned in other primary sources, which confirms the 
date of their original display, although not for how long they were displayed, or whether 
they were reused in later campaigns. Complete coverage of posters even for so small a 
topic appears impossible, and no details can be found of posters before the 1942 campaign. 
Posters did exist, but did not attract the controversy that later campaigns did, as they were 
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not displayed on billboards, but limited to places such as public conveniences. In January 
1942, blue and white posters, produced by the MOI for the MOH, started appearing on 
hoardings in anticipation of the major ‘delay is dangerous’ campaign, double-crown 
posters to be placed in public conveniences.66 In January 1943, railway companies allowed 
the MOI to display posters for free in railway station toilets, giving details of nearby 
treatment centres. It was hoped that these would eventually also appear on platforms.67  
 
Wartime posters aimed not to construct social difference, everyone was a part of 
‘citizenship’, with an emphasis on similarities. Citizenship, however, involves concepts of 
social difference, and is a gendered concept itself, publicly articulated as male.68 We will 
see through images whether the same message is involved when a man or woman is 
depicted or appealed to, and see cases where there are posters that appear to be 
‘genderless’, often with a message solely based on text. In April 1943 a series of posters 
was released, all clearly marked with MOH logos, designed in duplicate form for 
specifically gendered audiences. Figures 250 to 252 were directed at those who exposed 
themselves to risk of infection, whilst figures 253 to 254 were addressed to the public at 
large. The former were considered more suitable for indoor sites, the latter for outdoor 
sites, although it was hoped that as a result of the amount of discussion already on the 
subject, all could be displayed on outdoor sites.69 Figures 250 and 251 each depict a lone 
civilian, one a woman, one a man, in contrast with many wartime posters which depict men 
only in uniform. Each walks past a marker displaying a month, indicating the passing of 
time. The dangers of delay are a recurrent theme throughout wartime VD literature, a time 
when the nation needed its citizens to be ‘fighting fit’. As in the earlier campaign 
‘Diphtheria is Deadly’, the MOH favoured the use of alliteration to get this message 
across.70 The posters use quasi-traditional imagery, realistic looking without photography, 
with indistinct faces. As with many VD posters, sombre colours are used, appropriate for a 
sombre topic, although possibly simply a result of restrictions on paper and ink. As is 
common in VD posters, the ‘VD’ letters are emphasised. In this case ‘venereal disease’ is 
also spelt out, possibly because it was expected that people would not know what it stood 
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for. In general, VD posters do not appear to spell out the name or nature of the diseases. In 
figure 252, syphilis and gonorrhoea are named, although the symptoms are not spelt out, 
information more suited to accompanying leaflets.71 The photographed man in the image 
looks rather wary, as though he is unsure about the, assumedly ‘quack’, pills he is taking. 
A graphic arrow points away from the ‘quack’ pills, towards the ‘true’ medical solution. 
With the shame associated with the disease, and doubts about the confidentiality of a 
consultation with the family doctor, people turned to ‘quack’ medicines. The government 
needed to emphasise that only proven medical methods would work, and wanted to stop 
people wasting money and delaying ‘proper’ medical treatment. 
 
In August 1943, the Ministry of War Transport was directed by the MOI to display the 
montaged figures 253 and 254 on railway sites, including the Underground.72 Figure 253, 
obviously aimed at men, depicts a bride in pure white. At the time women would have 
been expected to be pure at marriage, although the same standards were not applied to 
men. She is heading towards grasping, shadowy hands (the concept of shadows is 
discussed on page 213). It is designed to induce feelings of guilt in a man committing the 
‘vile’ moral crime of infecting his wife and the children yet to come. At a time when 
knowledge of contraception was still limited, the assumption is that there will be children. 
In figure 254, children are perceived as ‘the future’, as ‘tomorrow’s citizen’. Aimed at 
future parents of both sexes, the poster follows eugenics ideals; parenthood is something 
one should be ‘fit’ for, something to be earned. The poster does not specify the symptoms 
of VD, or the way in which a child would be disabled, as the word ‘handicapped’ alone 
would probably strike fear. The spotlight shines on a young, innocent looking boy, with the 
shadow behind of a young man, standing tall and straight: what he should grow up to be if 
his progress is not hampered by VD. 
 
Designed by Reginald Mount, including the copy, figure 255 has since become a very 
famous design. It, however, was simply the first of three posters, designed to indicate that 
VD was not just caught from prostitutes, reflecting worries about ‘amateurs’ who 
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harboured the disease. Distribution of the poster was restricted to some 500 copies, and 
certain port areas, with an obvious male audience intended. The flower on the hat has a 
certain fleshy ‘unhealthiness’, viewed as a ‘symbol of enticement’.73 The skull gives an 
indication of the ‘kiss of death’, smiling as it beckons (emphasised by the text) the man 
towards the faceless ‘easy’ woman. The veil adds a furtive atmosphere to all this, 
suggesting that the true nature of the woman cannot be seen, that she is behaving in a 
‘shady’ manner, as a prostitute would. The message is consistent with Victorian moral 
discourses of sexuality: a man has natural sexual urges, whilst a woman should remain a 
virgin until marriage, otherwise be stigmatised ‘easy’. The diseases are specified, and the 
medical damage spelt out, although not the emotional damage. The government appeared 
to be less in favour of religious or particularly emotional messages. Medicine allowed the 
problem to be dealt with in the present, in a pragmatic way. Religion, however, deals with 
the hereafter and while redemption is possible, some viewed the hereafter as pre-ordained. 
 
In early 1945 a series of seven posters was offered free to local authorities, consisting of 
three pictorial designs (figures 256 to 258), and four non-pictorial, designs (figures 259 to 
262).74 Several VD images use the colour red, signifying danger in western cultures, and in 
the pictorial designs the VD letters are used to graphically reinforce their message with a 
blood-red shadow falling over lives. The image of a shadow often recurs throughout 
designs dealing with VD, indicating something that darkens, or lurks, maybe in the 
background, damaging what it casts its range over. The image would have been familiar 
from other health campaigns about the ‘shadow on the lung’, tuberculosis (TB).75. The 
shadow has long and evocative associations in discourse. It draws on religious ideas of 
coming out of the dark into the light, enlightenment coming from education, urban living 
in enclosed and shadowy areas; and criminal activity transacted in furtive, secretive, 
shadowy areas. The subject for figure 256 is a woman, with VD a threat to her happiness, 
damaging her potential chances at marriage, thought the key path to happiness for women 
in the 1940s. For the man, the shadow is on health (figure 257), rather than on happiness. 
The significance of this unclear, although women were maybe deemed more concerned 
with ‘emotions’, men with concrete ‘health’. The woman looks apprehensively over her 
shoulder, although whether she is ‘to blame’ or an ‘innocent victim’ is unclear. The man 
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has a different gaze that connects with the viewer, possibly to induce feelings of guilt. The 
use of photographs for these images indicates ‘reality’, ‘real people’ have this problem, 
and so could the viewer of the poster The persons used in these images look serious, young 
and middle class, challenging the traditional conception of VD as a problem of the urban 
poor. 
 
The poster ‘Shadow on his future’ (figure 258) purveys a similar message, although 
allowances would have to be made for a slightly different audience. This would have been 
aimed at both parents, one of whom may be an ‘innocent’ party. No trace can be found of a 
similar poster dealing with her future. The poster particularly deals with syphilis, an 
inheritable condition, and stresses the need for clean living to allow the family the best 
future. Children and babies are often represented as ‘the future’ of a nation, although this 
appears to be focusing on the child as an individual, to get (future) parents to think about 
the facts. It does not specify how it will affect the child, with accompanying literature able 
to give more medical detail. The message is a very emotional, hard-hitting one, aimed at 
inspiring guilt about the potential to damage future generations. 
 
The remainder of the 1945 campaign used only text, no images (figures 259 to 262), 
possibly indicating times when it was questioned how to illustrate such a sensitive topic to 
appropriate audiences, or a wish not to categorise the target audience. Significantly, the 
text in many posters is serious, grave-like and monumental in style.76 In figure 259, it was 
seen as the duty of ‘every citizen’ to know about VD, presumably to aid prevention. The 
emphasis on ‘clean living’ indicates that those who did contract VD were ‘dirty’ in some 
way, and treatment almost appears to be offered as an afterthought. In figure 260, ‘evil’ 
and ‘menace’ are not friendly terms. Such terms were used in the Second World War in 
relation to VD, demonstrating ideas of the ‘enemy within’. Within these posters particular 
subjects are not identified, no class or gender divisions appear, although provision of free 
treatment indicates that it was the poor who were particularly seen as a problem. Although 
VD is seen as a ‘great’ problem, with ‘grave’ and deathly consequences, there is no stress 
on speed of treatment as in previous posters (figures 250 to 251). The major emphasis is on 
prevention, with an emphasis on clean living as the ‘real’ and ‘only’ ‘safeguard’, was 
consistent with the interwar idea that ‘where there’s dirt there’s danger’ (figure 60). In 
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figure 261, VD is not just a threat to the individual: eugenics ideas surface as it is 
perceived as a threat to ‘the whole nation and to the future of our race’. Those who run the 
risk are failing in their moral duties as a citizen by being careless. Figure 262 has space in 
the centre available for overprinting of times and location of confidential treatment centres. 
The poster is informational rather than emotional, containing no visuals, aside from an 
official logo, and an arrow leading to more information. Such posters were a staple part of 
every campaign, and would have built on those in 1943 that had been widely displayed on 
hoardings, in public buildings, stations, and were not confined to public lavatories as 
previous placards were.77 Photographic displays were also used, presumably issued blank, 
with the message changed according to the location (figure 263). 
 
Henrion, responsible for the photographic designs in the series, used uplighting to make 
the atmosphere look sinister. Two other posters that look rather like they belong to, or are a 
continuation of, the same series, although possibly not produced until the late 1940s, are 
figures 265 and 266. Once again the theme of shadows, and the emphasis on skilled 
treatment is used. In figure 265, the wording draws attention to parents, throwing equal 
responsibility onto them for the child as the future. If one parent was irresponsible, the 
other had to deal with the consequences, and needed to be persuaded to overcome shame, 
anger at betrayal, and fear of the consequences, to be treated. In figure 266 the faces are 
unseen, indicating that this could be anyone, although in this case a middle-class 
male/female couple is depicted. The cinema, often the place for a first date, offers a 
shadowy atmosphere that may allow for ‘unsavoury’ behaviour. We note throughout that 
the assumed audience for these posters was a heterosexual one. In wartime homosexuality 
was illegal, and thus was not officially perceived to exist.78 
 
Figures 267 and 268, not necessarily produced by the MOH as they do not have the logo 
which the MOH appeared happy to place on its other posters, stress the idea of the damage 
to the home. At the centre of this discourse lies the idea of the home at the heart of the 
nation, with its gendered notions of citizenship. Homes had already been split by war, 
through evacuation, and service overseas, and damage limitation needed to be applied. In 
figure 267, the use of red could indicate danger, a red light district, or a red traffic light 
indicating ‘stop’. The poster presents a stark image with a stark message. The letters ‘VD’ 
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take over most of the poster, casting a shadow over the whole life. The person, of unclear 
class, but almost certainly a man, is depicted in the centre of the poster in a very dejected 
attitude, head bowed in shame. In figure 268, the letters ‘VD’ take on the function of an 
image, depicted as a V-bomb, arriving fast and unexpectedly, something people would 
have been very familiar with. The poster depicts structural damage, but it is clear it is the 
emotional life of the home that will be damaged. There is a very clear graphic message 
although no people are depicted. The colour red again stands out, and we have to question 
whether it was chosen for its ‘dangerous’ connotations, or whether it was simply a typical 
colour for a roof. As we saw on page 68, the public was most accepting of the idea that 
abstract, non-representational forms, such as those used in figures 267 to 269, conveyed 
moral messages. 
 
The campaigns aimed at the military have a slightly different tone, ‘construed not so much 
in religious terms, but in terms of civic responsibility’.79 As we saw on page 202, the 
armed forces had a long history of dealing with the problem of VD, felt to interfere with 
the smooth running of warfare. Abram Games, working for the War Office, produced 
posters for ABCA, providing educational material to the armed forces. Figure 269, ‘Guard 
against VD’, is one of his modern designs, published in 1941. Stark colours and stark 
design present the issue as black and white. The outline, with a forage cap, is of an 
ordinary soldier. Not identified as a particular type, it could be any soldier, in the same 
way as VD could strike anyone. With a play on words, the soldier must be ‘on guard’ 
against VD, in the same way he is ‘on guard’ as part of his regular military duties, keeping 
upright and straight. The incidence of VD is linked with the idea of being drunk, 
persuading soldiers to ‘keep sober’, although getting drunk was one way out from the 
fighting and killing. It is not clear however, that it is sending out a moral message. It does 
not indicate that abstinence is the key; rather, that there is a need to be sober enough to 
remember to use protection. There are seen to be duties appealing to different emotions: 
there are appeals to self-interest; appeals to protective instincts towards ‘womenfolk’; 
appeals to pro-Soviet feelings; and appeals to patriotism. Figure 270 was produced in both 
blue and brown, both fairly dull colours, although the letters ‘VD’ are in red, raising the 
question of how much attention the designers wished to attract attention to the poster. The 
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poster is aimed at men in the armed forces, away for a long time and likely to forget the 
women they had left, designed to make men stop and think. If they were behaving in a two 
faced manner writing loving letters home whilst sleeping around, they needed to think 
again, although whether this was through abstinence or prophylaxis is unclear.  
 
It is not clear if figure 271 is even a British image. It looks quite different from all the other 
images seen, and the uniform looks American, but it is lodged with the British posters at 
the IWM. There is always the possibility that it was part of the VD campaign for American 
troops in England mentioned in Advertiser’s Weekly. This was to ‘be launched by means of 
special posters, cartoons and educative talks on the dangers of the disease’.80 The couple 
appears to be doing the jitterbug, associated in popular parlance with bad habits. She 
appears to be dancing seductively and is depicted as a ‘loose woman’, ready to be ‘picked 
up’, with a short skirt, heels, nylons, and the latest haircut. Behind the happy looking 
scene, the dangers of VD are clearly spelt out alongside the skull, noted earlier as 
associated with death. Only three facts are provided to remember, although one would 
have to be up close to read them; but the fiery orange colour would make the poster stand 
out from a distance.  
 
Figure 272 is a very different poster from all those previously discussed, very wordy, 
probably intended for placement in areas like a mess where there would be time to read it 
properly. Who would wish to be seen looking so closely at the text, attracting a bad 
reputation, or ribbing from their colleagues must be questioned. The letters ‘VD’ function 
as image as there are no others, and every sentence begins with a confrontational ‘venereal 
disease’ highlighted in red. A medical prevention model is evident, with the words 
‘entirely preventable’ emboldened. The alliteration plays a rather strained rhyme: ‘venereal 
disease means victory delayed’. The soldier is damaging his (unless this was also displayed 
in female service areas) duty as a citizen. ‘Your release can be delayed’ (figure 273) was 
obviously produced near the end of the war, or even early post-war, with demobilisation 
clothes visible. With the end of the war in sight, and the soldiers returning home, the need 
to cure VD in soldiers became more urgent. Even without compulsory schooling, there was 
obviously expected to be recognition of a cell shape, referring to the medical model of 
understanding. The cell contains calendar dates, indicating the passing of time, promoting 
the all too familiar idea of the danger of delay, although in this case there is more a fear 
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that demobilisation will be delayed. In figure 274, the bacterial shape is again evident. At 
the end of the war, ‘delay’ could mean men missing the chance to get the boat home. The 
man in the image is rather comic looking, the everlasting fool. The red text is designed to 
be eye-catching and bold, although there are minimal other colours used. 
 
Irresponsible sexual behaviour did not just affect the individuals involved. It had 
consequences for the whole nation, for the outcome of the war, and for ‘innocent’ parties 
affected by others who by implication were ‘bad’. A constant stress is evident throughout 
the poster campaigns on the availability of ‘free and confidential treatment’. Dealing with 
the problem appeared to be more important than ‘punishing’ those involved with public 
pillorying or financial penalties, continuing pre-war thinking that treatment was the key 
way to deal with the problem. The most important message to get across was to ensure that 
people knew what facilities were available. Exactly what is at stake, and the damage 
caused, is generally not spelt out. Often the threats are rather vague and non-medical, 
playing on emotions of guilt and fear. We have seen an emphasis on ‘duty’, the duty of 
citizenship, to women, children, the country, the race, the future, rather than any religious 
or moral messages. Unlike in the past, blame was attributed in a gender-neutral fashion, 
although we see a protective attitude to women and children emerging, consistent with the 
idea of building up the nation. The designs used in the VD campaigns draw primarily on 
scientific discourse, but also moral discourse, to get their message across. Strong graphic 
design styles, non-realistic elements, and photography were all used in an effort to 
demonstrate that the issue is one that can be tackled in a modern and scientific way. 
Stereotypical ‘medical’ staff are featured, and there is constant reference to the need for 
swift medical treatment, with moral behavioural changes advocated as a secondary 
message. The message is a difficult one to represent; too much detail would have been 
resented, and, unlike in the ‘careless talk’ campaigns, there is little humour evident. The 
statements used within the posters, however, are direct: ‘you will’, rather than ‘you might’ 
is the message, whether traditionally moral, or modern scientific. 
The Reception of VD Posters  
Within the questionnaires circulated for this project in 1998, respondents were asked if 
there were any poster campaigns they particularly remembered. The interest in this case 
study was partly triggered by information received from a respondent:  
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The one that seems very funny to me now but not at the time was VD Kills. In 
those days such a thing was never mentioned such was the ignorance, but it must 
have been a very big problem as this was the largest poster of the lot. When you 
asked about it, a look of horror would come over the person’s face and you would 
get no explanation. Then one of the schoolboys got the full facts from a soldier at 
the nearby camp. “You went deaf, and blind and your nose fell off” and you caught 
this affliction by talking to girls. Needless to say after that you only spoke to boys. I 
remember averting my eyes every time I passed that poster.81  
My research did not identify any posters using the phrase ‘VD Kills’, although VD was 
certainly viewed as dangerous to society and the individual. The interwar educational 
efforts of local and central government were believed to have led to widespread knowledge 
about VD, but the rising incidence after the outbreak of war had led to calls for special 
measures to check the spread of the disease.82 
 
A small mention of VD campaigns, obviously based on a press release, can first be found 
in Advertiser’s Weekly on 5 November 1942, giving information on the publicity in 
preparation by the CCHE for the MOH. It was hoped that support would be given by the 
press, through editorials, with a ‘realistic attitude’ adopted.83 Press support for the 
campaign was vital, but in February 1943, Advertiser’s Weekly noted that the press were 
not allocating the subject space.84 The Daily Mirror devoted a whole page to attacking the 
‘humbug and hypocrisy with which the subject of venereal disease has been surrounded’. 
Under the headline ‘False modesty won’t stop this disease’, they detailed the changes that 
newspapers had made to original copy supplied by the MOH and attacked the ‘optimistic 
complacency which is based on the assumption that if only a thing can be kept hidden it 
will disappear’.85 In December 1942, Mass-Observation (M-O) questioned people about 
press advertisements. 50% still seemed ignorant about the subject, with only about 10% 
embarrassed, although some men worried about their womenfolk viewing the subject in the 
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papers. Few understood the different venereal diseases, although ‘the pox’ and ‘the clap’ 
were referred to and in one case the ‘venerable’ disease.86 
 
M-O was responding to a government request to investigate attitudes towards the anti-VD 
campaign. There was largely approval, both for the campaign and for Regulation 33B, 
although some felt that it did not go far enough and that regular checks should be made on 
people for the infection. There was some resistance to Regulation 33B, with fears that it 
would drive the disease even further underground, but little ‘on the ground that existing 
treatment facilities were adequate and used by all who needed them’. There was a ‘fear of 
blackmail’, and worries that ‘it interfered with the liberty of the individual’, as the CD Acts 
had proved in the 1860s. A great variety of opinion existed as to what people thought 
constituted the best way of reducing VD, with the need to combat ignorance and 
superstition through education key. In general there was a tendency for women to be more 
inhibited about the subject of VD than men and to be more afraid to bring it out in the 
open.87 In January 1943, M-O observed a MOH ‘Fighting Fit’ Exhibition at Charing Cross 
Station. The last panel of this exhibition was concerned with VD and the need to ‘find out 
the facts’. Some comments were overheard but none regarding the VD panels, although 
they observed a woman pick up leaflet, peer at it short-sightedly, look at the title ‘venereal 
disease’, throw it down in disgust and leave.88 
 
The Minister of Health commented that Home Intelligence (HI) reports were ‘of great help 
in the development of our general publicity on this delicate subject’, influencing the 
‘substance and emphasis’ of publicity.89 Fife Clark of the MOH commented that regular 
reports on the progress of the VD campaign were particularly useful as ‘public feeling on 
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this subject does not express itself through the ordinary channels of opinion’.90 The first 
comments on VD in HI reports appeared in October 1942, after Sir Wilson Jameson’s 
broadcast. Favourable comment was received, although the subject was still felt to be too 
‘hush hush’, with a need for more detail on symptoms.91 By December 1942 there was 
much of comment on VD, and on the recently introduced Regulation 33B, of which the 
details were little understood.92 By March 1943, comment was appearing on the content of 
advertisements, felt to be readable and human. It was believed that ‘frankness should not 
be sacrificed to prudery’, and more wanted the consequences to be stressed, rather than the 
moral tale.93 The rate of rise of the incidence of VD was lower in 1943 than in previous 
war years, and it was felt that the new measures of control and the educational campaign 
were being effective. The wide range of media used in the campaign, produced by the 
MOH in collaboration with local authorities, the MOI and the CCHE, appeared to be 
generally welcomed and approved by the public.94 
 
Between March and April 1943, the Wartime Social Survey (WSS) carried out a survey, 
mostly concentrated in urban areas, for the Campaigns Division of the MOI into how the 
first widespread MOH campaign regarding VD (in the press) was being received by the 
public. The VD campaign was regarded as different from previous campaigns, as it dealt 
with a subject that had until recently largely been regarded as taboo. Previously notices had 
been placed in public lavatories regarding where to obtain treatment, there had been a few 
films, and a few non-medical books and pamphlets, but the subject had otherwise largely 
been hidden from public view. The survey was intended to measure the extent of approval 
for the publicity, whether there should be a ‘plain and frank statement of the facts’, or 
whether secrecy was believed preferable, and also which advertising media were thought 
appropriate. The survey opened with general questions regarding MOH publicity, 
abandoned only if people became too embarrassed once the subject of VD was introduced, 
which happened in only 3% of cases. It was noted that people often became embarrassed 
but continued to answer the questions posed. It was realised that some might be reluctant to 
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admit that they had read the statement, fearing that as an admission of a personal reason for 
being interested. Further questions were therefore asked in order to suggest that these were 
matters in which the public had a right to be interested. 91% of interviewees approved of 
the use of newspapers and the wireless to remove the secrecy surrounding VD, with 52% 
deeming this the best way. Only 1% suggested that posters were an appropriate medium.95  
 
In early April 1943, doctors noted more patients attending clinics in expectation of a cure. 
HI noted less comment, although the moral approach was described as ‘useless’, with the 
medical angle, combined with confidentiality, expected to be successful.96 By the end of 
the month increased interest was noted as films and posters promoted discussion, and 
helped remove the shame associated with the topic.97 There were worries that increasing 
figures of infection indicated that the campaign was failing.98 Consternation increased for 
some, as it was felt it must be a problem for the MOH to give it such publicity.99 In May 
1943, there were reports in the north-west that ‘loose living’ posters were being torn down 
almost immediately after placement. These were described as ‘melodramatic’, and ‘cheap 
and nasty’.100 In July people complained that the adverts were ‘lifeless and monotonous’ 
and so were not read ‘by those who need them most’. Suggestions were made that clinics 
should be provided at ‘ordinary’ times and places, as otherwise other people, particularly 
those in small towns, would ‘know’ what treatment was being obtained for.101 There were 
worries that the campaign was being given ‘too much publicity’, which would be nullified 
by the jokes being told about it.102 By August 1943 comment had declined again. Approval 
was still being noted, although there were doubts that it was reaching ‘the right people’ and 
that it was worrying the ignorant unnecessarily.103 In November 1943, approval was noted 
for the posters and publicity displayed, with desire that they should be even stronger,104 
although some found them ‘rather embarrassing’.105 
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Early in 1944, the WSS was asked to investigate the second campaign, to find out how 
effective increased publicity had been. They were also asked to assess public attitudes to 
posters on display (still only on display on a small scale, but figures 253 to 255 and 262 
were available to interviewees on small hand-held cards), the suitability of other media, the 
state of knowledge about VD, and to make suggestions for improvement for dealing with 
the issue. Again, the issue of VD was ‘hidden’ within a general survey about MOH 
publicity, with questions about the ‘Coughs and Sneezes’ and Diphtheria Immunisation 
campaigns. Only 1% of individuals refused to answer questions.106 Many had seen posters, 
although the largest proportion (83%) of those interviewed regarded newspapers as their 
main sources of information, with radio, magazines (particularly for women) and films also 
influential.107 
 
Figure 253, the ‘Bride’ was noticed most in London and Northern England, and by more 
men than women. Out of 2,587 people interviewed, 67% made favourable comments about 
the poster, with comments falling into the following categories: those that thought it would 
make people ‘look before they leap’ into marriage; agreement that it was a crime (for men) 
to pass VD onto innocents; that it provided good information stressing confidentiality, and 
others that the ‘wording and picture catches the eye’. There was some negative comment 
about the poster. Some felt it was ‘too forceful, outspoken, frightening or crude’, others 
that it was not suitable for public display, or would not reach the intended audience, while 
some said that it was horrible, but served as a good warning. Other criticisms fell into the 
following categories: the poster implied that only men were to blame; the wording would 
be unclear from a distance; the meaning was unclear; or the poster lacked information. 500 
in the sample chose this as the most striking poster, with 25% choosing it because the 
physical attractiveness of the poster, 35% because they felt it was useful for those about to 
get married, giving good information. This poster, as with ‘Tomorrow’s Citizen’, had been 
purposely designed to appeal to people’s sense of responsibility for the young and innocent 
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but the poster was felt to appeal more directly to men, and the wording was felt to imply a 
reproach, and thus was not so constructively suggestive.108 
 
70% of the sample made favourable comments about figure 254, ‘Tomorrow’s Citizen’. 
Comments fell into the following categories: its appeal to everyone; emphasising the effect 
on children; its direct message; and the striking shadow. Some made criticisms of this 
poster, complaining that the image was not forceful or striking enough; the figure of the 
boy was insignificant; that the picture was confusing with an unclear message; or that the 
colour-scheme or general layout would not catch the eye. Others complained that the 
poster did ‘not tell you anything’; and that ‘the results of VD should be emphasised or 
shown in the picture’. 905, the largest proportion, in the sample chose this as the most 
striking poster, few because of its physical attractiveness, most because they felt it would 
make a special appeal to parents because of the child. Others felt that it depicted the 
tragedy and suffering of the child, and others felt it had a general appeal to responsibility 
and decency. This poster was felt to carry a definite message urging all adults to ensure 
that they ‘do not risk endangering the lives of health of young people, by themselves being 
carriers of such a dangerous disease’.109 
 
Figure 255, ‘Hello boy friend’ attracted 59% of favourable comments, falling into the 
following categories: a ‘good warning to young men, troops, etc’; realistic and to the point; 
explains the results; and good colour; and this poster was felt to ‘carry a special message to 
“those girls”.’ 20% made criticisms: some felt that the design was not striking enough, 
whilst others felt that it was too gruesome, blatant or crude. Some felt that it was horrible, 
but necessary, whilst others were disgusted at the thought of the poster being displayed at 
all. Some asked where was the ‘easy boy-friend’; others felt that it should give more 
detailed information; whilst others felt that it would not reach the ‘right section of the 
community’; and that the display should be limited to particular areas such as ports and 
camps. 850 in the sample chose this as the most striking poster, with 33% choosing it 
because the physical attractiveness of the poster, and 32% because they felt it got to the 
root of the problem. Others felt it gave good information; that it would make a particular 
impression on young people. Aimed at a fairly small sample, the poster was felt to gain by 
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its unusual presentation, and the clarity of its warning details about the possible results of 
VD.110 
 
The WSS was interested in the terms people used to describe VD, particularly whether 
medical or colloquial terms were best used in posters and accompanying literature. Those 
who had seen MOH publicity seemed better informed, and were more likely to recognise 
the correct terms than those who had not. The vast majority of those interviewed were 
aware that there was a need for medical advice, particularly through VD clinics. People did 
not wish to appear over-curious about the subject, and when asked what else they would 
like to know about VD, only 35% said they wished for more information. People were 
generally in favour of more information on VD, although some were worried about the 
effects on children, particularly if children ‘were not fully enough informed to understand 
the real significance of the problem’. The younger age groups were shown to be relatively 
ignorant about the venereal diseases, and there were calls for sex education to be taught in 
schools and factories. Explicit knowledge about VD was felt to be essential in regard to 
gaining swift treatment. The survey concluded that: 
[I]t is abundantly clear that far from being shocked at VD publicity, people are 
keen to learn everything they can about the diseases, provided the information is 
given in a form which they can easily understand. 
It was clear that people wanted knowledge, but although many professed to have no need 
of services, there was an emphasis on preserving privacy and anonymity of those who 
attended treatment centres.111 
 
Interviewees were questioned as to which media methods were most appropriate in 
disseminating knowledge about VD, and roughly 90% agreed that newspapers, magazines, 
posters, radio, films and lectures were all suitable mediums, with only 3% disagreeing with 
the use of posters. Concerns, proved correct by the questionnaire respondent on page 219, 
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were that children and young people would get a distorted view of sex, or that parents 
would have answer awkward questions. There was a feeling that information should 
change frequently, as familiarity would otherwise breed contempt. It was recognised that 
newspapers, magazines, radio and lectures could appeal only to certain sections of the 
community although radio and lectures were thought to be good if ‘expounded’ by the 
‘right people’, such as the medically qualified or the padre. Overall there was definite 
approval from 82% of the sample for the publicity on the subject, although just under half 
felt there was even more that could be done in the way of publicity.112 In March 1945, the 
public seemed generally in support of the campaign, with calls to increase this over the 
next twelve months.113 
 
Posters were a highly visible medium for VD campaigns, although newspapers were still 
the main source of information. The campaign that was noticed by more people than other 
health campaigns, possibly because of its more ‘shocking’ nature.114 People were 
interviewed about VD posters with a view to seeing how they would react if they were 
displayed more widely. Posters were deemed as successful for a variety of reasons: their 
appeal ‘to decency and sense of social responsibility’; their appeal to particular groups in 
the community; the ‘colour, design and pictorial qualities’; and the subject matter or 
information they contained. The results of the survey were felt to confirm psychological 
studies of advertising, which claimed that an interest in the subject in a poster was more 
important than any other elements, and that positive, rather than negative suggestions were 
more likely to produce desired results.115 WSS investigators checked for posters in railway 
stations and public lavatories in the areas they were working. Posters did not appear to be 
on display in many areas, although whether this is because there was an aversion to 
displaying them, or simply because they were looking in the wrong places, or some other 
reason, is not clear. Considering the placement of the posters, the investigators believed 
that they would be more effective if placed in a position where the lighting was good, and 
in prominent display areas. These included the centre of train platforms, rather than in 
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corridors where people were less likely to stop. Some posters were observed to be defaced, 
or even torn down, and it was suggested that such posters should be placed high up, and 
even possibly within a frame to prevent such damage. VD posters tended to be quite small, 
and were thus overshadowed by large posters that surrounded them, rendering them largely 
ineffective.116 Advertiser’s Weekly criticised the colours used in figures 259 to 262, red on 
a black background, as once the blackout ended, mercury vapour streetlighting would 
again be used, and the red would fade and become a muddy brown.117 
 
Unlike previous campaigns, as a more controversial campaign, the VD campaign used a 
smaller, more modern, range of stylistic influences, with the main criteria that the message 
would reach the appropriate audience. Photography, non-representational images, montge, 
and abstract shapes were all elements of the modern style used, whilst text-only 
proclamations were also used. Most of the images are very strong, with no wishy-washy, 
realistic, pen-and-ink drawings as was evident in less controversial campaigns, and 
cartoons were used exclusively for a wholly male audience, hardened by the rigours of 
war. Reactions to the poster campaigns are similar to government approaches to dealing 
with the problem, partly because the government responded to the information gained from 
surveys and HI. As was seen in attempts to deal with the problem of VD before the war, 
the sanction of both science and religion was transferred to the campaign, although the 
cards were stacked more in favour of the medical approach. Moral and medical approaches 
to the problem of VD were not seen as polar opposites, the transfer of authority of both 
science and religion was applied to the message, with discourses often intermixed in a 
medico-moral approach. VD was constituted, or name-called, as ‘bad’ and ‘evil’, and those 
who ran the risk of contracting it were failing in their duty, as a citizen, to remain healthy 
and disease free. It was implied that everyone else was doing their duty, and thus all should 
jump on the ‘band-wagon’ and remain clean. The testimonials of medical and religious 
experts were provided in support of the campaign, and ‘card-stacking’ of the facts was 
applied to provide the worst-case scenario if the diseases were contracted. This continued 
into the war, with medical, religious, government, legal, and educational institutions 
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influencing the campaigns. Having discussed these four case studies, the next chapter 
draws together the conclusions of the thesis.
  229
Conclusion  
Sixty years after the end of the Second World War, there is still a huge amount of historical 
interest in all aspects of the conflict. Much of it is populist material surrounded by myth, 
with much academic material debunking those myths. Within this literature and 
museumisation, propaganda continues to attract interest, and it is within this field that this 
project is offered. Despite a wide range of studies on propaganda, there has been no serious 
academic study on British home front posters from the Second World War. Most general 
poster studies jump the era as though unworthy of consideration. This study claims that 
they are worthy of consideration. Popularly, people have been interested in the project and 
have been able to contribute via the questionnaire and website. Academically, posters have 
proved worthy of deeper consideration, demonstrating that such posters were not produced 
in a cultural vacuum, but were drawing on longer term discourses. The questionnaire 
respondents held differing opinions as to the usefulness of wartime posters: a ‘necessity’ 
that helped people ‘pull together’;1 a force for ‘positive motivation’ for a boy and his 
parents;2 to just being ‘part of the scenery’.3 Within this project we have clearly 
demonstrated that the Second World War Home Front propaganda posters were an 
important part of the home front war effort. The posters visibly drew on longer term 
discourses, or as Huxley termed it in the 1930s, canalised ‘an existing stream’. This has 
been achieved using a range of archival sources, and a key theoretical underpinning. 
 
Within the project, we investigated Foucault’s concepts of discourse analysis, which 
promoted the idea of the visual as a form of language. As with all types of language, the 
visual draws on the norms and assumptions of an established culture, and this is clearly 
demonstrated as the posters draw on established traditions, both in style and content. The 
methodological chapter established that silences and differences are concealed by 
dominant discourse in a move to present the ‘truth’. Propaganda cannot afford to present 
competing views, although in a democracy at least the illusion of choice needed to be 
presented, hence the submergence of legal discourses. Within discourses of citizenship, it 
was expected that technologies of the self would come into play, with citizens working 
within self-set restrictions. Texts and images have constructed (historically) specific views 
of the social world, presented as real and truthful. These revealed assumptions held by the 
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designers, both government and artists, about (and by) their audience. The thesis 
demonstrates that poster images were not objective images produced in a vacuum, but 
produced from certain contexts, or longer term discourses that were drawn on to provide a 
cohesive picture of national effort. The chapter also discussed content analysis, which is 
used in the database. This was one of the first databases to be used for visual material, 
rather than data such as censuses.4 Visual databases are now gaining credence within the 
historical field, but at the start of this project were not in existence. The database was of 
key importance to the thesis, as such collated data did not exist elsewhere, although 
throughout the course of the project digital archives have increased the possibility of 
accessing such information.5 
 
Foucault’s concepts of discourse provided the framework for the thesis. Discourse analysis 
focuses on how knowledge is constructed subjectively; how it is produced and structured, 
largely through institutions; and considers the implicit assumptions underlying knowledge. 
Identifying different discourses, we can see which is the more dominant, and where 
discourses compete with and compliment each other. As a history project (rather than an 
art project) where the context is key, discourse analysis allowed us to investigate both the 
images and their context. As the site of production is as important, if not more so, than the 
images themselves, it has been important to tie the discourses to the producing institutions. 
As Rose outlined, the main weakness of Foucauldian discourse analysis is that it can be 
difficult to know where to stop setting the context, and at times the image becomes ignored 
as the context is focused on. Within the case studies, a concerted effort was made to link 
the contextual planning information to the posters being discussed in the design and 
reception sections, identifying the aspects of the key discourses.6 
 
These weaknesses meant that the method of discourse analysis was not used alone. A 
combination of the database and discourse analysis allowed key themes to be identified 
across a wide range of posters, produced over a long time-frame, although definitive 
conclusions cannot be drawn without access to all of the thousands of posters produced 
throughout the war. The method allowed not only the identification of strands and clusters 
of overlapping information, but also missing themes and silences. For instance, urban and 
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 Dunning, A., Personal Comment, AHDS Digitisation Workshop, April, 2001. 
5
 Throughout this thesis, information technology has contributed in many different ways, allowing access to a 
wide range of online information, directing attention to sources via online catalogues, and highlighting new 
texts available. 
6
 Rose, G., Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to the Interpretation of Visual Materials, 2001, p.161. 
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industrial areas were represented as clean, with dirt and smoke absent, even within bomb 
damaged areas; poverty was absent from rural areas; the enemy was usually represented by 
Hitler, rather than the Hun evident in the First World War; and VD in posters was always 
presented as a matter of health, rather than as a matter of sex. Content analysis does reduce 
the rich visual material to a set of codes which cannot distinguish between good and bad 
examples of a particular code, and so the overall impression of the image is lost. Within the 
case studies, however, having extracted the pertinent images from the database, discourse 
analysis is applied and a more complete picture of the images appears. A prominent 
methodological approach to images is semiotic analysis, but with such a strong focus on 
the composition of the image itself,7 as a method it scarcely accounts for the historical or 
social context. The combination of discourse and content analyses has allowed the 
coverage of a wide range of images, fixing them within their historical context. 
 
Before the case studies, two chapters set the context and general understanding of the 
posters, through a study of propaganda theories, historical poster styles, and the Ministry of 
Information’s (MOI) production processes. In Chapter 2, contemporary models of 
propaganda were considered. Having reflected on these, the project’s model of how posters 
worked within the British Second World War democratic propaganda effort is illustrated in 
Appendix 5. Here we see how the government had to react to events, and the interaction it 
had with various outside organisations. In the production of posters the government 
worked within restrictions, including the availability of talent, paper, ink and printing 
presses. The government made decisions whether to produce posters, and/or use other 
propaganda, and whether to use legislation as well or instead. If posters were produced, 
they were not working alone. As with the multi-step model, we see some of the influences 
on the viewer. The viewer would then make a decision as to whether to take the required 
action or not. If not, the government would then have to make decisions as to what further 
measures to take, potentially legislation, such as internment to lessen the danger of spying 
by foreign nationals to their home nation. 
 
Chapter 2 also studied the various art movements that impacted on the wartime graphic 
designers. As evident from the artist biographies in Volume 2, Part 2, British poster 
designers used such a wide variety of styles that it can be difficult to identify a distinctive 
British poster style. Some artists were members of the Royal Academy, some were trained 
                                                 
7
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graphic designers, some were a combination, and some were neither. What does emerge in 
this chapter is that the dominant British style was one of pragmatic functionalism. 
Tradition was still the dominant style, but modernism, was also clearly evident, influenced 
by, but never going to the extremes of, European modernism. The two most obvious 
extremes of this are the very traditional work of Frank Newbould, and the very modern 
work of Abram Games, both of whom worked for the War Office in the Second World 
War. Increasing professionalism in the advertising industry meant that not only was there 
standardisation in poster sizing and display, but standardisation in technique was more 
common, with cleaner, less crowded designs, with a clear purpose. British graphic design, 
alongside international graphic design, was discussed on a regular basis in the interwar 
years in Advertiser’s Week and Art and Industry, and Chapter 2 highlights the European art 
movements that influenced British graphic design. With an emphasis on content over style, 
such knowledge had even filtered into the general populace who designed their own 
posters for specific purposes within the war.  
 
The conventional wisdom was that posters were exhortations until Bracken was in charge 
of the MOI. Questionnaire respondents provided a fairly consensual opinion: ‘the posters 
were necessary common sense directives’,8 and ‘they were a necessary national effort; 
nothing whatever to do with the life of a schoolboy’.9 Throughout the thesis we see an 
emphasis on the variety of poster styles used to get the message across: the extremes of 
modernism and tradition in the urban and rural campaigns; the influence of the Soviet style 
in the industrial posters; the use of both humour and horror in the careless talk campaigns 
to ensure lack of boredom and achieve the widest audience; and the use of photography in 
the VD campaigns. When posters were objected to, it appears to be on grounds of the 
message, rather than the style.10 Unlike German and Soviet posters, where styles were 
                                                 
8
 Male, UK/Serving overseas, reply to questionnaire, April 1998. 
9
 Male, H., reply to questionnaire, June 1998, (emphasis in original). 
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imposed from above, the British were happy to follow a laissez-faire approach: so long as 
the message was getting across, any style was acceptable. In a democracy, fighting a 
‘people’s war’, those in positions of power had to have confidence that artists already 
knew the right thing to do, and trust their judgement as to the style used, rather than 
imposing a recognisable style. 
 
Having recognised the importance of the MOI in the First World War, following the 
interwar professionalisation of the publicity industry, the MOI reformed immediately on 
the commencement of the Second World War. As it was not key to the project, the 
structure of the MOI has not been researched in depth, but it is clear that chaos was caused 
as departments constantly changed.11 Chapter 3 concentrated specifically on the poster 
producing division which, although also affected by changes within the general MOI 
structure, was one of the more consistent divisions. There were procedures in place, 
although the MOI had to both work with, and fight against, other departments that had 
developed in the interwar years, and specifically with the Treasury. Pragmatically, the 
MOI at times had to play speed against quality in preparation, and against a lack of freely 
available artists, at least until some were recalled in June 1942. To understand how posters 
worked, and to set the scene for the case studies, we examined the production of the first 
posters produced in the war. Throughout the war there was evidence of stronger co-
ordination, more professionalism, faster production, and more cohesion, although there 
remained a lack of imposition of style from above. Public opinion was important, and 
complying with government legislation regarding posters was regarded as necessary in 
order not to affect the effectiveness of the message.  
 
Initial plans were to abandon the MOI the day after Armistice with Germany, but the MOI 
argued that they had a role to play, at least throughout the war against Japan.12 The MOI 
provided a central organ of government publicity, not only technical but creative. As the 
Director General put in the latter part of the war, ‘I believe also that no Government after 
the war will either be able or expected to abandon the use of publicity in its approach to its 
own citizens’, although whether this would be through a central agency was a different 
matter.13 Bracken was convinced that the MOI should be dissolved as soon as the war 
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 See McLaine, I., Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War 
Two, 1979 and Balfour, M., Propaganda in War 1939-45, Organisations, Policies and Publics in Britain and 
Germany, 1979 for this administrative history. 
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 PRO INF 1/941, ‘The Ministry of Information’, November 1943. 
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 PRO INF 1/941, ‘Memo from Director General to The Minister’, undated, but October 1943-May 1944. 
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ended;14 it had, after all, been set up as a wartime organisation. A lot of press comment was 
also unfavourable, but The Newspaper World put forward the ‘advantages of preserving 
certain features’ of the MOI, particularly the ‘projection of Britain’ overseas, and the 
centralisation of specialised publicity services.15 Others also felt that there were lessons to 
be learnt from the First World War, when the MOI had disbanded so quickly: ‘What we 
learned in the last war, and which our enemies made the most of, we have pooh-poohed 
and bungled.’16 They felt that it still had much to do, including the re-education of 
Germany, the presentation of the UK’s case abroad, and that the study of propaganda 
techniques, and their advancement through the study of other methods, was necessary in 
order to keep democracy alive.17 In April 1946, the MOI was absorbed into the Central 
Office of Information (COI): 
envisaged as a common service technical agency, charged with handling 
contractual questions, booking advertising space, and co-ordinating departmental 
campaigns. Responsibility for the initiation of publicity schemes, the formulation of 
policy, and the preparation of materials was assigned to each individual ministry.18  
The COI remains the central government information agency to this day. 
 
In the mini case study at the end of Chapter 3, we examined the first posters produced by 
the MOI. In discussions over the first poster, it was expected that the poster would draw 
heavily on the past, in cases where the British had defended themselves, for instance by 
depicting medieval bowmen. In the event, the first series of posters was in the style of a 
proclamation, a ‘dignified’, traditional typographic design that was expected to work with 
a democratic monarchy.19 These initial posters called people to patriotically do their part in 
the war, in the name of the monarchy, similar to the First World War. In the First World 
War people had been asked (or ordered) to do something by their superiors, whereas in the 
Second World War people were more clearly subject to self-regulation, both by themselves 
and by their peers, and it became clear that the message needed to change. Those in the 
factories were contributing as much as those in the front line and solidarity was stressed, 
and the ‘enemy within’ needed to be dealt with by pulling together towards the common 
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target. The four main case studies - urban and rural representations of Britain, industrial 
propaganda, the ‘enemy within’ and VD posters - were examined via the key contradictory 
and complimentary discourses that became evident in the process of writing. The body and 
the land are always crucial in war: the land that is being fought for, or defended, and the 
need for healthy bodies to fight, as other bodies are decimated in the process of war. The 
first case study examined what people were fighting for, and identified their ‘imagined 
community’ (in the words of Benedict Anderson). The second case study emphasised the 
idea of the island nation, and identified those involved in the industrial effort. The third 
case study examined who was excluded from, or was considered damaging to, the war 
effort, with the fourth case study exploring in detail who was compromising the effort 
through their sexual and moral behaviour. This was a people’s war, and throughout the 
thesis, we see how contributions were expected from all citizens. 
 
Posters are intended for a mass audience and as such were perfectly suited for a people’s 
war, with a significant style change from the First World War. The Second World War was 
expected largely to be a ‘war of nerves’, with a lot more strain on, and much wider 
participation by, the civilian population. Poster propaganda was expected to appeal to 
comradeship and have a popular appeal. The posters, still remembered many years after the 
war, were consistent with this construction of the myth of pulling together, which has been 
questioned by some.20 Throughout the thesis the notion of ‘the people’s war’, both a 
contemporary concept, and popularised since the war through Calder’s 1969 book,21 is a 
consistent theme. The sources used are consistent with the idea of the people’s war. BIPO 
looked for the (statistic) collective effort, Mass-Observation investigated the masses but 
concentrated on individuals within that, and the questionnaire looked for individual 
remembered responses to the posters. 
 
The idea of responsible citizenship is bound up with the concepts of mass democracy. 
Citizens had both rights and responsibilities, and propaganda in a democracy had to work 
in a different way to how it worked within a totalitarian state. Presented as information, 
advertising looked for conformity with its message, but did not enforce it. There was room 
for individual effort within the greater picture, as all were still aiming for the same overall 
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goal. Particularly within the industrial effort, each personal endeavour contributed to the 
whole. Similarly, lack of individual effort: for example those who risked venereal disease 
(VD), could damage the health of the nation, both literally and metaphorically. Citizenship, 
as the most highly visible discourse in the Second World War, looked for people to 
contribute to the war effort; if they did not contribute then they were stigmatised as ‘not 
belonging’, they were not ‘normal’. Throughout the case studies we see a series of duties 
for the ‘good’ citizen to commit to: the first poster was a statement of duty for the 
individual citizen, from the King; the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA) posters 
appealed to the citizen soldier, looking for sacrifice; strikers within industry were viewed 
as committing treason; and patriotic citizens needed to ensure that their conversations were 
of no use to the enemy, and needed to be fit and healthy in order to fight. Along with these 
duties were certain rights, such as the right to civil liberties: and ID cards were not 
introduced until the Second World War. The right to strike still existed, and with a loss of 
pre-war deference, and without fear of imprisonment, these increased. We have noted that 
there were few legal constraints on wartime citizens, partly through pragmatism, with more 
emphasis placed on duties rather than restrictions. Voluntarism was key as factories lost 
their profit motive (although they had little choice in this, needing to take government 
contracts), poster display sites were offered free, local campaigns supported the national 
effort, and artists accepted lower pay whilst working for the MOI because they wanted to 
‘do their bit’. The posters were important disseminating these messages. 
 
Deciding their strategy for how they were going to deal with particular campaigns, the 
government looked to that past to see how things had been dealt with in preceding years. 
The MOI was built upon the ideas used in the First World War, and in dealing with spies, 
the First World War and the Spanish Civil War were heavily examined, although it appears 
that spy novels also had a part to play. Posters drew on historical discourses to present their 
message, not only by drawing on traditions of ‘high art’, but in the messages themselves. 
Newbould drew on the landscape tradition stylewise, drawing upon previous artists such as 
Constable, but also subject-wise, depicting the heritage vision of ‘England’s green and 
pleasant land’, in a similar way to how suburban houses drew on mock Tudor ideals. The 
rural was clearly associated with the past, and particularly with the Conservatives, and 
Baldwinism. The countryside was associated with something stable and long-lasting, with 
life itself as food could be grown, and particularly with the South, with the ‘English 
village’ giving a sense of community For the urban dweller, the countryside was associated 
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with holiday labour, essentially manual work. The countryside depicted in posters certainly 
appears to be unaffected by modern machinery, although preservationist movements 
popularly associated with tradition were often actually calling for modern methods of land 
management. Less obviously, churches were central features in images of traditional rural 
villages, and large churches such as Salisbury Cathedral and – in an urban setting - St 
Paul’s Cathedral are seen standing, the first amongst lush greenery, the other within the 
wreckage of a bombed London. Religious and moral discourses are clearly associated with 
the past and tradition. The war was presented as a case of ‘right over might’: Britain was 
something that should be saved. One’s own country was something that one should not 
‘betray’. Victorian moral values are clearly expressed throughout the case studies, 
including the protestant work ethic in industry, the secrecy surrounding the subject of VD, 
and the notion of immoral and antisocial behaviour. The traditional power and authority of 
the church was transferred to propaganda messages, with religious discourses most clearly 
evident in the VD campaign, where VD, and the thoughtlessness of those who dared run 
the risk of transferring it, were evil. 
 
Modernity was presented as a scientific, largely secular belief, and Pick described modern 
art as ‘morally lax’ when there was no purpose to it.22 It was associated with the cult of the 
new, of change, of the importance of the future, rather than the traditions of the past. 
Modern methods of doing things included increased professionalism, and the idea that 
things could be planned for. Planning for the MOI started in 1935, and every poster 
campaign was planned over time, although propaganda was deemed difficult to plan too 
early as it would be out of date before posted. Although the past was generally associated 
with the rural effort, and the urban with the future, the industrial revolution was also 
presented as part of England’s ‘glorious past’, helping to shape the nation. The miner was 
symbolically central to this effort, who could still, however, be perceived to be making his 
effort from the land, although his product was largely being used to fuel industrial living. 
Prostitution and spies were both more closely associated with urban areas than rural areas. 
Both were activities to be carried out in the shadows, and would have been easier to spot in 
rural areas. VD was presented as something that should be associated with the Victorian 
industrial past, not with a bright, clean, new scientific future. Those who risked VD risked 
the future of their families, constructed as the future of the nation as a whole. 
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The UK had traditionally been presented as an island nation, with a proud naval tradition. 
In the Second World War the technologically advanced airborne enemy was to be more 
feared, and industrially prepared for. The industrial effort was particularly associated with 
the North, the dirty ‘world’s workshop’, although many of the factories involved in the war 
effort were consumer factories based in the South. Much of the modern war effort 
depended on industrial production, and on efficient and professional production, with 
complicated technological equipment to produce. Modern American interwar studies 
conducted into time, motion and efficiency were obviously influential, divorcing workers 
from the final product, and presenting new hazards to be protected from. Other modern 
ideas, particularly the notion of scientific medicine, were key: the idea of treatment (of 
VD) rather than simply prevention, which was more of a moral argument. Science and 
technology were key to the war effort, with key military developments.23 Not only was the 
success of the posters judged through ‘scientific’ surveys, particularly through Mass-
Observation, but quantified measurement of results was expected. Improvements in 
photography and communication were down to new technology, and the photographic style 
gave a realism to messages that the government wanted to get across. Modern propaganda 
relied on modern methods of communication, which, along with other technology, 
including the means of travel, had advanced a great deal during the interwar years. The 
benefits of this were a wide range of communication methods available to government, 
improvements in graphic design after artists had travelled, professionalisation of the 
advertising industry and development of the experience of political propaganda, both 
internally and through external campaigns such as the interwar Empire campaigns. The 
corollory is that spies, and black propaganda, were also more dangerous as the ‘enemy 
within’ also had access to these modern communication methods.  
 
Yet the discourses within the thesis are evidently also contradictory. In some eyes urban 
living was associated with dirt, death and disease, and many saw urban living as a 
temporary measure before they could return to the ‘real’ Englishman’s home, the rural. 
Some attempted to recreate rus in urbe, for example in the ‘Dig for Victory’ campaigns. 
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Modern graphic techniques, such as those used by Games, were used to convey the 
message of a modern future. Dirty heavy industry factories were being replaced in the 
interwar years by cleaner, more modern factories, and Games’ vision of the old, urban, 
decaying past to be covered by the progress of the planned urban future developed from 
this. The future was something to be planned for, urban development was to be properly 
planned to give everyone a clean, hopeful, fit-for-purpose, future: the ‘New Jerusalem’. 
Communism, socialism and the Soviets were associated with highly-planned urban 
economies, Churchill was against planning the post-war world, but by the Second World 
War, the UK was already a highly planned nation, for example with regular inter-war 
health promotion campaigns. It is noticeable that if propaganda campaigns were not 
backed up by well-planned practical arrangements, including recruitment campaigns to 
industry, those who had responded to the campaigns were annoyed and carried negative 
associations with the message. In 1945, the Labour Government was elected on a clear 
manifesto for a planned future, and ‘as usual, the voters showed more signs of reacting 
against an unpleasant experience in the past than of deliberately embracing a doctrinaire 
programme for the future.’24 
 
Throughout the case studies two key power relations are evident: gender, both masculinity 
and femininity; and identification of ‘the other’. Within the rural landscape, and even 
within the industrial setting, women’s work is presented with the potential for glamour: 
women still retain the aura of femininity. On the land, women are set within picturesque 
surroundings, encircled by cute animals. In the factories women partake of the lighter 
work, and many of the posters are more focused on their appearance and dress code than 
the scope of their work. On both the land and within the factory, the men do the heavy 
work, although on the land this is largely focused on manual labour, whilst in the factory 
the men are perceived to deal with the heaviest and most complicated machinery. Within 
the second pair of case studies, covering the ‘enemy within’ and the anti-VD campaigns, 
both men and women can be seen in a negative and a positive light. The woman is 
negatively the gossip, the seducer, full of glamour, although also positively presented as 
the great mother or the innocent victim of VD. The man is negatively presented as the 
show-off, the thoughtless carrier of infection, the foolish man, but also positively as the 
man stolidly (or stoically) keeping his mouth shut, fighting for his country, or wisely 
keeping clear of infection in order to protect his family. 
                                                 
24
 Pelling, H., Modern Britain 1885-1955, 1960, pp.154-155. 
  240
 
Throughout the case studies we have seen that the posters sought to identify the good 
citizen, and thus by default also identified the ‘non-citizen’, ‘the other’ who did not fulfil 
the criteria of good citizenship. Within an industrial setting the worker who cannot produce 
the required amount of work, to the required standard, or prevents others from doing the 
same, is identified as ‘useless’ and outside of normal citizenship. The spy, both internally 
and externally, is clearly identified, through his or her physical features and behaviour, as 
‘the other’, as is the person at danger of passing on VD, particularly the prostitute. 
Throughout the thesis, the idea of the ‘professional’ is clearly evident, with the ‘non-
professional’ as ‘the other’. There were a lot of complaints in the press that the MOI 
employed more civil servants than it did advertising professionals, although the general 
public believed that advertising was something that anyone could do. Those in industry 
needed to be properly trained for the job: the idea of a professional intelligence service had 
developed in the interwar years, and medical treatment to cure VD was to be given only by 
trained doctors, rather than ‘quack’ doctors. The idea of training and education was an 
important development in wartime, and the posters themselves were a form of informal 
education. The ABCA movement was all about education, and Abram Games’ ‘Your 
Britain’ poster for ABCA (figure 19) demonstrated a form of official sanction for social 
reform, which culminated in the Education Act of 1944. It was not only the modernists 
who held a vision of the benefits of education, however, as evidenced by inter-war 
campaigns, some of which continued into the Second World War, educating users to 
respect the countryside, and educating citizens to prevent and treat VD.  
 
The British have a reputation for possessing a distinct laissez-faire attitude, and throughout 
this thesis we have seen demonstrations of this from the government which support this 
argument. The government belief, or that of Churchill at least, was that the future be 
allowed to take care of itself whilst the war was fought. The government refused to force 
separate publicity departments into the MOI, and there was no imposition of a poster style 
on artists, unlike in Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union, a highly planned economy, where 
the Soviet Realism style was imposed. There was, however, clear evidence of state 
intervention, and the very fact that the MOI existed demonstrated a government concern 
with the efforts of their citizens. The MOI gradually became more centralised, becoming 
the COI at the end of the war, allowing proper balance to be given to campaigns. The state 
kept a close watch on rumours, issued counter-rumours, and indeed prosecuted people for 
  241
rumour-mongering and defeatism, and legislation was also considered in the VD 
campaign. Planning, clearly not laissez-faire, was also evident in looking towards the 
future, improving conditions for citizens, with health and education all round, but there 
was also to be protection of the national heritage. Throughout the case studies the 
discourse of protection constantly appeared. In the first case study the heritage of the UK 
was to be protected, while in the industrial case study the workers needed to protect 
themselves, and thus the overall war effort, by avoiding accidents. In the ‘enemy within’ 
citizens needed to protect themselves from danger, and in the VD case study, citizens 
needed to protect themselves from disease. 
 
In drawing together the conclusions of this thesis, we have had to be aware of making 
sweeping statements. The posters of the Second World War evidently drew heavily on 
longer term discourses emanating from new and established institutions, although there 
was often a clear distinction between those that drew on the past and tradition, and those 
that pushed forward to the future. Such is the significance of the discourses identifiable in 
wartime posters, that the posters continue to resonate with a modern day audience. Vintage 
wartime posters sell well,25 and the IWM has a wide-range of reproduction items that 
appear popular.26 Some of these items, including postcards and keyrings, are aimed at the 
‘pocket-money’ market, and wartime posters are a popular subject for study in primary 
schools. The IWM produces poster packs aimed at Key Stage 2,27 and both today,28 and in 
wartime,29 posters are something that children enjoy designing themselves. The posters 
themselves are sometimes re-used in another context, for example, as on the front cover of 
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also sent me examples of posters that she had designed at school (aged 13-14) during wartime. 
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books to attract a new audience.30 In 1999, a wartime Coughs and Sneezes Spread Diseases 
poster was used on the front-cover of a flu jab leaflet aimed at pensioners who were likely 
to remember that original.31 The Constable-influenced ‘Your Britain’ designs by 
Newbould (figures 14 to 17) have been re-used in protectionist arguments,32 and the 
images have been subverted by artists such as Micah Wright. Wright’s images at first 
glance appear to be the original designs, but on a closer look, the message has been 
subverted to present an anti-War or an anti-Bush message (see figure 280, subverted from 
figure 110).33 It is clear that a great deal of nostalgia still surrounds Second World War 
posters, yet this thesis, anchors these posters firmly back into their historical context. 
                                                 
30
 See, for instance, Black, J., A History of the British Isles, 1997, which uses a detail from figure 17 and 
Clark, T., Art and Propaganda, 1997, which uses a detail from figure 151. 
31
 Information summarised from Lewis, R., ‘Nostalgia and the Visual Image’, paper presented at Ruskin 
College, May 2000. See Lewis, R., ‘Nostalgia and the Visual Image’, 
http://www.ww2poster.co.uk/poster/confevents/publichist.htm, accessed January 14 2004, for the full text of 
this paper. 
32
 Baker, C., ‘Tide of anger rises at cliffs’, 
http://www.thisiseastbourne.co.uk/eastbourne/archive/2000/07/18/NEWS80ZM.html, written July 18 2000, 
accessed January 14 2004. The article discusses building of a sea wall to protect the ‘iconic landscape’ of the 
Seven Sisters and the Birling Gap on the South Downs, idealised by the Arts and Crafts movements of the 
nineteen-thirties, and depicted in figure 17. 
33
 Wright, M., ‘The Propaganda Remix Project’, http://homepage.mac.com/leperous/PhotoAlbum1.html, 
accessed January 14 2004. Due to the success of this website, the following books have been published: 
Wright, M., Back the Attack: Remixed Propaganda Posters, 2003; Wright, M., If You’re not a Terrorist, 
Then Stop Asking Questions!, 2004. 
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